Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Sprawiedliwość podziału degresywnie proporcjonalnego

100%

Łyko J.

Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu

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2013

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nr 2 (23)

180-189

EN

The principle of degressively proportional distribution of seats in the European Parliament has been legally sanctioned under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus there appeared a solution which defied the perception of justice of distribution according to culturally shaped proportional allocation rules. Previous methods of determining the composition of collegiate bodies generally used the rule of proportional to the population of each constituency, composition of the legal body representing the society. On this basis, there are many socially accepted methods which have been tried and tested. In the field of electoral law regulations the rule of degressive proportionality is a new solution, and as such it still lacks tradition and already shaped approval that may justify its use. This article aims to find justification for this solution as opposed to the socially accep- table methods of distribution of goods and debts. In order to arrive at this argument the article reaches back to Aristotle’s philosophical concept, as well as solutions taken from the Talmud. It turns out that the degressive proportionality falls within the accepted concepts of equitable distribution. It offers an intermediate solution between equal and proportional allocation. There are also legitimate reasons for the use of degressively proportional rule in the process of allocating seats in the European Parliament. The problem is only the lack of unambiguity of the rule and the lack of precise reasoning to determine the boundary conditions at the level set in the Lisbon Treaty. This creates a very high degree of freedom of interpretation, leaving room for political negotiations on the acceptance of specific proposals. This situation has led to the point that, since the legal acceptance of the principle of degressive proportionality, the rule has not been applied in practice. Proposals for the composition of the European Parliament presented at the beginning of 2013 for the term 2014-2019 indicate that over the next five years exceptions to this rule will be approved. The second part of the paper presents proposals on solving the problem that can be found in the literature, as well as two other directions for seeking fair allocation. They cannot be deprived of discretion, as, of course, it is not possible to obtain conclusive decisions without the introduction of additional postulates. These postulates aim at clarifying the determination of the boundary conditions in such a way as to reduce the number of possible solutions or introduce an additional rule that will allow for an unambiguous (for a given population) specification of composition of the European Parliament. This is possible thanks to, inter alia, the ability to generate all feasible solutions. In this situation the solution of the problem is to select one out of a finite number of known divisions according to an established criterion. This frees the process of selecting the composition of the European Parliament from political considerations, and moves the weight of the debate to the ground of determining the said additional criterion. The current problem concerning the distribution of seats in the European Parliament is of course more general. The conditions that caused sanctioning of such a solution are of economic and social origin. It is expected that in the future the number of problems associated with allocation of goods, that are solved in this way, will be greater than they are currently. Undoubtedly, inequalities in various aspects of social existence favor the issue.

2

Finding the Pareto optimal equitable allocation of homogeneous divisible goods among three players

100%

Dall'Aglio M. , Di Luca C. , Milone L.

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tom Vol. 27, No. 3

35--50

EN

We consider the allocation of a finite number of homogeneous divisible items among three players. Under the assumption that each player assigns a positive value to every item, we develop a simple algorithm that returns a Pareto optimal and equitable allocation. This is based on the tight relationship between two geometric objects of fair division: The Individual Pieces Set (IPS) and the Radon–Nykodim Set (RNS). The algorithm can be considered as an extension of the Adjusted Winner procedure by Brams and Taylor to the three-player case, without the guarantee of envy-freeness.

3

Axiomatization of divisor methods and weakly degressive proportionality

100%

Dniestrzański P.

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2017

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nr 14(18)

19-26

EN

The paper analyzes the differences between weakly degressive proportionality and proportional allocations represented by divisor methods. The analysis is accomplished by the axiomatization of divisor methods in line with Balinski and Young.

4

Formal procedures in rural development planning: a comparison of selected methods

63%

Kiryluk-Dryjska E.

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2020

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nr vol. 64, nr 4

63-74

EN

The objective of this paper is to compare and discuss the results of the multi-objective linear programming and bankruptcy rules applied to a practical structural policy budget allocation problem using the example of the Polish Rural Development Program 2007-2013. The spread, the Gini indexes and the Lorentz curves were used to compare the funds’ dispersion. The results show some similarities between the allocation performed by the linear programming model and the CEL method. Both of the procedures resulted in the allocation concentrated on a limited number of measures, assuring their high financing. Conversely, CEA allocation is the most similar to the actual allocation of the MARD. In both cases the financing is spread among all programs, with a special emphasis on satisfying programs with lower claims. The results demonstrate that, with the use of formal methods, decision-makers can choose if they are willing to set more dispersed or more concentrated budgets.

