Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Základní potřeby jako důvody vedoucí k jednání

100%

Pinzani A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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tom 63

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nr 1

57-76

EN

This article begins with the observation that most contemporary theories of justice pay no attention to the concept of need. And, as my main thesis, I shall argue that this is not correct. First of all (I) I shall explain the reasons for this theoretical deficit and I shall strictly distinguish (II) the concept of “need” from other concepts, such as “wish” and “drive”, which are routinely interpreted as its synonyms. Then (III) I shall offer a definition of need which is based on a complex conception of human personality. I shall introduce an enumeration of the various levels of the person by which various categories of need correspond with various objects. In the next step (IV) I shall tackle the question of whether in some regard it is necessary to treat needs as reasons for conduct. In this context I shall briefly present a historico-naturalistic account which aims to provide a grounding for judgements about questions of human needs. (V). Finally I shall deal with the social dimension of human needs and I will put forward reasons for the view that a theory of social justice should deal with the concept of need as its main theme (VI).

2

Natura ludzka – jaźń – indywidualność. Filozoﬁczno-antropologiczne i etyczne podstawy koncepcji demokracji Johna Deweya

100%

Nysler Ł.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

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2007

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tom 2

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nr 1

55-75

EN

In this article I reconstruct some crucial concepts of John Dewey's naturalistic philosophical anthropology and ethics to show their importance for the Deweyan concept of democracy. In particular, I focus on such concepts, as “human nature”, “selfhood”, “individuality”, and “self-realization”, and argue that these concepts are indispensable if we want to effectively grasp what Dewey intended in his ideal of democracy. In this way I hope to show the vital significance of Dewey's thought for contemporary controversies in philosophical anthropology, ethics, social and political philosophy.

3

Czy solidarność jest przeciwna ludzkiej naturze? Spojrzenie z perspektywy biologii ewolucyjnej

100%

Beyer G. J.

Prakseologia

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2012

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nr 153

51-66

EN

Contemporary theological and philosophical ethicists posit the ability of human beings to achieve solidarity with one another on a large social scale. However, many people, including politicians and key decision-makers, have argued that this kind of solidarity is not possible. Several current anthropological theories, such as those undergirding neoclassical economic theory and the realist school of international relations, maintain that individuals and nations essentially act in their own interest. “Selfish” human nature discounts the possibility of broad and sustained solidarity. This paper addresses the question of whether or not human nature contains the potential and impulse to practice solidarity to ever greater degrees. First, it brieﬂy deﬁnes solidarity. Next it summarizes competing views among biologists on the consistency between human nature and solidarity. Then it turns to the work of renowned evolutionary biologists David Sloan Wilson and Frans de Waal to demonstrate that solidarity may be more consistent with human nature than many acknowledge.

4

Aristotle on Why Study Lower Animals (De Partibus Animalium, I,5, 644b22–645a36)

88%

Thein K.

Eirene. Studia Graeca et Latina

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2014

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tom 50

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nr 1-2

208-229

EN

The paper comments upon On the Parts of Animals I,5 and its leading question of why a naturalist should study all animal species, including those that are perceived as worthless and more or less repugnant. It analyzes different reasons produced by Aristotle in order to justify a systematic biological inquiry and argues that a common feature of these reasons consists in their connection with Aristotle’s understanding of human nature as situated at the juncture of perishable individual substances and intellectual activity that “shares in the divine.” Starting from the epistemic contrast between our conjectures about the most valuable celestial region and the more easily available knowledge about the sublunary world, Aristotle emphasizes not only the sum of what we can learn about the animals that live around us but, especially, the possibility to grasp the teleological structure shared by the latter and mankind alike. Learning about nature and its inner workings implies learning about human nature, including its capacity to imitate the works of nature in art and to understand them through science. The parallel between the pleasure obtained by understanding art and the pleasure gained by scientific inquiry only confirms that the latter offers us some independent value which is irreducible to the superior but not quite attainable knowledge of the divine.

