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tom 43
349-373
EN
Both the Nuremberg Tribunal in its judgment of Jan. 1, 1946 as well as the European Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber judgment of Oct. 21, 2013 in the case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia abstracted from a substantive decision on Russia’s responsibility for the Katyń massacre and failed to determine the consequences to be borne by the defending state, whose authorities decided upon the performance of the act in question. Contemporary Russian state denies that the murder of 22,000 Polish prisoners of war and inmates at the behest of the highest authorities of the USSR in 1940 was indeed a war crime. According to the position of the Russian government, represented before the ECHR, what took place was solely a crime committed by the administrative personnel who acted beyond their authority, the prosecution of which expired after 10 years, i.e. in 1950. The Russian side also claimed that it was not obliged to conduct an investigation on the matter and refused to disclose the content of the order to discontinue the criminal proceedings issued in 2004 to both the relatives of those who were murdered and to the ECHR. It also refused to recognize the murdered Polish prisoners of war as victims of political repression, claiming that it is unclear according to which criminal code they were sentenced to be shot. Russia’s position in denying the temporal jurisdiction of the ECHR and the ratione materiae with regard to the Katyń massacre which was in fact accepted by the ECHR in its judgment, should be subject to criticism. According to the statement of the court, Russia has not violated Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural aspect or Article 3 in its way of dealing with the relatives of the victims. The Court has lost the chance to contribute to appointing — in terms of human rights — a protection standard for a vital legal interest, which is currently the collective memory of the persecution of people because of their national, racial or religious background, ones who had become victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed in the name of Nazi or communist ideology once pursued in Europe.
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nr 2 (194)
143-160
EN
Along the rapid development and proliferation of autonomous robotic weapons, machines begin to replace people on the battlefields. The use by the USA of Predators or Reapers and other unmanned aerial vehicles (so called drones) in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other places in the world clearly signals distancing of the soldiers from their targets. Some military and robotics experts have predicted that “killer robots” – fully autonomous weapons that could select and engage targets without human intervention – could be developed within 20 to 30 years. At present, military officials generally say that humans will retain some level of supervision over decisions to use lethal force, but their statements often leave open the possibility that robots could one day have the ability to make such choices on their own power. In this paper I will concentrate on the last kind of autonomous weapons, namely fully autonomous ones. It should however be noted that so far such a weapon does not yet exist. Nonetheless, lawyers should already be anticipating the effect of these technologies on international humanitarian law and the conduct of warfare. The thesis of the paper goes as follows: the use of autonomous weapons would be contrary to the basic and fundamental principles of international humanitarian law such as the principle of distinction, proportionality and military necessity and thus illegal. Such weapons are not capable of meeting the conditions enshrined in these principles. As such their use would threaten the well-being, life and health of civilians and civilian populations. On the other hand, there are scholars who are of the opinion that prohibiting the use of autonomous weapons would make no sense at all and that the development of such weapons is inevitable and will take place gradually. Moreover, autonomy in weapon systems might positively promote the aims of the laws of war in some technological configurations and operational circumstances – but not in others. As I will try to demonstrate below, the drawbacks of the use of autonomous weapons are of such magnitude that they exclude its legality. In my opinion, it is legal to use autonomous devices aimed at target identification but not autonomous weapons capable of attacking the target without human interference.
EN
The aim of the paper is to generally outline the relationship between the law of armed conflict and human rights protection, and thus the usability of the human rights standards in the military occupation. The paper provides an analysis of the application of relevant legislation and will aim to explore complementarity, compatibility and possible exceptions to the applicability of those standards. Finally, the paper aims to identify practical and legal loopholes in the implementation of the human rights commitments and options for addressing these international legal problems.
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tom 39
287-290
EN
Review of a book: Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham: 2019
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tom 2 (46)
205-223
EN
In recent years, armed conflicts have changed in nature (civil war, ‘terrorism’) and the means used are increasingly technological (robotisation, cyberwar). Faced with these developments, some would claim International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is outdated. While these technological innovations present new challenges in the application of IHL, it still constitutes a relevant legal framework for armed conflicts and the conduct of hostilities. Indeed, the flexibility of IHL allows it to adapt to contemporary conflicts. Therefore, this shows that the statements about its obsolescence are primarily political in nature.
