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1
Content available Judicial Review – historia i współczesność
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PL
Judicial Review – sądowa kontrola konstytucyjności ustaw, kształtowała się na przestrzeni kilkuset lat, równolegle z formowaniem się podstawowych elementów współczesnych systemów politycznych. Jej pojawianie się poprzedziło ugruntowanie się koncepcji trójpodziału władz, suwerenności narodu (w miejsce suwerenności władzy królewskiej) oraz praw człowieka. Instytucje te oraz zasady ustrojowe wprowadzone zostały do Konstytucji amerykańskiej z 1787 r. , której struktura podkreśla fundamentalny charakter trójpodziału władz, jak również, przez wprowadzenie do niej w procesie ratyfikacji Konstytucji, pierwszych dziesięciu poprawek – praw i wolności obywatela amerykańskiego. Przez okres ponad stulecia debata polityczna, w tym także ustrojowa, Europy koncentrowała się nade wszystko nad problematyką suwerenności i praw, tym samym odsuwała na plan dalszy kontrolę konstytucyjności ustaw. Uważano bowiem, iż formowanie organu sprawującego kontrolę konstytucyjną nad aktami władzy ustawodawczej i decyzjami formowanej przez nią władzy wykonawczej, prowadzi do ustanowienia swoistej super izby wobec parlamentu będącego emanacją woli suwerena. Refleksje ustrojowe A. de Tocqueville'a, następnie rozważania i działania praktyczne H. Kelsena przybliżyły – stopniowo- instytucję sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności ustaw do realiów europejskich. Poważna debata polityczna nad tym zagadnieniem podjęta została w Polsce w latach osiemdziesiątych, a warunki do jej ustrojowej materializacji powstały dzięki regulacjom Konstytucji RP w 1997 r. Proces integracji europejskiej sprawił, iż polski system ustrojowy, w tym także funkcjonowanie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, stało się częścią tworzonego przez Unię Europejską autonomicznego systemu prawnego.
EN
The Convention of ILO № 102 is the basic source of international-law rules in the area of social security. This convention concerns the standards of judicial review in matters regarding social security. It declares that whenever a claim is settled by a special tribunal established to deal with social security questions and on which the protected persons are represented, no right of appeal should be required. It means that matters regarding social security should be settled by tribunals that are organizationally, personally and procedurally separated from those dealing with other cases. In Poland, most of the matters regarding social security are settled by common courts, by their special departments, in a special procedure. Nevertheless, relevant departments can also deal with cases concerning labor law and they do not consist of persons who are not judges and represent protected persons. It means that the Polish regulations concerning the judicial review in matters regarding social security do not fulfill the standard established by the Convention № 102.
EN
Taxing discretion disrupts the dichotomous nature of tax law provisions, especially if it concerns tax liabilities. This institution may even be considered arbitrary and deemed not applicable in the Czech Republic. An analysis of English and German law indicates that taxing discretion is inevitable but may be effectively limited, e.g. by introducing a legal doctrine stating that exercise of taxing discretion is bound by the purposes of an act of Parliament granting taxing discretion and by judicial review. In the Czech Republic, taxing discretion is limited by administrative guidelines and judicial review, but further improvements are advisable. This would allow to reintroduce tax cancellation based on taxing discretion into Czech law.
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Content available Putting Dawn Raids under Control
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FR
« Dawn raids » sont devenus un moyen efficace de faire respecter le droit européen et national de la concurrence. Le contrôle judiciaire est un mécanisme essential de contrôle du pouvoir exécutif contre d’éventuels abus de ce pouvoir. Toutefois, ce contrôle judiciaire a montré ses limites ; il ne garantit pas toujours une reparation adéquate pour les parties concernées. Comment résoudre le problème du contrôle judiciaire limité pour assurer le contrôle des « dawn raids »? Cet article avance que les limites du contrôle juridictionnel pourraient être résolues en étendant les types de contrôle sur cette action, c’est-à-dire les orientations législatives ex ante et la responsabilité interne des administrateurs. Ainsi, la thèse plus conceptuelle de l’article est qu’il est essentiel de chercher des liens entre les différents concepts et types de contrôles pour garantir un système complet et efficace de contrôle des actions du pouvoir exécutif.
