Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Znaleziono wyników: 9

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych:  folk psychology
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available What More is Folk Psychology?
|
|
nr 1
49-60
EN
Oridinary describing and explaining of everyday behavior became an object of systematic psychological study in the late-40s. The results create a picture of folk psychology as a primitive version of scientific psychology, kind of "naive" theory which is rather false. The picture represents
folk psychology only as a speculative artefact, but there is also another notion of folk psychology as a basic conceptual schema which organizes experience. The specific scientific approach to folk psychology is described, some arguments against the view of folk psychology as a theory are pointed and the alternative notion of folk psychology is demonstrated in this article.
Mniej
Więcej
2
Content available Folk Psychology and Law: the Case of Eliminativism
EN
The aim of this paper is very modest. First, we want to assess how differentstrategies of naturalization might deal with the need of using folk psychologyin legal domain. Second, we want to check whether folk psychology is indeedindispensable in the legal domain. Third, we want to describe
possible problemswith one strategy of naturalization, i.e. radical naturalization with classicalelimination. Our conclusion will be that despite various attempts, every projectof naturalization of law will have to resolve the tension between law and folkpsychology and such resolution would not be achieved by simple reduction orelimination of folk psychology. A variety of non-standard solutions might be inplace to resolve this tension. We will only outline those strategies here.
Mniej
Więcej
PL
Arkadiusz Gut, Małgorzata Moszyńska, Natalia Reszuta, Who Is a Creative Person? Conceptualisation of creativity by people with autism spectrum disorder. Interdisciplinary Contexts of Special Pedagogy, no. 27, Poznań 2019. Pp. 373–387. Adam Mickiewicz University Press. ISSN 2300-391X. e-ISSN
2658-283X. DOI:https://doi.org/10.14746/ikps.2019.27.17 A growing body of literature has focused on individuals with autism spectrum disorder who are entering adulthood. Thus, one of the main topics is social interactions and the issue of their functioning in professional contexts. Researchers focus their attention on those individuals’ folk theories that are also crucial in the lives of the normative sample. One of the key folk theories that guide our professional lives is a folk image of the creative person. The folk theory is nothing more than tacit knowledge held by a group of people. It is a system of beliefs and an inner standard of assessment that serves us to explain, for example, why we believe that someone is creative or when we assess the effects of their work. The aim of this paper is to present chosen findings from our study of the folk theory of creativity and creative person using a sample of persons with an autism spectrum disorder. We used a reversed version of Klaus Urban’s and Hans Jellen’s Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production (TCT-DP) where respondents selected previously prepared drawings, instead of making them. Their task was to select the most and least creative drawings and rank all the drawings according totheir level of creativity. We also measured respondents’ levels of creative efficiency and creative identity.
Mniej
Więcej
|
|
nr 2
EN
The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and
normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
Mniej
Więcej
5
Content available remote Eliminativní materialismus, lidová psychologie a jazyk myšlení:
|
|
nr 2
253-284
EN
The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely
examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program.
Mniej
Więcej
CS
Článek se věnuje rozboru eliminativního materialismu Paula a Patricie Churchlandových. V jejich eliminativismu rozliším dvě argumentační linie: jednu usilující o eliminaci lidové psychologie a druhou kritizující hypotézu jazyka myšlení Jerryho Fodora. Následně se blíže zaměřím na tuto druhou
linii a ukáži, že představuje hlavní motiv práce Churchlandových od konce 80. let 20. století, a dále předvedu, proč úspěch argumentace proti hypotéze jazyka myšlení nezakládá důvod k eliminaci lidové psychologie. V závěru text přezkoumám důsledky tohoto přístupu pro roli lidové psychologie ve zkoumání mysli a ukazuje, že tato oslabená eliminativistická pozice stále naplňuje původní záměr programu Churchlandových.
Mniej
Więcej
|
|
nr 7
87-100
PL
W artykule zostają poddane badaniu cechy szczególne religijno-filozoficznych poszukiwań Michaiła Michajłowicza Priszwina. Na materiale wczesnych dzienników pisarza przenalizowne są etapy jego dążeń do «słusznej wiary». Zostaje scharekteryzowana kulturalno-historyczna sytuacja Rosji końca XIX
i początku XX wieku. Przedstawione są także analizy specyficznych cech świadomości religijnej inteligencji rosyjskiej. Autor zwraca szczególną uwagę na fenomen «starczestwa» i jego znaczenie w literaturze rosyjskiej. Zestawienie egodokumentalnych i artystycznych źródeł pozwala na stworzenie wyobrażenia o cechach szczególnych religijno-filozoficznego myślenia Priszwina, o sposobach przyswojenia przez niego psychologii i wiedzy ludowej.
