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EN
Safety engineering has become a challenging and rewarding career field in the present day age of rapid technological and scientific advances. But how to raise student’s awareness regarding the legal and regulatory requirements introduced by safety organizations and government agencies? The aim of this paper is to show how successful cooperation between professionals in the field of safety engineering, especially functional safety and experienced university language teachers can boost student motivation and inspire them to face the social and industrial needs of changing business environments. We will try to prove that a tailor-made course provides students with efficient information about the subject, source material and vocabulary from the field of safety engineering. It will also enable students to use knowledge to respond to hazards and accidents. It will teach them to take independent decisions in emergency situations and prepare them to feel comfortable in the global business.
EN
Safety engineering has become a challenging and rewarding career field in the present day age of rapid technological and scientific advances. But how to raise student’s awareness regarding the legal and regulatory requirements introduced by safety organizations and government agencies? The aim of this paper is to show how successful cooperation between professionals in the field of safety engineering, especially functional safety and experienced university language teachers can boost student motivation and inspire them to face the social and industrial needs of changing business environments. We will try to prove that a tailor-made course provides students with efficient information about the subject, source material and vocabulary from the field of safety engineering. It will also enable students to use knowledge to respond to hazards and accidents. It will teach them to take independent decisions in emergency situations and prepare them to feel comfortable in the global business.
EN
This article addresses the issue of human reliability analysis (HRA) in the context of accident scenarios. The need for contextual analysis of human operator behavior with careful treating of errors and dependent failures within given accident scenario is emphasized. The functional safety analysis including the human reliability analysis is illustrated on example of the protection layers of a hazardous industrial system that includes the basic process control system (BPCS), human-operator (HO) and safety instrumented systems (SIS) designed with regard to the functional safety criteria.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia zagadnienie analizy niezawodności człowieka (HRA) w kontekście scenariuszy awaryjnych. Podkreślono potrzebę kontekstowej analizy zachowania człowieka ze starannym traktowaniem błędów i uszkodzeń zależnych w rozważanym scenariuszu awaryjnym. Analizę bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego z uwzględnieniem oceny niezawodności człowieka zilustrowano na przykładzie warstw zabezpieczeń przemysłowego systemu podwyższonego ryzyka, który obejmuje główny system sterowania procesu (BPCS), człowieka-operatora (HO) i przyrządowe systemy bezpieczeństwa (SIS) zaprojektowane z uwzględnieniem kryteriów bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego.
EN
The aim of this article is to identify and discuss some issues of the safety systems’ design for nuclear power plants equipped with the light water reactors using a defence in depth (D-in-D) conception. Because the functional safety solutions play nowadays an important role for the risk control, the basic requirements for the instrumentation and control systems are specified with regard to relevant international standards. For the design purposes the safety functions are categorized into three categories. The I&C systems implementing these functions are assigned to one of three classes that conform to defined design, manufacturing and qualification requirements. These systems are designed to implement functions of relevant categories. Additional design requirements are discussed, including hardware and software aspects, to achieve and maintain the required reliability commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed to reduce risk.
EN
Mechatronics elements are very often used as parts of the safety-related devises or systems. As they are used with or as parts of electric/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems, the estimation of theirs safety integrity level (SIL) is very important. On examples of elements presented in manufactures catalogues and according the guidelines done in EN 61508-1, the SIL's of elements characterised be the lifetime by continuous mode of operation were assessed. The proposal of SIL evaluation for the discrete elements, is also presented. Some conclusions are formulated.
PL
Elementy mechatroniczne są często stosowane jako części urządzeń lub systemów związanych z bezpieczeństwem. Ponieważ są używane razem z elektrycznymi/elektronicznym /programowalnymi elektronicznymi systemami związanymi z bezpieczeństwem lub jako ich części, to jest istotne oszacowanie ich poziomu nienaruszalności bezpieczeństwa (SIL). Na przykładach elementów prezentowanych w katalogach wytwórców według wskazówek podanych w EN 61508-1 oszacowano SIL elementów scharakteryzowanych trwałością przy pracy ciągłej. Przedstawiono także propozycję wyznaczenia SIL w przypadku elementów dyskretnych. Sformułowano wnioski.