EN
Dawn raids have become an effective tool to enforce EU and national competition laws. Judicial review is an essential mechanism of control over the executive branch against possible misuse of this power. However, this judicial review has shown to have limits; it cannot always guarantee an adequate redress for the affected parties. How to address the limited judicial review to ensure control over dawn raids? This article argues that the limits of judicial review could be addressed by extending the types of controls over this action, i.e. ex ante legislative guidance and internal managerial accountability. The more conceptual argument that this paper puts forward is thus that it is essential to seek connections between different concepts and types of controls to ensure a comprehensive/water-tight system of controls over the actions of the executive branch.
EN
As a general rule, every legal system in the world has regulations governing proceedings before a national court of law; some of the proceedings are possibly instituted subsequently to arbitration and thus review awards issued in arbitration proceedings. Such review may be carried out, first, where there is a motion to have the arbitral award set aside (deemed invalid, nullified) or where the arbitral award is to be recognized or enforced judicially. The general objective of the review is to secure legal transactions by eliminating decisions made in the conduct of arbitration proceedings, if their outcome may not be authorized by a state, mainly due to their disaccord with the basic principles of legal order. The scope of the review may vary as it is dependent upon internal regulations of a given state, especially whether the aforesaid regulations were set forth in compliance with the UNCITRAL Model Law, or whether the legal system provides for separate provisions on arbitral awards issued at a territory of a given country but within international arbitration proceedings, or finally whether the parties, at their discretion, may be precluded from applying to have an arbitral award set aside.
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Content available remote Sądowa kontrola konstytucyjności ustaw zmieniających konstytucję w Indiach
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EN
The article presents evolution of the case law of the Supreme Court of India on the judicial review of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments, its evaluation in the legal doctrine and perception outside India. Although the Constitution of India does not contain any limitations as to the substance of constitutional amendments, during the political crisis in the period of Indira Gandhi’s rule, the Supreme Court has developed an effective system of judicial review of constitutional amendments. It is based on the assumption that the competence of the Parliament to enact amendments to the Constitution is not unlimited, because the parliament cannot destroy the same act from which it derives its authority. It must therefore respect certain fundamental principles which form the so-called “basic structure of the Constitution”. Applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court overturned a number of amendments, including those violating principle of judicial independence. The evaluation of the Supreme Court’s case law is divergent: according to some legal scholars it helped to save Indian democracy, while according to others it is full of loopholes and gives unlimited power to the judges. Despite this, it has had a substantial impact on the jurisprudence of courts in other countries in the region or even in other parts of the World.
EN
Throughout the first decade of the American republic, competing claims between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalist (later Republicans) regarding the proper interpretation of the Constitution and the application of its principles were confined primarily to the executive branch, Congress and states. The year 1801 marked the beginning of a turnabout in the role of the Supreme Court in the national affairs. Thomas Jefferson, having promised to bring about a revolution in the principles guiding the government, took office as the third president of the young nation. Although the legislative and executive branches of government came under the control of Jefferson’s Republican party in the election of 1800, the federal judiciary remained a bulwark of the rival Federalist party. In this article the author argues that differences in the interpretation of the Constitution resulted from the clear and irreconcilable differences in the political and constitutional philosophies of Jefferson and Marshall. These differences sparked fierce debate over such monumental issues as the use of judicial review over acts of Congress and the development of the doctrine of implied powers. According to the author, political considerations were paramount in determining the tactics employed by both leaders in their efforts to define the proper role of the judiciary in a balanced government and the role of the national government itself within the federal system.