Mniej
Więcej
EN
This article examines the features of the religious and philosophical quests of Mikhail Mikhaylovich Prishvin. Based on material from the writer’s early diaries, the various stages of his search for the “correct faith” are traced. The cultural, historical and religious situation in
Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century is characterised. The specific features of the religious consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia are also analysed. Special attention is paid to the phenomenon of the “eldership” and its significance in Russian literature. This comparison of Prishvin’s egodocumentary and artistic sources allows us to present specific aspects of his religious and philosophical thinking, and how Prishvin assimilated folk psychology and folk faith.
Mniej
Więcej
RU
В статье рассматриваются особенности религиозно-философских исканий Михаила Михайловича Пришвина. На материале ранних дневников писателя прослеживаются этапы его поисков «правильной веры». Характеризуется культурно-историческая и религиозная обстановка в России конца XIX – начала XX вв.
Анализируются специфические черты религиозного сознания русской интеллигенции. Особое внимание уделяется феномену старчества и его значению в русской литературе. Сопоставление автодокументальных и художественных источников Пришвина позволяет составить представление об особенностях его религиозно-философского мышления, о способах усвоения Пришвиным народной психологии и народной веры.
Mniej
Więcej
EN
The article presents a meaning of the notion “political anthropodoxis” and justifies its analytical separation. The title category, inspired by the structure of philosophical anthropology thought and findings in folk psychology, is first placed into the system of political theory concepts.
Its subsequent detailed characteristics is followed by outlined methodological perspective appropriate for its analysis.
Więcej
|
|
nr 1
93-119
EN
The dominant view in contemporary philosophy of action is that, to explain an action we need to provide a reason for it. A reason is what rationalises an action. According to Donald Davidson, before we can describe a reason we must identify the need that accompanies the performance of a given
action, as well as the specific attitude of the agent to the action. The author of “Action, Reason and Cause” believes that the proattitude/ belief pair helps determine the reason for action, which is at the same time the action’s cause. Davidson’s view has a lot of supporters today and is strictly related to the so-called post-Humean theories of action. The objective of the present analysis is to demonstrate that the primary reason for action is not provided by the pro-attitude/belief pair, but by predictions due to which agents act in such and such a way. This expands on Elizabeth Anscombe’s intuition according to which each intention is predictive in nature. I will support the thesis about the predictive nature of reasons for action by means of two arguments. The first argument relies on the analysis of the Knobe effect concerning the asymmetry between attributing intentionality and attributing responsibility for actions; the other draws upon the theory of predictive processing. The remainder of this paper has the following structure: in §1, I will discuss Donald Davidson’s theory. §2 will focus on Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception. In §3, I will examine an argument drawn from the analysis of the Knobe effect, according to which an agent will intentionally perform a given action when he can predict the effects of performing it. §4 will introduce the problem of providing reasons for action in the context of folkpsychological explanations. §5 will examine the theory of predictive processing. §6 will demonstrate that predictions serve a specific, normative role in the decision-making processes, whereas §7 will advance the argument from predictive processing whereby to explain an action is to identify specific predictive reasoning which caused the action to be performed . In the Conclusions, I will show the consequences of my main thesis for the problem of the nature of actions and explanations, as well as the rationale for using folk-psychological categories.
Mniej
Więcej
|
|
nr 2
EN
The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and
normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.
Mniej
Więcej
PL
Celem tego tekstu jest rekonstrukcja i analiza argumentów przedstawianych za Psychologiczną Zasadą Niesprzeczności (PZN), stwierdzającą, że żaden podmiot nie może mieć sprzecznych przekonań lub być opisany jako posiadający sprzeczne przekonania. Poprzez rozróżnienie dwóch możliwych
interpretacji PZN, deskryptywnej i normatywnej, oraz dokładne zbadanie argumentacji przedstawionej dla każdej z nich z osobna, wskazuję zawarte w nich błędy oraz problemy związane z uzgodnieniem ich z wynikami badań prowadzonych w psychologii poznawczej i klinicznej. Uzasadniam, dlaczego PZN nie może być wyprowadzona z żadnego ze stanowisk metafizycznych dotyczących nastawień sądzeniowych i że posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań powinno być uznane za możliwe. Następnie piszę, dlaczego zinterpretowanie niektórych podmiotów jako posiadających sprzeczne przekonania może być bardziej efektywne w wyjaśnianiu przypadków nieracjonalnego zachowania niż rozwiązania zgodne z PZN.
Mniej
Więcej
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last