Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Je Tichého logika logikou? : O vztahu logické analýzy a dedukce

100%

Raclavský J.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2012

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tom 60

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nr 2

245-254

EN

It is sometimes objected that Tichý’s logic is not logic because it underestimates deduction – providing only a logical analysis of expressions. I argue that this opinion is wrong. First of all, detection of valid arguments (which are formulated in a language) requires logical analysis determining which semantical entities – Tichý’s constructions – are involved. Entailment is defined as an extralinguistic affair relating those constructions. The validity of arguments (composed of propositional constructions) stems from properties of the constructions. Such properties are displayed by the derivation rules of Tichý’s system of deduction.

CS

Tichého logika bývá někdy znevažována proto, že prý podceňuje dedukci – že se věnuje pouze logické analýze. Ukazuji, že tento názor je mylný. Logická analýza, tj. určení toho, které tzv. konstrukce výrazy vyjadřují, je k určení platnosti úsudků formulovaných v přirozeném jazyce nezbytná. Vyplývání je definováno jako určitý vztah mezi konstrukcemi, tedy jako mimojazyková záležitost. Platnost úsudků (složených z konstrukcí) se odvíjí od vlastností příslušných konstrukcí. Tyto vlastnosti vyobrazují derivační pravidla Tichého systému dedukce.

2

On the interaction of semantics and deduction in Transparent Intensional Logic (Is Tichý's logic a logic?)

100%

Raclavský J.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

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2014

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tom 23

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nr 1

57–68

EN

It is sometimes objected that Tichý’s logic is not a logic because it underestimates deduction, providing only logical analyses of expressions. I argue that this opinion is wrong. First of all, to detect valid arguments, which are formulated in a language, there needs to be logical analysis to ascertain which semantical entities (Tichý’s so-called constructions) are involved. Entailment is defined as an extralinguistic affair relating those constructions. The validity of an argument, composed of propositional constructions, stems from the properties of the constructions. Such properties are displayed by the derivation rules of Tichý’s system of deduction.

3

Logical Analysis against Superstitions: Józef M. Bocheński on the Social Role of Philosophy

88%

Brożek A.

Edukacja Filozoficzna

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2020

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nr 70

39-57

EN

According to Józef M. Bocheński, philosophers should analyze and not moralize. Bocheński also wrote that the philosophers’ aim is to battle with superstitions. The present paper concerns the question of how philosophical analysis may serve this aim. In the first part of the paper, the kinds and tools of philosophical analysis are presented. In particular, the objects of philosophical analysis (concepts and statements) as well as logical “instruments” of analysis are discussed. In the second part, the concept of superstition (or prejudice) is analyzed. Taking Bocheński’s definition as the point of departure, some essential distinctions involved in this concept are explained, for instance the distinction between truthfulness of a statement and somebody’s acceptance of a statement, and the distinction between a false statement and an obviously false statement. Next, the mechanism of fighting against superstitions by means of analysis is shown using examples taken from Bocheński’s book Sto zabobonów [One Hundred Superstitions] (1987). Superstitions connected with authority, patriotism, and tolerance are analyzed.

4

Od analizy do morfologii. Przyczynek do rozważań nad filozoficzną metodą Ludwiga Wittgensteina

75%

Piekarski M.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2013

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tom 1

235-244

EN

The article discusses the problem of the unity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The author suggests that Wittgenstein uses different methods of inquiring. The modifications of his philosophy are correlated with modifications of his method of thinking and investigations. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus the only correct philosophical method is that of logical analysis of sentences. In early 30s his philosophy becomes a phenomenological description of experience. The task is to construct phenomenological language. After 1933 Wittgenstein recognizes the grammatical dimension of language, and creates tools of grammatical analysis. He introduces concepts of language-games and forms of life. His philosophy becomes the morphology and description of human linguistic practice.

PL

W artykule dyskutowany jest problem jedności filozofii Wittgensteina. Wykazuje się, że Wittgenstein stosuje dwie metody badań. Modyfikacje jego filozofii są skorelowane z modyfikacjami jego metody myślenia i dociekania. W Tractatus logicophilosophicus jedyną poprawną metodą jest logiczna metoda analizy zdań. We wczesnych latach trzydziestych przekształca on swoją filozofię w fenomenologiczny opis doświadczenia, a za jej cel uznaje konstrukcję języka fenomenologicznego. Po 1933 roku Wittgenstein rozpoznał gramatyczny wymiar języka, i utworzył narzędzia analizy gramatycznej. Wprowadził pojęcia gier językowych i form życia. Jego filozofia stała się morfologią i opisem ludzkiej praktyki językowej.

5

Wnioskowanie logiczne jako uzasadnienie w akcie wiary

63%

Krzos B.