EN
The article addresses the issue of judicial review of decisions in the area of development policy (that consist in not qualifying a specific project for funding) and an attempt is made to assess the functioning of this measure on the tenth anniversary of its introduction into the national system for implementing this policy. The analysis of legal acts, doctrine and case law in the field of development policy allows one to draw the conclusion that the act of implementing the policy, i.e. selection of a specific project for financing, is a sui generis operation of administration, not subject to the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure. The most important criterion for assessing this measure should be its effectiveness, understood as the highest degree of implementation of the objective assumed under development policy. Hence, the model of review adopted in Poland and applied by administrative courts, appointed to examine the legality of reviewed acts, does not meet the expectations. The article is an attempt to assess the adopted review model in terms of its impact on the effectiveness of the development policy system and the effectiveness of protection granted.
PL
W artykule podjęto temat sądowej kontroli rozstrzygnięć z zakresu polityki rozwoju (polegających na niezakwalifikowaniu konkretnego projektu do uzyskania dofinansowania) i dokonano próby oceny funkcjonowania tej instytucji w dziesiątą rocznicę jej wprowadzenia do krajowego systemu realizacji tej polityki. Analiza aktów prawnych, doktryny i orzecznictwa z zakresu polityki rozwoju prowadzi do wniosku, że akt realizacji polityki, jakim jest wyłonienie do dofinansowania konkretnego projektu, stanowi sui generis działanie administracji niepodlegające przepisom kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego. Najistotniejszym kryterium oceny tego działania powinna być jego efektywność, rozumiana jako najwyższy stopień realizacji celu założonego w ramach polityki rozwoju. Stąd też przyjęty w Polsce model kontroli dokonywanej przez sądy administracyjne, powołane do badania legalności kontrolowanych aktów, nie spełnia pokładanych w nim oczekiwań. Artykuł stanowi próbę oceny przyjętego modelu kontroli pod względem jej wpływu na efektywność systemu prowadzenia polityki rozwoju oraz na skuteczność udzielonej ochrony.
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Content available remote The role of parliamentary autonomy in constitutional review
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EN
The article deals with the principle of parliamentary autonomy and the role it plays in decisions of courts carrying out constitutional review. The principles and interests competing with parliamentary autonomy are categorized and analysed against the backdrop of relevant case-law, offering a wide scale of approaches used by courts around the world. Three groups of competing interests are analysed separately: (i) public control of parliaments, (ii) the principle of representation and (iii) the rights of parliamentary opposition and individual members of parliament. Within the analysis, examples of good practice as well as those of unpersuasive approaches are offered. Subsequently, the article offers general doctrinal principles, the observance of which would help ensure that courts do not overreach in regulating parliamentary internal affairs, thus triggering unwanted consequences.
EN
There is no doubt that the United States were not created as a purely democratic state. On the one hand, it established basic rules and principles of democratic government such as free elections, sovereignty of the nation, fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals or independent judiciary. All of these principles were, however, enjoyed only by the part of American society: free elections were guaranteed for white men, excluding women and blacks; sovereignty belonged to the nation, i.e. white women and men, because slaves were not considered citizens; fundamental rights and freedoms were guaranteed only for whites; institutional independence of the judicial branch did not prevent the system from injustice towards the blacks. Furthermore, one of the most important values of democratic society, equal protection of law, was absent in the original constitutional document of 1787, as well as the provisions of Bill of Rights. The clause became part of U.S. constitutional reality yet in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, as a direct result of social and political changes caused by the civil war. After introducing the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, which abolished slavery, the government took a step forward by making all citizens equal in 1868 and by providing black Americans with suffrage rights in 1870. For former slaves it meant a milestone step in their fight to destroy the social and political boundaries which limited their basic rights and freedoms. However, before the above mentioned events took place, the period of injustice and exploitation occurred with the U.S. Supreme Court in the middle of social and political tensions. The main purpose of the article is to show the changing attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the social and political status of African‑Americans. This attitude influenced historical and contemporary social relations among the American society proving one of the most controversial aspects of U.S. democracy.