EN
This chapter addresses the systems engineering approach to integrated functional safety and cybersecurity analysis and management regarding selected references, standards and requirements concerning critical installations and their industrial automation and control system (IACS). The objective is to mitigate the vulnerability of industrial installations that include the information technology (IT) and the operational technology (OT) to reduce relevant risks. This approach includes verifying the safety integrity level (SIL) of defined safety functions, and then to check the level obtained taking into account the security assurance level (SAL) of particular domain, such as a safety related control system (SRCS), in which given safety function is to be implemented. The SAL is determined based on a vector of fundamental requirements (FRs). The method proposed uses defined risk graphs for the individual and/or the societal risk, and relevant risk criteria, for determining the SIL required of given safety function, and probabilistic models to verify the SIL achievable for the SRCS architecture to be designed and then implemented in an industrial installation.
EN
This article addresses selected aspects of the alarm system and human factors that should be evaluated during the design and operation of an industrial hazardous installation. In such installations the layer of protection analysis (LOPA) methodology is often applied for simplified risk analysis based on defined accident scenarios. To reduce and control the risks the safety instrumented functions (SIFs) are identified and their safety integrity levels (SILs) determined taking into account defined criteria the risk evaluation results. Given SIF is implemented using the basic process control system (BPCS), the alarm system (AS) and the safety instrumented system (SIS). Nevertheless a crucial role plays the human-operator undertaking safety-related decisions during potential abnormal situations and accidents. Below some issues concerning requirements for the alarm system design in context of human factors are outlined and discussed.
8
Content available Functional safety analysis including human factors
88%
EN
In this paper selected aspects of human factors are discussed that should be taken into account during the design of safety-related functions for a complex hazardous installation and its protections. In such installations the layer of protection analysis (LOPA) methodology is often used for simplified risk analysis based on defined accident scenarios. To control the risk the safety instrumented functions (SIFs) are identified and their safety integrity levels (SILs) determined with regard to results of risk assessment. Given SIF is to be realised by the electric/ electronic/ programmable electronic system (E/E/PES) or safety instrumented system (SIS) and the human-operator. The SIL is to be verified according to requirements and criteria given in international standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. Selected issues related to designing the alarm system (AS) with regard to human factors are outlined. Some aspects of human reliability analysis (HRA) as a part of human-machine interface (HMI) assessing and probabilistic modelling of the system are shortly discussed.
EN
The approach addresses selected technical and organization aspects of risk mitigation in the oil port installations with regard to functional safety and security requirements specified in standards IEC 61508, IEC 61511 and IEC 62443. The procedure for functional safety management includes the hazard identification, risk analysis and assessment, specification of overall safety requirements and definition of safety functions. Based on the risk evaluation results the safety integrity level (SIL) and security assurance level (SAL) will be determined for consecutive safety functions. The proposed approach will be composed of the following items: process and procedure based safety and security management, example of procedure based safety management including insurance, integrated safety and security assessment of industrial control system (ICS) of the oil port pipelines, tanks and critical infrastructure.
EN
Cognitive engineering is considered nowadays as interesting multidisciplinary domain that focuses on improving the relations between humans and the systems that are supervised and operated. The industrial automation and control systems (IACS) in hazardous plants are increasingly computerized and perform various safety functions. These are designed and implemented according to the functional safety concept. The objective is to maintain high performance / productivity and reduce various risks related to identified hazards and threats. An approach is proposed to apply selected cognitive engineering methods for verifying the design of the functional safety technology implemented in given hazardous plant in context of defined safety functions, operator interfaces, communication means and procedures. The methodology developed might be applied for functional safety management in life cycle of industrial hazardous plants and oil port terminals.