6
75%
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nr 2
252-267
EN
Cyberspaces can be significantly influenced by simple tools and tactics, and offer cost-effective solutions for states to achieve their objectives. However, it can also be used for conducting cyberwarfare, and its effects remain in gray areas. The spectrum of cyberwarfare activities ranges from minor web disruptions to crippling attacks on critical national infrastructures. Nevertheless, cyberattacks present a unique challenge in applying well-established humanitarian legal principles, particularly regarding the distinction between civilian and military targets. This is because of the interconnectedness and shared infrastructure of cyberspace between civilian and military entities, which blurs the lines between combatants and civilian populations. This article seeks to shift the general perception of the problems associated with this manner of conducting hostilities by building on the learning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, the authors examine the cyber activities that occurred during the conflict and the legal and ethical challenges that arise from classifying these activities and applying international law. They try to distinguish cyber activities as an act of force or armed attack, with a focus on determining the criteria that played a role in this classification, in light of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter. With reference to the United Nations (UN) Charter and the principles of self-defence, the concept of attack is scrutinised. Furthermore, the article addresses the principles of distinction and proportionality in relation to qualified cyber activities as an armed attack in the same conflict, emphasising the importance of the principle of proportionality in assessing cyber warfare.
7
Content available Humanity in modern warfare, empathy and jus in bello
75%
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2014
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tom 12(12)
189-200
EN
Based on the work of S. Baron-Cohen, the text considers the relationship of empathy disorders with the perception of humanity in the context of the conduct of hostilities. Making use of philosophical and legal assumptions, it examines the understanding of the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience, namely the Martens Clause, providing for the moral compass of international humanitarian law. Controversially it argues that the widely proclaimed postulate of warfare humanisation is a kind of paradox. On the one hand, we assume that man is inherently good and, therefore, the conduct of war should be more humane; on the other hand, we perform it by withdrawing man from the battlefield and by replacing him with autonomous systems . Will the replacement of human weaknesses kind by artificial intelligence lead to a revolutionary solution and reduction of suffering or will it only speed up movement of humanity on the slippery slope? In this text, the author will try to draw the reader's attention to the often overlooked ethical dilemmas and issues of fundamental nature which are often lacking in the security studies.
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nr 6
177-185
EN
The author presents and analyses the joint initiative of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross on strengthening the implementation of international humanitarian law. The proposals include regular Meetings of States on International Humanitarian Law, thematic discussions on international humanitarian law issues and national reports presented periodically.
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tom 31
47-78
EN
“Operation Cast Lead” undertaken by the Israeli armed forces against Hamas forces in the Gaza strip in 2008/2009 raises a significant number of international legal issues. These issues relate to the nature of the military conflict, the legal status of the Gaza strip under international humanitarian law, but also, more generally, to the applicability and suitability of international humanitarian law in such kinds of asymmetric warfare taking place in densely populated areas. Besides, the article also questions at least some of the findings made by the “Goldstone Report” tasked by the United Nations Human Rights Council to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law during the armed conflict.
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nr 3
237-252
PL
Artykuł dotyczy konwergencji międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego i prawa międzynarodowego praw człowieka w konfliktach zbrojnych. Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne i prawo praw człowieka zbliżają się oraz wzajemnie przenikają, ponieważ u podstaw obu tych dyscyplin prawa międzynarodowego publicznego znajduje się prawo naturalne. Jakkolwiek międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne stanowi lex specialis, to jednak reguły ogólne dotyczące interpretacji traktatów wyraźnie wskazują, że prawo międzynarodowe praw człowieka musi być interpretowane w kontekście innych reguł prawa międzynarodowego, a jego ewentualne derogacje muszą być kompatybilne z innymi zobowiązaniami międzynarodowymi państwa, w tym z prawem humanitarnym. W przypadku konfliktu między międzynarodowym prawem humanitarnym i prawem międzynarodowym praw człowieka mechanizm rozwiązywania sprzeczności między normami został przez Międzynarodowy Trybunał Sprawiedliwości uzupełniony interpretacją w oparciu o zasadę integracji systemowej, co skutkuje „humanizacją” międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego. W przypadku stosowania instrumentów uniwersalnych i regionalnych prawa międzynarodowego praw człowieka mamy do czynienia z „humanitaryzacją” tych praw. Dlatego w praktyce coraz częściej zwraca się uwagę na komplementarność międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego i prawa międzynarodowego praw człowieka, co znajduje potwierdzenie w dyskusjach i rezolucjach dotyczących sytuacji w konfliktach zbrojnych Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych.