EN
The purpose of this paper is to examine regulatory agencies and regulated parties in an empirical study of administrative disputes initiated against the decisions of regulatory agencies in Croatia. We first aim to provide an overview of the status and trend estimates regarding these disputes; second, to answer the question how well does the system work from the perspectives of both the plaintiffs and the regulatory agencies; third, to identify the problem areas and to compare these with problem areas identified by the authors studying the broader area of administrative judiciary in Croatia, and finally to compare efficiency level of regulatory agencies to other public authorities in confirming the legality of their decisions and actions. Data on all administrative disputes against 12 Croatian regulatory agencies’ decisions in the 17-year period between 1995 and 2011 are used to identify the main characteristics and trends relating to these disputes. Data for 2012 to 2013 was also examined to identify initial changes and emerging trends in the new administrative judiciary system resulting from fundamental legal reform as part of Croatia’s process of accession to the European Union in 2013. The results show these administrative disputes to be often costly and timely with modest outcome for the plaintiff and impressive success rate for the most of regulatory agencies.
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Content available remote Modele pozaparlamentarnej kontroli konstytucyjności prawa
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EN
The article presents models of extra-parliamentary constitutional review of law. The starting point is the methodological discussion of various concepts of the division and types of review, i.a. political vs judicial, strong vs weak, centralized vs decentralized. Most often the constitutional review of law is classified into American-type review (judicial review) and European-type review (review performed by constitutional courts). This dichotomous classification is often replaced with the categories of “dispersed review” and “concentrated review”, which is the most often classification, at the same time clearly expressing the features distinguishing the two review mechanisms. While the American model does not raise serious discussions, the European model — also referred to as Kelsenian or Austrian model — is controversial. It can be subclassified into original (pure) model and its various mutations, referred to as the mixed European model of the constitutional review of law, most often applied in practice. Moreover, other types of review are also applied in Europe, hence the French and the Scandinavian models are also sometimes distinguished. Regardless of the classification, all review models are now being homogenized. This means that the review is performed by the courts (concrete review is introduced), the protection of rights and freedoms of an individual is emphasized, and poli­tical consequences of constitutional review are becoming more significant, as a result of which the organ performing the constitutional review becomes a political, active authority within the state.
EN
This article concerns constitutional problems related to the implementation of EU directives seen from both the legal and comparative perspectives. The directives are a source of law which share a number of characteristic features that significantly affect and determine the specificity of Member States’ constitutional review of the directives as well as the legal acts that implement them. The review of the constitutionality of EU directives is carried out in accordance with the provisions of national implementing acts. Member States’ constitutional courts adopt two basic positions in this respect. The first position (adopted by, inter alia, the French Constitutional Council and German Federal Constitutional Court) is based on the assumption of a partial “constitutional immunity” of the act implementing the directive, which results in only a partial control of the constitutionality of the implementing acts, i.e. the acts of national law implementing such directives. The second position, (adopted, explicitly or implicitly by, inter alia, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Czech Constitutional Court, Polish Constitutional Court, Romanian Constitutional Court and Slovak Constitutional Court) concerns the admissibility of a full review of the implementing acts. This leads to the admissibility of an indirect review of the content of the directive if the Court examines the provision as identical in terms of content with an act of EU law. Another issue is related to the application of the EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review. The French Constitutional Council case-law on review of the proper implementation of EU directives represents the canon in this regard. Nonetheless, interesting case studies of further uses of EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review can be found in the case law of other constitutional courts, such as the Belgian Constitutional Court or Spanish Constitutional Court. The research presented in this paper is based on the comparative method. The scope of the analysis covers case law of the constitutional courts of both old and new Member States. It also includes a presentation of recent jurisprudential developments, focusing on the constitutional case-law regarding the Data Retention Directive and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.
EN
Creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office was from its very beginning accompanied by a wide-ranging debate regarding the most challenging issues, one of them being judicial review of its acts. This article deliberates on several groups of these acts and their review by either national courts or Court of Justice of the European Union. Where appropriate, in analyses their review in relation to the Slovak Republic. As a conclusion, it offers several considerations as to the Member States’ obligation to provide for effective judicial protection.