5

Some Philosophical Remarks on Educating Genuine Leaders

88%

Tarasiewicz P.

Studia Ełckie

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2012

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tom 14

57-67

EN

The author intends to make an appeal for paying closer attention to human nature in educating genuine leaders. His philosophical approach embraces following topics: (1) whether leaders are born with talents and traits that allow, or even cause, them to be successful leaders, or whether effective leadership behaviors can be learned through education and experience; (2) whether the influence exercised by groups or individuals can be considered as a necessary and sufficient factor in explaining leadership; (3) whether leaders lead the followers to achieve the required end for the sake of the end itself, or rather that of those who are to achieve it – in other words, whether the followers exist for the end or the end for the followers. The author concludes that well-educated leaders are those who know not to confuse the ultimate end with particular ones in their own life and in that of others.

6

Human Nature in the Post-Modern Era: Toward a Theory of Instinctual Flourishing

75%

Block J. E.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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nr 1

162-170

EN

The question of human nature has not been effectively addressed in our time be-cause of great skepticism in the academic and philosophical discourses about the idea of social progress and the validity of a common humanity. As a result the question has been reduced by neoliberalism, biopsychology, and social psychology to demonstrating the malleability of humans in response to hierarchical, biological, or social-conformist pressures. To recover the concept of human nature it will be necessary to reconceptual-ize the dynamic of human development as a feature of the modern and late modern achievements of a more evolved vision of individuality and community.

7

The Sophists’ Political Art

75%

Mantzanas M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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nr 1

231-236

EN

The Sophists were the first supporters of the values of knowledge, education and po-litical self-determination. Their attitude and tactics demonstrated that human nature and especially every individual’s personality is of prior importance. The Sophists rejected the idea of the ontological stability of the laws and declared their confidence in the eternal values of the natural law and cosmopolitanism, in the individual ability of every human being and in the concurrent refusal of traditions and of any form of authenticity. In addition, the Sophists were the first innovative enlightenment philosophers, who tried to exert their influence on society by using their teachings.

8

Two-level, Open, Plastic and Multidimensional Human Nature. An Ontological Riddle

75%

Czarnocka M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2016

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nr 1

19-30

EN

I present—in an extremely sketchy form—a model of two-level, open, plastic and multidimensional human nature. Due to the included attribute of multidimensionality this model opposes the reductive conceptions of man dominating in today’s philosophy. The main objective of the paper is the ontological status of man, especially the ontic foundation of multidimensional man. I demonstrate that this status remains a riddle; one only knows that from the ontological perspective man is a wholly exceptional object, not explainable by to-date ontological constructions.

9

Natura Pura: A Concept for the New Evangelization

75%

Seiler C. M.

Theological Research. A Journal of Systematic Theology

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2014

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tom 2

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nr 1

53-65

EN

This article explores the concept of Natura Pura. It addresses its aspects both from the point of Scholastic thought as seen especially in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. It also addresses the metaphysical question in relation to the thought of Aquinas and Henri de Lubac.

10

PROBLEM DOBRA WSPÓLNEGO

75%

Landowski W.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2013

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tom 2

107-128

EN

The main purpose of this article is to discuss the relation between the understanding of human being and the concept of common good. On the one hand, materialist and spriritualist concepts of man lead to the univocal understanding of bonum commune, on the other hand, dualist anthropology entails a breakdown of the unity of common good. The author reveals weak points of these approaches and undertakes an attempt of examining realist vision of man and its impact on the notion of bonum commune. He starts with analyzing the complex structure of human being, which includes the potential and actual nature of human person. Against the background of the personalist anthropology, the author concludes that the common good has not only a material or instrumental, but above all a personal dimension, which makes this good both common and non-antagonistic.