11
Content available Can we use IEC 61850 for safety related functions?
88%
EN
Safety is an essential issue for processes that present high risk for human beings and environment. An acceptable level of risk is obtained both with actions on the process itself (risk reduction) and with the use of special safety systems that switch the process into safe mode when a fault or an abnormal operation mode happens. These safety systems are today based on digital devices that communicate through digital networks. The IEC 61508 series specifies the safety requirements of all the devices that are involved in a safety function, including the communication network. Also electrical generation and distribution systems are processes that may have a significant level of risk, so the criteria stated by the IEC 61508 applies. Starting from this consideration, the paper analyzes the safety requirement for the communication network and compare them with the services of the communication protocol IEC 61850 that represents the most used protocol for automation of electrical plants. The goal of this job is to demonstrate that, from the technical point of view, IEC 61850 can be used for implementing safety-related functions, even if a formal safety certification is still missing.
12
Content available remote Obliczanie jakości funkcji bezpieczeństwa
88%
PL
Producenci maszyn są prawnie zobowiązani do produkowania maszyn zgodnych z nową Dyrektywą Maszynową. Ważną rolę odgrywa przy tym pojęcie bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego, a więc i funkcje bezpieczeństwa. Wraz z podporządkowanymi dyrektywie nowymi normami ISO 13849 i IEC 62061 wprowadzono - oprócz miar czysto jakościowych - także i aspekty ilościowe. Dzięki temu można wykazać za pomocą obliczeń, jaka jest jakość określonej funkcji bezpieczeństwa. Przeprowadzanie tego typu obliczeń wspomaga narzędzie kalkulacyjne Safety Evaluation Tool, należące do programu Safety Integrated firmy Siemens.
EN
In the study, the functional safety of the hydraulic drive control system of a tracked undercarriage used as a mobile platform for a robotic bricklaying system (RBS) was evaluated. Hazards and risks caused by the hydraulic drive control system of the rubber track undercarriage were identified. The schematic diagram and main components of the conventional hydraulic drive control system of a tracked undercarriage are presented. The functions and parameters of the components of the hydraulic power and control system are discussed. In a conventional hydraulic drive, the safety function is fulfilled by failsafe brakes built into the hydraulic motors. To ensure that the RBS works safely on the construction site, it was necessary to introduce an advanced safe control system for the hydraulic drive of the tracked undercarriage. An advanced safe control system for the hydraulic drive of the tracked undercarriage includes hydraulic control valves with safety functions, a category 3 safe two-channel control architecture, and a safety microcontroller. SISTEMA software tools were utilized to determine safety functions and calculate their specifications. Based on the specifications of the safety function associated with the category of safety control architecture, the achievable performance level of the hydraulic drive control system for the tracked chassis was determined.
EN
In the process of designing safety systems, an integrated approach in safety and cybersecurity analysis is necessary. The paper describes a new technique of increasing resilience through integrated analysis of functional safety and cybersecurity. It is a modeling methodology based on the combination of the multifactor method utilizing modified risk graphs, used previously for Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment, and the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) approach. The NFR approach, based on the analysis of graphical representation of conceptual and physical components of the system, contributes a technique to include cybersecurity through the Softgoal Interdependency Graph. The assessment methodology is outlined in detail and applied to a case study involving an industrial control system. The analysis turns out to be effective in both aspects: confirming the findings of the multifactor approach based on modified risk graphs and complementing the traditional analysis to increase resilience in discovering and mitigating security vulnerabilities for SIL assessment by the use of NFR.
PL
W niniejszym artykule przedstawia się wybrane zagadnienia związane z oceną bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego w nawiązaniu do normy międzynarodowej IEC 61508. Zarysowuje się dobór właściwej architektury systemu zabezpieczeniowego, projektowanego w oparciu o sterowniki PLC dla odpowiedniego poziomu nienaruszalności bezpieczeństwa SIL, wynikającego z przeprowadzonej wcześniej oceny ryzyka.