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Content available remote Freedom of speech, propaganda and EU at war: case of Russia today France
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EN
The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 triggered the need for a European response. With unprecedented speed, the Union adopted a series of restrictive measures limiting trade with the Russian Federation, freezing the assets of individuals, and restricting their activities in the Single Market. The Union also had to address the issue of the undermining of European unity and society by Russian media houses based in Member States. Restrictions on the broadcasting of Russia Today France were subsequently challenged in the European General Court. This was the first time the Court had ruled on restrictions on the activities of an entire editorial office. The days of innocence are coming to an end and days of hard choices are becoming the norm as the Union begins to assume its geopolitical responsibilities.
EN
This article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s lesser-known educative role as an egalitarian institution within a broader deliberative democratic process. Scholars have argued that the Court’s long asserted power of judicial review, especially in the equal protection and civil rights context, has been an over-reach of the judicial branch’s constitutional authority and responsibilities. Normative and empirical critiques have been centered on the aims of judicial review, and the challenges it poses in American political life. A core issue surrounding these critiques is that Justices are appointed not elected, and thus undermine the principle of majority rule in the U.S. constitutional democratic order. Although these critiques are legitimate in terms of claims about unelected Supreme Court Justices’ seemingly discretionary powers over elected legislative bodies, and the uncertain policy implications of judicial pronouncements on the broader society, there is, nevertheless, a positive application of judicial review as a tool Justices use as part of their educative role overcoming the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” Through a close reading of oral arguments in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and San Antonio vs. Rodriguez (1973)-two landmark cases invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution-the article shows how appointed Justices adjudicate individual cases on appeal and attempt to educate (through an argumentative, reason-based and question-centered process) citizenlitigants and their legal representatives about the importance of equality, fairness and ethical responsibility even prior to rendering final decisions on policy controversies that have broader national social, political and economic implications.
EN
The article concerns the stability of a specific political system based on the so-called non--codified constitution, which was formed in the State of Israel. The main goal is to present and characterise the systemic position of the Supreme Court in this country and, above all, the competences of this body in the field of maintaining political stability and public order. There are two main hypotheses in the paper. According to the first one, the Supreme Court is especially predestined to perform stability functions. According to second hypothesis a system based on an uncodified constitution supports the actions of the Supreme Court aimed at achieving a state of political stability. In the course of the analysis, tools from such disciplines as political theory, jurisprudence and the science of constitutional law were used. At the beginning of the article, the research perspective was defined, the most important element of which is the operationalization of the general concept of “stability” and the concept of “political stability”.
EN
In order to ensure that the right to bring an action before a court, which in substantive terms is understood as safeguard of the effective protection of individuals’ rights, is exercised and that a fair judgment is entered, the administrative courts may review the correctness of actions taken by governmental bodies in establishing the facts of the case, subject to the principle of legality. For this reason, it is necessary for the administrative courts to provide reasons for their judgments so as to demonstrate that the review of an administrative instrument was comprehensive and took account of all the facts of the case. The reasons so provided may cause the complainant to believe that he has indeed been granted legal protection. Moreover, this may demonstrate that the administrative courts not only review compliance with the principle of legality, but primarily exercise judicial power conferred on them. Therefore, it is appropriate to state that the applicable Polish regulations on the  administrative courts safeguard the individual’s right to bring an action before a court both in formal and material sense.
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Content available remote Soudní přezkum rozhodnutí zdravotních pojišťoven
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EN
If any issue attracts the attention of the legal public in the area of judicial review of decisions of health insurance companies, it is primarily an inconsistent attitude of administrative courts to decisions on reimbursement of otherwise non-reimbursed health services pursuant to Sec. 16 of Act No. 48/1997 Coll. on Public Health Insurance. On the basis of suggestions arising primarily from the decisions of the Municipal Court in Prague and the Supreme Administrative Court, or possibly the Constitutional Court, this paper notes three areas of problems, namely the term decision of the administrative authority pursuant to Sec. 65 of the Code of Administrative Justice, participation in the proceedings for an action against a decision of an administrative authority, and finally a procedural succession. The purpose is not to give a definitive solution to these problems, but to contribute to the discussion with further arguments, and also to place the problem in the wider context of legislation and case law.