11

Ren Xing: Mencian’s Understanding of Human Being and Human Becoming

75%

Xu K.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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nr 2

29-39

EN

Ren xing shan (human nature is good) is a famous thesis of Mencius. But it is ques-tionable whether the Mencian concept of ren xing is an exact equivalent of the Western concept of human nature, and whether Mencius really thinks that all human beings are naturally moral. This paper suggests that when talking about ren xing, Mencius actually refers to both human being and human becoming. Ren xing may have a root in the na-ture of human being, which is a “mandate” endowed by the “Heaven.” But the complete notion of ren xing should be construed in terms of the process towards full human be-coming. “Human nature is good” does not guarantee complete virtue for individual human beings. However, the human being has the capability of pursuing the moral di-rection along life’s path, and should take the responsibility of maintaining the right moral direction of human becoming, and thus should avoid veering from this moral path. This interpretation may provide a more consistent understanding of the metaphys-ical foundation, theoretic system, and self-cultivation practice of the Mencian ethics.

12

The Islamic Notion of Fitrah and the Nature of tThe Human Being

75%

Chenari Y. H. , Azadboni R. M.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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nr 1

187-194

EN

In the Quran, the Muslim Holy book, many verses refer to the human being and in many ways issues regarding mankind are dealt with. In the Quran the possibility of doubting God’s existence is ruled out as man has a particular nature (“Fitrah” is a Quranic term). The aim of this paper is to disclose the very basic Quranic concept concerning human nature: Fitrah. According to the Quranic understanding, mankind has its origin in God; this understanding is based on the concept of Fitrah. Fitrah is considered a natural component of the human being in which God and another Truth can be perceived through man’s existential experience.

13

Capital Grace of the Word Incarnate According to Saint Thomas Aquinas

75%

Siemering L. M.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2016

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tom 5

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nr 2

327-343

EN

The doctrine of capital grace was developed during the Scholastic period and bears on many areas of theology including ecclesiology, Christology, sacraments, and Trinitarian theology with regard to the missions of the Word and the Holy Spirit. Viewed from a Christological standpoint, capital grace sheds light on how Christ in his human nature can be said to be a source of grace to the members of the Church. Following his contemporaries, the young Thomas Aquinas espoused a view in which Christ is a meritorious, ministerial, and dispositive cause of grace according to his human nature, and an efficient cause according to his divinity. After a deeper reading of John Damascene’s treatment of Christ’s humanity being an instrument of his divinity, Thomas was able to articulate a view in which Christ’s human nature is an instrumental efficient cause of grace. This view undergirds Aquinas’s strong conception of Christ as one acting person in two natures.

14

Moralisation, Human Nature, Morality

63%

Czerniak S.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2016

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nr 1

39-52

EN

The author defines moralisation as cultural processes marked by a rise in moralistic argumentation (also in areas in which such argumentation has heretofore not played a meaningful role) to a degree which raises questions and doubts of a philosophical and sociological nature. This is developed on in detail in the sections “The moralisation of the world and suffering,” “The moralisation of everyday life and history,” “The morali-sation of knowledge” and “The moralisation of human nature.” The closing section of the article, “Moralisation and morality,” focuses on the relation between the described moralistic approach and the changes broadly-understood moral awareness is undergoing in the contemporary world.

15

Do principles of natural law depend on conceptions of human nature?

63%

Nedevska J.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2015

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tom 51

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nr 2

95-114

EN

This article deals with the “is” – “ought” question in the Thomist natural law tradition. The 20th century revival of natural law theory, in jurisprudence and political theory, has placed its foundations under scrutiny. Do principles of natural law depend on conceptions of human nature? If so – how? Two central claims are made in this article. First, I put forth that there is no obvious position on human nature among contemporary natural law theorists. Some thinkers argue that a natural law doctrine must not rely on accounts of human nature at all. Such is the view of John Finnis, who has been particularly influential in shaping a present understanding of natural law. Several theorists of the tradition, however, find a certain kind of dependence necessary and vehemently argue against Finnis’ interpretation. I suggest, secondly, using a distinction made by David Miller, that the disagreement on human nature is not substantial, but rests on whether one speaks of “dependence” as a matter of logical entailment, as Finnis’ does, or as presuppositional grounding, which seems to be the concept employed by his critics. I argue that one may safely deny that normative principles are derived from accounts of human nature (rejecting the former kind of dependence), while also presupposing that human nature conditions those principles (assuming dependence of the latter kind). Lastly, I put forth two questions that arise for natural law theorists, if they wish to maintain this position.