Roczniki Teologii Dogmatycznej

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2011

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tom 3

163-185

EN

Reasoning is one of the most important activities of intellect. Reasoning itself can be also a justification of human beliefs. It is connected one to another with process of acteptation of propositions as true ones. Thus it plays a role both in sciences and common thinking as well. That is why a justification is also needed as a support in domain of faith and of religious knowledge. The logical analysis of single act of faith is the content of this paper which main purpose is to point at the premisses which reasonelbe human intellect can accept revealed propositions as true ones with. To attain our delibarate purposes we present in turn two propositions from Holy Gospel according to Mark 2, 5. 10. Next, we are to reconstruct the logical arguments which brings to us demanded propositions as their conclusions, appearing as results of process based on implication. Next we are to examine the truth value of obtained premisses to show the rights which allow us to accept the revealed propositions which we are thinking about. In the same time we touch another topic. It is all about free human will and its decision which helps us to justify the propositions coming from Divine Revelation. In first part of this paper we find out something about reasoning in act of faith and we look closer on three concepts of reasonable faith. In second part we are going to lead an argument founded on two phrases from st. Mark's Gospel. By examining the argument step by step we will precise a way which revealed proposition is accepted on. In third part we figure out a few general conclusions about human free will which decision takes finally place in act of faith. An act of free will doesn't belong to human's intellectual activity so that it can be brought about by some influence from „outside”. During logical analysis of reasoning present in act of faith, we came up against moment for act of will. The act of will can be caused by the testimony of community of faith which The Revelation is bequeathed in. However obviously is that non every act of faith can be adequately translated into logical language but reconstruction and analysis put into practice wherever it could be applied, help us to understand complexity of act of faith and plurality of factors which it is built of. Even that reasonning is to be only one of them we need it as reasonable beeings and even more, we must angage our reason in our faith as far and deeply as it is possible.

6

Umiarkowanie i jego modele

51%

Trzcieniecka-Schneider I.

Logos i Ethos

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2017

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tom 45

EN

Temperance is one of the four cardinal virtues which were first formulated by Plato. Today the notion of temperance has a central position in many ethical systems, especially in ecophilosophy (environmental philosophy). Temperance, involwing balance and moderation, may give resolution to many contemporary human problems. The attempt of analysis of this concept with simple formal means can make clear some hidden assumptions and the structure of the concept of temperance. The analised concept includes both – a decision (a choice) and an action/behaviour as an effect of the decision. First model is based on Aristotle’s theory of golden mean presented in his Nicomachean Ethics. The attempt of reconstruction Aristotle’s idea using mathematical notion of weighted mean shows that the concept of temperance is strongly restricted to the cultural background. Therefore in extremal cases the universal concept of temperance may not exist.Second model given by Epicurus is based on the notion of consequence. It concerns pleasure and pain only, but temperance is just recommended in using pleasures. The set of temperant decisions is built recurently. A – the set of pleasure – is modified step by step by consequence CR(A) where R – set of rules – includes modus ponens, law of identity and some simple laws of everyday provenience. U is the set of temperant choices in Epicurean sense iff ∀p ∈ P, ~(p ∈ CR (U)) where P – set of pain.

PL

Umiarkowanie jest jedną z czterech cnót kardynalnych, pierwotnie podanych przez Platona. Obecnie pojęcie umiarkowania zajmuje kluczową pozycję w wielu systemach etycznych, w tym w ekofilozofii. Umiarkowanie zakłada zachowanie właściwej równowagi, potrzebnej przy dokonywaniu wyborów życiowych. Próba analizy tego pojęcia przy pomocy prostych środków formalnych pozwala ujawnić ukryte założenia, a także jego strukturę. W pojęciu umiarkowania mieści się zarówno decyzja (wybór), jak i działanie bądź zachowanie jako efekt podjętej decyzji. Pierwszy model oparty jest na koncepcji Arystotelesa i jego „złotego środka” zawartej w Etyce nikomachejskiej. Próba rekonstrukcji koncepcji Arystotelesa pokazuje, że pojęcie umiarkowania w tym ujęciu jest silnie zrelatywizowane do kręgu kulturowego i, co wydaje się zaskakujące, w skrajnych przypadkach jego określenie może okazać się niemożliwe.Drugi model, podany przez Epikura, jest oparty na pojęciu konsekwencji logicznej. Wprawdzie dotyczy jedynie przyjemności i przykrości, ale umiarkowanie najczęściej zalecane jest właśnie w odniesieniu do rzeczy przyjemnych. Zbiór decyzji umiarkowanych jest budowany rekurencyjnie. A – zbiór przyjemności – jest modyfikowany krok po kroku poprzez konsekwencje CR(A), gdzie R jest zbiorem reguł zawierającym prócz reguły modus ponens oraz reguły tożsamości proste, najczęściej nieformalne, reguły działania/wyboru pochodzące z codziennego doświadczenia. Zbiór U jest zbiorem wyborów umiarkowanych w sensie Epikura wtedy i tylko wtedy, gdy dla dowolnego p należącego do zbioru przykrości, p nie należy do zbioru konsekwencji ∀p ∈ P, ~(p ∈ CR(U)).