CS
Poutá-li nějaká otázka pozornost právnické veřejnosti v oblasti soudního přezkumu rozhodnutí zdravotních pojišťoven, jde především o nejednotný postoj soudů ve správním soudnictví k rozhodnutím o úhradě jinak nehrazené zdravotní služby podle § 16 zákona č. 48/1997 Sb., o veřejném zdravotním pojištění. Tento příspěvek si na základě podnětů plynoucích především z rozhodnutí Městského soudu v Praze a Nejvyššího správního soudu, popřípadě též soudu Ústavního, všímá tří okruhů problémů, a sice pojmu rozhodnutí správního orgánu ve smyslu § 65 odst. 1 s. ř. s., účastenství v řízení o žalobě proti rozhodnutí správního orgánu, a konečně procesního nástupnictví. Účelem není podat definitivní řešení těchto problémů, ale přispět do diskuse dalšími argumenty, a také zasadit problém do širšího kontextu právní úpravy a rozhodovací praxe.
EN
Any discussion of private antitrust enforcement usually focuses on substantive law and proceedings applicable to private antitrust cases. Those elements are important, however, the efficacy of both public and private enforcement relies upon rules of law (substantive and procedural) along with their application. The latter constitutes a substantial aspect affecting the institutions which make decisions in private antitrust enforcement cases, namely the relevant courts. The enforcement of competition law is inextricably intertwined with the economy and markets. As a result, antitrust cases are demanding for non-specialist judges, who usually do not have enough knowledge and experience in the field of competition. Even if the Damages Directive has already been implemented in all EU Member States, there is still room for discussion about developing an optimal court model for the adjudication of private antitrust enforcement cases. In the aforementioned discussion the issue of the binding effect of decisions made by the European Commission (EC) and National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in private enforcement cases, as well as the experience of judges stemming from the number of cases they have resolved, cannot be missed. Bearing this in mind, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the model of competent courts operating in private antitrust cases in twenty selected countries including the US, the UK and the vast majority of EU Member States. Taking into account that a theoretically pure concept of an ideal model of relevant court operations presumably does not exist, it is essential to try to figure out what the main characteristics of the courts might be that can lead to effective private antitrust enforcement.
FR
Toute discussion sur l’application privée du droit de la concurrence se concentre habituellement sur le droit matériel et sur les procédures applicables aux affaires antitrust privées. Ces éléments sont importants, cependant, l’efficacité de l’application publique et privée repose sur des règles de droit (matériel et procédural) ainsi que leur application. Ce dernier constitue un aspect important affectant les institutions qui prennent des décisions dans les cas d’application des lois antitrust privées, qui sont les tribunaux compétents. L’application du droit de la concurrence est inextricablement liée à l’économie et aux marchés. En conséquence, les affaires antitrust exigent des juges non spécialisés, qui n’ont généralement pas suffisamment de connaissances et d’expérience dans le domaine de la concurrence. Même si la directive ‘dommages-intérêts’ a été mise en œuvre dans tous les États membres de l’Union européenne, il reste encore des discussions sur la mise au point d’un modèle judiciaire optimal pour le règlement des affaires d’antitrust privées. Dans la discussion susmentionnée, la question de l’effet contraignant des décisions prises par la Commission européenne et par les autorités nationales de la concurrence dans les affaires privées, ainsi que l’expérience des juges découlant du nombre d’affaires résolues, ne peuvent manquer. Dans cet esprit, l’objectif principal de cet article est d’analyser le modèle des tribunaux compétents opérant dans les affaires antitrust privées dans vingt pays sélectionnés, y compris les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la grande majorité des États membres. Puisqu’un concept théoriquement pur de modèle idéal d’activités judiciaires pertinentes n’existe pas, il est essentiel de tenter de déterminer quelles pourraient être les caractéristiques principales des tribunaux susceptibles de conduire à une application efficace des lois antitrust dans les affaires privées
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