16

THE SERVIENT CHARACTER OF POLITICAL POWER ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

63%

Tarasiewicz P.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2014

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tom 3

399-413

EN

The author attempts to justify the thesis of the servient character of political power. By his analyses, he arrives at two conclusions. First, the ultimate goal of service fulfilled by political power should be identical with the natural goal of every human being, meaning a life of virtue. Hence, service to the cause of the citizens’ virtue requires that the fundamental duties of power include the protection of public peace, the promotion of actions towards the common good, and striving for a common abundance of worldly possessions. Second, to elect those in political power it is necessary to make sure that aspirants to such are characterized by the appropriate level of virtuous development. Each candidate should be first and foremost a person possessing a high moral quality (virtus boni viri), where prudence and magnanimity appear to be virtues especially fitting power (virtutes boni principis).

17

Pojęcie natury ludzkiej w nauce i teologii

63%

van der Meer J. M.

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy

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2013

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tom 10

243-250

PL

W obawie, że zmiany w naukowym rozumieniu przyrody wymuszą zmiany w przekonaniach religijnych, wielu chrześcijan utrzymuje religię i naukę w separacji. Chcąc złagodzić tę obawę, wykluczają istnienie oddziaływania między tymi dziedzinami, redukując jego złożoność. Naukę oraz religię sprowadza się na przykład do odrębnych dziedzin wiedzy, w których obowiązują ich własne, swoiste twierdzenia. Religię rozumie się jako pozalogiczny sposób funkcjonowania człowieka zwany wiarą, charakteryzujący się emocjonalnym spojrzeniem na świat. Jeśli zastosuje się teorię typów logicznych do religii i nauki, relacje logiczne mogą zachodzić wyłącznie pomiędzy logicznymi dziedzinami wiedzy. Dlatego między religią a nauką nie mogą zachodzić żadne relacje logiczne, jeśli tę pierwszą rozumie się jako pozalogiczny sposób funkcjonowania człowieka zwany wiarą, drugą zaś - jako logiczny sposób funkcjonowania. Niemniej udało się zidentyfikować przynajmniej jedną relację logiczną między religią a nauką, a wywierały one na siebie wpływ także na inne sposoby. Moja propozycja pozwala na wyjaśnienie tych sposobów oddziaływania dzięki zastąpieniu jednowymiarowych logicznych koncepcji poznania, takich jak syntaktyczne oraz semantyczne ujęcia teorii, wielowymiarową koncepcją poznania. Własne, alternatywne wyjaśnienie rozpocznę od osadzenia oddziaływań pomiędzy religią a nauką w naturze ludzkiej, ponieważ wyłącznie ludzie stoją w relacji zarówno do Boga, jak i przyrody. Następnie rozróżnię zakres nieredukowalnych sposobów funkcjonowania człowieka, ujawniających się w odpowiadających sobie wymiarach relacji osoby do Boga oraz przyrody. Posłużywszy się dwoma spośród tych wymiarów - zawierzeniem Bogu i poznaniem - jako przykładami, wykażę, że oddziaływanie pomiędzy religią a nauką rozumie się jako zachodzące pomiędzy (1) zawierzeniem Bogu (wiarą) a przekonaniami dotyczącymi Boga (teologią); (b) zawierzeniem Bogu (wiarą) a przekonaniami dotyczącymi świata (nauką) oraz (c) przekonaniami dotyczącymi Boga (teologią) a przekonaniami dotyczącymi świata (nauką). Argumentuję, że wszystkie razem i każdy z osobna sposób funkcjonowania człowieka może na siebie wzajemnie oddziaływać. Przykład takiego oddziaływania stanowi metaforyczne przeniesienie znaczenia między każdą z wymienionych powyżej par sposobów funkcjonowania człowieka.