EN
In this paper selected issues of functional safety assessment in relation to international standard IEC 61508 are presented. Determining of a proper architecture of the protection system that is designed using PLC controllers, for appropriate safety integrity level (SIL) obtained from the risk assessment, is outlined.
EN
The paper deals with the problem of choosing an appropriate inspection interval for monitoring of safety related control systems in machinery. According to international standards the safety related systems are categorized according to their Safety Integrity Levels or Performance Levels, depending on their reliability parameters. Extremely simple, approximate models have been proposed in order to provide practitioners without reliability training with useful tools for the determination of inspection policies. The method(s) based on the required availability of the system. The paper presents some practical examples of systems of categories B, 1 and 3, respectively. The frequencies of periodical inspection are calculated for: system monitoring closure of the door, behind which a dangerous element moves slowly, system of monitoring the access door on the automated production line and system, in which a light curtain is employed to monitor the access to the dangerous zone of an automatic assembly machine.
PL
W nawiązaniu do poprzedniej publikacji autora [1] zwrócono uwagę, że na Warsztatach CRITIS'2010 pojawiły się publikacje dotyczące analizy zagrożeń powstających w sieciach informatycznych sterujących infrastrukturą krytyczną i ilościowej oceny odporności na te zagrożenia. Ta tematyka ma wiele aspektów wspólnych z tematyką oceny zagrożeń i ryzyka stosowaną w bezpieczeństwie funkcjonalnym [3]. Zaproponowano zastosowanie tych metod w ocenie zagrożeń w sieciach informatycznych.
EN
Referring to the precedent publication of the author [1] the attention is direct to the fact, during Workshop CRITIS'2010 are occurred publications concerning threats analysis in the information networks controlling the critical infrastructure and quantitative assessment of the networks resilience. It is to note the many of aspects of these are common with the methods applied in the functional safety [3]. Use of functional safety methods to threats assessment in information networks is proposed.
18
Content available remote Bezpieczeństwo funkcjonalne - awers i rewers
75%
PL
Na tle cyklu życia bezpieczeństwa i zmniejszania ryzyka urządzeń i procesów technicznych przedstawiono idee bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego. Omówiono wymagania dotyczące nienaruszalności bezpieczeństwa urządzeń związanych z bezpieczeństwem i wskazano podstawowe sposoby osiągania wymaganych parametrów bezpieczeństwa, których stosowania wymagają odnośne. Na zakończenie zarysowano zagadnienie walidacji bezpieczeństwa funkcjonalnego.
EN
On the background of the safety life cycle and risk reduction of the technical devices and processes, the idea of the functional safety is presented. The safety integrity requirements for the safety-related devises are discussed and the basic measures to reach the safety parameters required by the relevant standards are indicated. On the ending the problem of functional safety validation is outlined.
EN
The aim of this article is to identify and discuss some methodological issues that are of interest among functional safety specialists and experts after publication of the second edition of international standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, including the design and implementing the safety-related functions of higher safety integrity levels and protection layers. The basic role of safety-related systems is to reduce effectively and to control in time the individual and/or societal risk with regard to its tolerable levels. These issues include: risk criteria, reliability data, probabilistic models of systems operating in high and/or low mode, dependent failures, human reliability analysis, security of programmable safety-related systems, and reducing uncertainty issues in decision making process applying the cost-benefit analysis. Selected aspects of these issues are discussed and some challenges requiring further research are indicated.
20
Content available remote PLCnext Technology w obliczu rozwoju IIoT i Przemysłu 4.0
75%
PL
Internet Rzeczy (Internet of Things – IoT) w ostatnich latach szturmem zdobywa rynek rozwiązań IT i odmieniany jest przez wszystkie przypadki.
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