EN
The article concerns the convergence of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in armed conflicts. International humanitarian law and human rights law converge and permeate each other because both these disciplines of public international law are founded on natural law. Although international humanitarian law constitutes a lex specialis, the general rules on the interpretation of treaties clearly indicate that international human rights law must be interpreted in the context of other rules of international law, and its derogations, if any, must be compatible with other international obligations of the state, including with humanitarian law. Where a conflict arises between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the mechanism for resolving conflicts between norms has been supplemented by the International Court of Justice by applying an interpretation based on the principle of systemic integration, resulting in the “humanization” of international humanitarian law. As regards the application of universal and regional instruments of international human rights law, we face a “humanization” of them. That is why more and more attention is paid in practice to the complementarity of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and this is confirmed in United Nations discussions and resolutions on the situation in armed conflicts.
PL
Celem artykułu jest omówienie możliwości zastosowania międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego konfliktów zbrojnych podczas konfliktu zbrojnego w Iraku w latach 2013-2017 toczonego przeciwko Państwu Islamskiemu. Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie jak sklasyfikować ten konflikt na tle międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego konfliktów zbrojnych. Przedstawiono argumentację za uznaniem go za konflikt niemający charakteru międzynarodowego, w którym stronami są Państwo Islamskie oraz rząd iracki. Na kwalifikację konfliktu zbrojnego jako międzynarodowy nie pozwala omówiony w artykule brak uznania posiadania przez Państwo Islamskie statusu państwa w rozumieniu prawa międzynarodowego. Klasyfikacji tej nie zmienia interwencja Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz państw sojuszniczych, która jako interwencja na zaproszenie rządu irackiego nie powoduje uznania konfliktu za międzynarodowy. Artykuł omawia również zakres norm międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego konfliktów zbrojnych, które znajdują zastosowanie do przedmiotowego konfliktu. Są to w szczególności art. 3 wspólny dla Konwencji genewskich oraz prawo zwyczajowe. Protokół II uzupełniający postanowienia Konwencji genewskich nie będzie miał zastosowania z uwagi na to, iż Irak nie jest jego sygnatariuszem.
EN
The article addresses the applicability of international humanitarian law during the armed conflict in Iraq in 2013-2017 waged against the Islamic State. The paper answers how to classify this conflict against the background of the law of armed conflict. The argumentation for considering it as a non-international conflict with the Islamic State and the Iraqi government as parties is presented. The discussed failure to recognize the Islamic State’s status as a state within the meaning of international law does not classify the armed conflict as international. The classification has not been changed by the United States and allied states’ intervention, which, as one at the invitation of the Iraqi government, does not mean qualifying the conflict as international. The article also discusses the scope of the norms of international humanitarian law that apply to the conflict in question. It primarily concerns Article 3 that is common to the Geneva Conventions and customary law. Protocol II supplementing the provisions of the Geneva Conventions will not apply as Iraq is not a signatory to it.