EN

Many Christians separate religion and science for fear that changes in scientific understanding of nature will force changes in religious belief. To alleviate this fear, many Christians define interaction out of existence by reducing its complexity. For instance, science is often reduced to a logical domain of knowledge characterized by its propositions. Religion is taken to be a non-logical way of human functioning known as trusting characterized by feelings. According to the doctrine of logical types there can be logical relations only between logical domains of knowledge. Therefore, there can be no logical relations between religion and science if religion is taken to be a non-logical way of human functioning known as trusting, and science as a logical way of functioning. Yet one logical relation has been identified, and religion and science have affected each other’s content in other ways. These ways can be accounted for, I propose, by replacing one-dimensional logical conceptions of knowing such as the syntactic and semantic views of theory with a multi-dimensional conception of knowing. I begin my alternative account of the interaction between religion and science by grounding it in human nature because only people stand in relation to both God and nature. Next, I distinguish a range of irreducible ways of human functioning which correspond with dimensions of a person’s relation with God and with nature. Using two of these dimensions as an example — trusting and knowing — I show that interaction between religion and science is seen to be between (a) trust in God (faith) and beliefs about God (theology), (b) trust in God (faith) and beliefs about the world (science) and (c) beliefs about God (theology) and beliefs about the world (science). I argue that there can be interaction between each and every way of human functioning by means of the metaphoric transfer of meaning, for instance, between each of the pairs of functioning just listed.

18

Czy psychologia potrzebuje koncepcji ludzkiej natury?

63%

Flis M.

|

EN

The primary thesis of this article is in accord with the postulate that notions about mankind are rooted in the concept of human nature. From the perspective of the history of ideas, it is clearly evident that the essence of the human being is intertwined with history while the influence of this intrinsic understanding of man has been and continues to exceed that of history. The strongest evidence of this is found in the philosophy of the human individual constantly present in the psychological discourse despite the intervening, temporary dominance of the empirical paradigm. The belief that everything can be measured and counted stems from mythical thought. This text undertakes an attempt to categorize the conceptual apparatus of contemporary cognitive science. Concurrently, it indicates the definitions and relationships which encompass such concepts as the mind, consciousness, and thinking.

19

Marxova filosofická antropologie

63%

Landa I.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2015

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tom 63

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nr 3

339-355

EN

The central question of philosophical anthropology is: What is the difference between man and other living beings? While traditionally philosophers attempted to answer this question by pointing to a certain property or ability belonging exclusively to man, Karl Marx performed a theoretical revolution in philosophical anthropology by introducing a new way of how to deal with the problem of anthropological difference. The aim of the paper is, firstly, to analyse the very form, which is common for the answers to the central question of philosophical anthropology, and to describe the dynamic which is characteristic for discussions concerning the anthropological difference. Secondly it depicts Ludwig Feuerbach’s solution to the problem, in which he introduced the concept of a species being. The third step focuses on Marx’s understanding of human nature, in which a central place is given to the concept of species powers. The fourth step sketches Marx’s own solution to the problem of the anthropological difference. In the final step a consideration is given to the underlying motivation of this solution.

20

Between Historicism and Essentialism. The Critical Ambitions of Gernot Böhme’s Philosophical Anthropology

63%

Czerniak S.

Dialogue and Universalism

|

2016

|

nr 3

59-76

EN

Gernot Böhme’s philosophical anthropology combines a historistic-descriptive and a normative approach (“historical models of man,” the axiological “sovereign man” project).The author describes both types of philosophical narrative in detail, together with the categorial and argumentative inconsistencies which appear on their crossing point. His thesis is that the German philosopher attempts to neutralize these aporias by reference to the category of “relief” (Entlastung) and an argumentative strategy close to the position of thinkers like Jürgen Habermas, who made use of the “relief” category in his critical bioethical analyses.