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The Downward Causality and the Hard Problem of Consciousness or Why Computer Programs Do not Work in the Dark

100%

Boldachev A.

Studia Humana

2014

tom 3

nr 4

7-10

Any low-level processes, the sequence of chemical interactions in a living cell, muscle cellular activity, processor commands or neuron interaction, is possible only if there is a downward causality, only due to uniting and controlling power of the highest level. Therefore, there is no special “hard problem of consciousness”, i.e. the problem of relation of ostensibly purely biological materiality and non-causal mentality - we have only the single philosophical problem of relation between the upward and downward causalities, the problem of interrelation between hierarchic levels of existence. It is necessary to conclude that the problem of determinacy of chemical processes by the biological ones and the problem of neuron interactions caused by consciousness are of one nature and must have one solution.

Cognitive phenomenology : the promising pragmatic marriage of methodologies in the field of theatre studies?

63%

Motal J.

Theatralia: Revue současného myšlení o divadelní kultuře (Theatralia: The revue of contemporary thought on theatre culture)

2016

tom 19

nr 2

59-75

The article presents cognitive phenomenology as a new methodological possibility for the humanities, and especially theatre studies, avoiding communication theory reductionism. The author adapts the perspective of amalgamated mind (ROWLANDS 2010), and elaborates its usefulness for the study of art. The article also interprets Aristotle's practical wisdom as a concept fully compatible with the cognitive perspective, and shows that the cognitive perspective should not be contradictory to the phenomenological one. The relation of phenomenality to the amalgamated mind is also discussed. The author concludes that the 'marriage of methodologies' will be successful, but only if the irreducible natures of phenomenality and embodied mind are preserved.