PL

Celem artykułu jest porównanie i omówienie wyników alokacyjnych dwóch formalnych metod podziału: modelu programowania liniowego oraz metod bankructwa zastosowanych do alokacji budżetu na przykładzie Programu Rozwoju Obszarów Wiejskich w Polsce 2007-2013. W celu porównania rezultatów alokacyjnych omawianych metod wykorzystano indeks Giniego oraz krzywe Lorentza. Wyniki wskazują na pewne podobieństwa między alokacją wykonywaną za pomocą modelu programowania liniowego a metodą bankructwa CEL. Efektem obu procedur jest koncentracja alokacji na ograniczonej liczbie działań zapewniających im wysokie finansowanie. Alokacja w wyniku zastosowania CEA jest najbardziej podobna do rzeczywistej alokacji MRiRW. W obu przypadkach finansowanie jest rozłożone na wszystkie programy, ze szczególnym naciskiem na zaspokojenie programów z niższymi roszczeniami. Wyniki pokazują, że za pomocą formalnych metod decydenci mogą wybierać, czy chcą ustalać bardziej rozproszone, czy bardziej skoncentrowane budżety.

5

Zastosowanie zasady równych ofiar do oceny sprawiedliwości taryfy podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych (PIT) w Polsce

63%

Słoczyński T.

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tom 259

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nr 10

23-47

EN

The aim of the paper is to perform an empirical analysis of the compatibility of the Polish personal income tax (PIT) function with the equal absolute sacrifice principle, which is a major principle of a fair division of tax burden. Throughout the empirical analysis, the author uses analytical methods proposed by Fisher (1927) and Young (1990). The Fisher method is based on calculating the variation in individual sacrifice according to an assumed utility function of income. The Young method is based on selecting the isoelastic utility function of income, which makes all taxpayers sacrifice most equally. Subsequently, a new tax function is determined, which guarantees equal absolute sacrifice according to the selected utility function of income, and compared with the actual tax function. The empirical analysis carried out by the author shows that the Polish personal income tax (PIT) function in 1999-2008 provided a good fit with the equal absolute sacrifice principle, while the sacrifice of most taxpayers was equalized according to reasonable utility functions. However, the author identified three groups of taxpayers whose sacrifice was significantly lower than required by the equal absolute sacrifice principle as well as described the time variation in the compatibility of the Polish tax function with the equal absolute sacrifice principle and in the progressivity of this function.

PL

Celem artykułu jest empiryczna analiza zgodności taryfy podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych (PIT) w Polsce z zasadą równych ofiar absolutnych, tj. jedną z podstawowych zasad sprawiedliwego podziału obciążeń podatkowych. Do realizacji tego celu zastosowano metody analizy zaproponowane przez Fishera [1927] i Younga [1990]. Metoda Fishera polega na określeniu zmienności ofiar ponoszonych przez podatników zgodnie z pewną, założoną na potrzeby analizy, postacią funkcji użyteczności dochodu. Metoda Younga polega na wyznaczeniu tej spośród izoelastycznych funkcji użyteczności dochodu, która w największym możliwym stopniu zrównuje ofiary ponoszone przez podatników; następnie wyznacza się taryfę podatku, która zrównuje ofiary wszystkich podatników względem otrzymanej funkcji użyteczności dochodu, i porównuje tę taryfę z faktyczną taryfą opodatkowania. Według przeprowadzonej analizy taryfa podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych (PIT) w Polsce w latach 1999-2008 była dość dobrze dopasowana do wymogów zasady równych ofiar absolutnych a ofiary większości podatników były zrównywane względem sensownych empirycznie funkcji użyteczności. Niemniej, wyróżniono trzy grupy podatników, których obciążenia podatkowe były niższe niż postulowane na gruncie zasady równych ofiar absolutnych, a także opisano zmienność w czasie zgodności taryfy opodatkowania w Polsce z zasadą równych ofiar absolutnych oraz progresywności tej taryfy.