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folk psychology only as a speculative artefact, but there is also another notion of folk psychology as a basic conceptual schema which organizes experience. The specific scientific approach to folk psychology is described, some arguments against the view of folk psychology as a theory are pointed and the alternative notion of folk psychology is demonstrated in this article.
possible problemswith one strategy of naturalization, i.e. radical naturalization with classicalelimination. Our conclusion will be that despite various attempts, every projectof naturalization of law will have to resolve the tension between law and folkpsychology and such resolution would not be achieved by simple reduction orelimination of folk psychology. A variety of non-standard solutions might be inplace to resolve this tension. We will only outline those strategies here.
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2658-283X. DOI:https://doi.org/10.14746/ikps.2019.27.17 A growing body of literature has focused on individuals with autism spectrum disorder who are entering adulthood. Thus, one of the main topics is social interactions and the issue of their functioning in professional contexts. Researchers focus their attention on those individuals’ folk theories that are also crucial in the lives of the normative sample. One of the key folk theories that guide our professional lives is a folk image of the creative person. The folk theory is nothing more than tacit knowledge held by a group of people. It is a system of beliefs and an inner standard of assessment that serves us to explain, for example, why we believe that someone is creative or when we assess the effects of their work. The aim of this paper is to present chosen findings from our study of the folk theory of creativity and creative person using a sample of persons with an autism spectrum disorder. We used a reversed version of Klaus Urban’s and Hans Jellen’s Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production (TCT-DP) where respondents selected previously prepared drawings, instead of making them. Their task was to select the most and least creative drawings and rank all the drawings according totheir level of creativity. We also measured respondents’ levels of creative efficiency and creative identity.
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normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program.
linii a ukáži, že představuje hlavní motiv práce Churchlandových od konce 80. let 20. století, a dále předvedu, proč úspěch argumentace proti hypotéze jazyka myšlení nezakládá důvod k eliminaci lidové psychologie. V závěru text přezkoumám důsledky tohoto přístupu pro roli lidové psychologie ve zkoumání mysli a ukazuje, že tato oslabená eliminativistická pozice stále naplňuje původní záměr programu Churchlandových.
i początku XX wieku. Przedstawione są także analizy specyficznych cech świadomości religijnej inteligencji rosyjskiej. Autor zwraca szczególną uwagę na fenomen «starczestwa» i jego znaczenie w literaturze rosyjskiej. Zestawienie egodokumentalnych i artystycznych źródeł pozwala na stworzenie wyobrażenia o cechach szczególnych religijno-filozoficznego myślenia Priszwina, o sposobach przyswojenia przez niego psychologii i wiedzy ludowej.
Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century is characterised. The specific features of the religious consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia are also analysed. Special attention is paid to the phenomenon of the “eldership” and its significance in Russian literature. This comparison of Prishvin’s egodocumentary and artistic sources allows us to present specific aspects of his religious and philosophical thinking, and how Prishvin assimilated folk psychology and folk faith.
Анализируются специфические черты религиозного сознания русской интеллигенции. Особое внимание уделяется феномену старчества и его значению в русской литературе. Сопоставление автодокументальных и художественных источников Пришвина позволяет составить представление об особенностях его религиозно-философского мышления, о способах усвоения Пришвиным народной психологии и народной веры.
Its subsequent detailed characteristics is followed by outlined methodological perspective appropriate for its analysis.
action, as well as the specific attitude of the agent to the action. The author of “Action, Reason and Cause” believes that the proattitude/ belief pair helps determine the reason for action, which is at the same time the action’s cause. Davidson’s view has a lot of supporters today and is strictly related to the so-called post-Humean theories of action. The objective of the present analysis is to demonstrate that the primary reason for action is not provided by the pro-attitude/belief pair, but by predictions due to which agents act in such and such a way. This expands on Elizabeth Anscombe’s intuition according to which each intention is predictive in nature. I will support the thesis about the predictive nature of reasons for action by means of two arguments. The first argument relies on the analysis of the Knobe effect concerning the asymmetry between attributing intentionality and attributing responsibility for actions; the other draws upon the theory of predictive processing. The remainder of this paper has the following structure: in §1, I will discuss Donald Davidson’s theory. §2 will focus on Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception. In §3, I will examine an argument drawn from the analysis of the Knobe effect, according to which an agent will intentionally perform a given action when he can predict the effects of performing it. §4 will introduce the problem of providing reasons for action in the context of folkpsychological explanations. §5 will examine the theory of predictive processing. §6 will demonstrate that predictions serve a specific, normative role in the decision-making processes, whereas §7 will advance the argument from predictive processing whereby to explain an action is to identify specific predictive reasoning which caused the action to be performed . In the Conclusions, I will show the consequences of my main thesis for the problem of the nature of actions and explanations, as well as the rationale for using folk-psychological categories.
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normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
interpretacji PZN, deskryptywnej i normatywnej, oraz dokładne zbadanie argumentacji przedstawionej dla każdej z nich z osobna, wskazuję zawarte w nich błędy oraz problemy związane z uzgodnieniem ich z wynikami badań prowadzonych w psychologii poznawczej i klinicznej. Uzasadniam, dlaczego PZN nie może być wyprowadzona z żadnego ze stanowisk metafizycznych dotyczących nastawień sądzeniowych i że posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań powinno być uznane za możliwe. Następnie piszę, dlaczego zinterpretowanie niektórych podmiotów jako posiadających sprzeczne przekonania może być bardziej efektywne w wyjaśnianiu przypadków nieracjonalnego zachowania niż rozwiązania zgodne z PZN.
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