The aim of this study is to refute the frequent and repeated critical objections to Singer’s almost four-decades-old argument against speciesism. These objections are based, above all, on misunderstanding. There is misunderstanding not only of the argument itself, but also of Singer’s methodological starting point, which we have termed “Singer’s ethical razor”. In the text we show why it is not possible to reject Singer’s utilitarian argument only by rejecting utilitarianism en bloc. In the same way, we show why it is not appropriate to charge Singer with failing to extend his ethics to include plants and lifeless nature. In fact the opposite is true because Singer clearly demonstrates how environmental ethics relating to the protection of the wild can be based on the same principle of the equal consideration of interests which is the basis for the moral unacceptability of speciesism.
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