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tom R. 14, Nr 34
45--56
PL
Środowisko naturalne od zawsze w historii konfliktów zbrojnych było „cichą ofiarą” wojny, na skutek szkód bezpośrednich, jak i pośrednich wywołanych działaniami wojennymi. Dopiero w latach 70. XX wieku na skutek doświadczeń wojny wietnamskiej w kontekście używania defoliantów i herbicydów oraz zwiększenia się świadomości bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego wśród członków społeczności międzynarodowej, spowodowało powstanie pierwszych przepisów na gruncie międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego chroniących środowisko naturalne. Wobec czego celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie jednej z najważniejszych umów międzynarodowych w tej materii, czyli Konwencji o zakazie wojskowego lub innego wrogiego wykorzystywania technik modyfikacji środowiska (ENMOD) w celu wykazania, dlaczego powyższa konwencja została stworzona w latach 70. XX w., a nie w innej dekadzie. Jednocześnie poddając analizie najważniejsze artykuły ENMOD, celem jest zidentyfikowanie kluczowych problemów konwencji w odniesieniu do konfliktu zbrojnego rosyjsko-ukraińskiego. Dlatego głównym problemem badawczym jest możliwość zastosowania omawianej umowy międzynarodowej ENMOD dla ochrony środowiska naturalnego w sytuacji konfliktu zbrojnego na przykładzie trwającej wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej. Według postawionej hipotezy badawczej konwencja ENMOD nie ma zastosowania dla zdecydowanej większości szkód środowiskowych spowodowanych konfliktem zbrojnym, niemniej jest kluczowym traktatem, który uzupełnia ogólny i szczególny reżim ochrony środowiska naturalnego w sytuacji konfliktu zbrojnego. Na potrzeby rozwiązania postawionego problemu badawczego i weryfikacji hipotezy w artykule zastosowano Wojnowski metodologię opartą na metodzie jakościowej, poddając analizie i krytycznej ocenie literaturę przedmiotu, przy jednoczesnym wykorzystaniu na gruncie nauk prawnych metody dogmatycznoprawnej w odniesieniu do aktów prawnych i historyczno-prawnej, aby ukazać genezę i ewolucję konwencji ENMOD. Autor w analizie dochodzi do wniosku, że ENMOD nie ma zastosowania dla większości szkód środowiskowych spowodowanych działaniami zbrojnymi, czego dowodzi konflikt zbrojny rosyjsko-ukraiński, gdzie obie strony konfliktu są związane tym traktem, jednakże ENMOD jest ważnym uzupełnieniem reżimu ochrony środowiska naturalnego w sytuacji konfliktu zbrojnego.
EN
The natural environment has always been a ‘silent victim’ of war in the history of armed conflict, as a result of both direct and indirect damage caused by warfare. It was not until the 1970s, as a result of the experience of the Vietnam War in the context of the use of defoliants and herbicides and an increased awareness of environmental security among members of the international community. The first provisions under international humanitarian law protecting the environment were established. In view of this, the aim of this article is to analyse one of the most important international agreements on the subject, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why the above convention was created in the 1970s and not in another decade. At the same time, by analysing the most significant articles of ENMOD, the aim is to identify the key problems of the convention in relation to the Russian- -Ukrainian armed conflict. Therefore, the main research issue is the relevance of the discussed ENMOD international agreement for environmental protection in a situation of armed conflict, taking the example of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. The stated research hypothesis is that the ENMOD Convention is not relevant to the vast majority of environmental damage caused by armed conflict. Nevertheless, it is a key treaty that complements the general and specific regimes of environmental protection in situations of armed conflict. For the purpose of solving the research issue posed and verification the hypothesis, the article applies a methodology based on a qualitative method, analysing and critically evaluating the literature on the subject, while using a dogmatic-legal method on the legal sciences in relation to legal acts and a historical-legal method to show the genesis and evolution of the ENMOD Convention. The author concludes in the analysis that the ENMOD is not relevant for most environmental damage caused by armed action, as evidenced by the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, where both parties to the conflict are bound by this treaty. However, the ENMOD is an important addition to the environmental protection regime in a situation of armed conflict.
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2024
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tom 47
47-62
PL
Artykuł prezentuje wyniki badań nad rosyjską agresją na Ukrainę i wynikającym z niej międzynarodowym konfliktem zbrojnym między tymi państwami w świetle międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego. Obrazy zniszczonych miast takich jak Mariupol, Irpień i Charków, a także mordy na ludności cywilnej w Buczy wstrząsnęły sumieniem ludzkości i rodzą pytanie o ich kwalifikację prawną. Autorzy odpowiadają na następujące pytania: Jakie zasady międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego zostały naruszone przez Rosję? Czy naruszenia te osiągają poziom zbrodni wojennych, zbrodni przeciwko ludzkości lub ewentualnie ludobójstwa?
EN
The research aim of this paper is to examine the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the ensuing international armed conflict between these states in the light of international humanitarian law. The images of the destroyed cities of Mariupol, Irpin and Kharkov as well as the killings of civilians in Bucha shock the conscience of mankind and raise the question of their legal classification. The author answers the following questions: Which rules of international humanitarian law are being violated by Russia? Do these violations reach the level of international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity or possibly genocide?
14
Content available remote Miedzynarodowe prawo humanitarne : problemy uchodźców, migracje ludności
38%
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tom nr 2
74--91
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