The present text comprehensively discusses a book by Katarzyna Szopa entitled Poetyka rozkwitania. Różnica płciowa w filozofii Luce Irigaray [Poetics of Blossoming. Sexuate Difference in Philosophy of Luce Irigaray]. The author of the article posits the monograph in question within the continuum of contemporary feminist thought and sees it as an instance of redefining essentialism. What, as the author suggests, seems the most worthwhile about Szopa’s book is inscribing Luce Irigaray’s thought in feminist materialism, aside from the literary scholarship of the author adding value to her critical adroitness.
That thing, called nothing, is, in the least, something. It is something because everything, indeed, anything has a name; and it doesn’t matter whether what is being referred to is membered (true), or non-membered (false). This means that there actually are two senses of existence: something- ness and no-thing-ness; whether it is some or none, the central being is thing or thing-ness. This could be demonstrated from the angle of reference (epistemology), meaningfulness (linguistic), inference (Logic), and the relevance of an absence of some certain reality (usually negative and undesirable) in the definition another reality (night-day, God-Satan, good-bad, right-wrong, etc). By the writings of classical and modern theorists, these concepts and perceptions ignite contemplating reality beyond immediate experience dissolving into the following ideas: perception versus independent reality; that every event has a cause vis-a-vis the idea/law of contingency and necessity; corporeality/materiality versus immateriality; tension between essence or existence; and ultimately the scope or nature of being in relation to non-being. Present article argues that for anything to count as nothing, it must be something which essence is nothingness. It concludes that, if the essence of a thing is thing-ness, and if the essence of nothing is nothingness, then, nothing is ultimately something which thing-ness rests in its nothingness.
Gernot Böhme’s philosophical anthropology combines a historistic-descriptive and a normative approach (“historical models of man,” the axiological “sovereign man” project).The author describes both types of philosophical narrative in detail, together with the categorial and argumentative inconsistencies which appear on their crossing point. His thesis is that the German philosopher attempts to neutralize these aporias by reference to the category of “relief” (Entlastung) and an argumentative strategy close to the position of thinkers like Jürgen Habermas, who made use of the “relief” category in his critical bioethical analyses.
Dr TOMASZ NAKONECZNY – adiunkt w Instytucie Wschodnim Uniwersytetu im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu. Zajmuje się współczesnym literaturoznawstwem, głównie polskim i rosyjskim, kulturą popularną w Europie Wschodniej, a także historią idei obejmującą okres od oświecenia do ponowoczesności.
EN
The article poses the question on conditio humana on the background of conflict between the two ideological orientation of our time: constructivism and essentialism. The first orientation continues the project of human emancipation, whose initial ideas shaped the Enlightenment. In this framework, the man is a constructor of his world. The second orientation includes a number of traditions and paradigms, describing the man as irrevocably immersed in the world of standards and truths derived from the non-human reality. The author reflects on the implications of the this ideological conflict to our ideas of man as a creature of special moral status.
A standard contemporary formulation essentialism defines essential properties with a help of a concept of possible worlds. It is often argued that in order to use possible worlds effectively, facts about transworld identity of individuals need to be determined. In this paper I discuss how essentialist might attempt the issue of transworld identity of individuals. Specifically, I analyze a connection between essentialism and the two theories that explain the transworld identity issue, that is, haecceitism and antihaecceitism. I provide a detailed analysis of different variants of antihaecceitism and argue, that all of them are incompatible with basic intuitions that stay behind essentialism. In contrast to that, I defend a position that essentialism ought to be combined with some form of haecceitism. In the remainder of this paper I provide the two ways through which essentialist might be a haecceitist.
Ponieważ znam klienta w Amsterdamie, marzę, by odwiedzić Muzeum Van Gogha. Zobaczyć jego oryginały i poczuć to, co on czuł. Chcę inspirować się jego obrazami, bo wtedy mój cel będzie bardziej wyraźny – czytamy napisy w filmie China’s Van Goghs (2016). Trudno nam zrozumieć znaczenie tej wypowiedzi producenta masowych replik. Czy jego pragnieniem jest pogłębienie wiedzy typu knowing that czy chce tylko podnieść efektywność posiadanej już wiedzy typu knowing how? Ale po cóż Zhao Xiaoyong – dysponujący coraz lepszą chińską connectivity – miałby trudzić się, skoro nie ma gwarancji, że jego świetnie prosperujący biznes dostarczy doskonalsze efekty sztuki niż oryginały Van Gogha? Czy istnieją inne konteksty – jak na przykład uczenie bez nadzoru – w których możemy inaczej spojrzeć na słynne rozróżnienie Gilberta Ryle’a i uprzywilejowaną pozycję dobrze ugruntowanej wiedzy?
EN
“Since I know the client in Amsterdam I have a dream to visit the Van Gogh Museum. See his originals and to feel how he felt. I want to get some inspiration from his paintings then my goal will be more clear,” read the subtitles in the movie China’s Van Goghs (2016). It is difficult for us to understand what the mass replicas manufacturer means. Does he want to deepen the knowledge of the knowing that type or does he simply want to increase the effectiveness of the knowledge of the knowing how type? But why would Zhao Xiaoyong – who has increasingly better Chinese connectivity – bother, despite the objections voiced by his wife, who is in charge of their home budget, since there is no guarantee that his thriving business will provide better art effects than Van Gogh originals? Are there other contexts – as, for example, Unsupervised Learning – in which we can look differently at Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction and privileged position of well-established knowledge?
The question of the real distinction between esse and essence in being constitutes the core of Thomistic ontology. While there is a primacy of esse over essence, such as that of the founding over the founded, one must neglect neither of these aspects in the analysis of the act-potency transcendental relationship that links them. Through a brief historical journey—from the years following the death of St. Thomas Aquinas to the present—the author tries to show the way in which the notion of esse has been gradually distorted and obscured by the notion of essence, and then replaced by the notion of existence.
ES
La cuestión de la distinción real entre el ‘ser’ y la ‘esencia’ en el seno del ‘ente’ constituye el corazón de la ontología tomista. Si bien hay una primacía del ser sobre la esencia, como la de lo fundante sobre lo fundado, no se deben descuidar en los análisis ambos aspectos y la relación trascendental actopotencial que los vincula. En el presente escrito pretendemos mostrar, a través de un escueto recorrido histórico, el modo en que la noción fundamental del ‘ser’ tomista ha sido paulatinamente distorsionada y oscurecida por la noción fundamental de ‘esencia’, hasta llegar a ser sustituida por la noción misma de ‘existencia’. Para ello, nos remontaremos a lo ocurrido en los años siguientes a la muerte del Aquinate, cuando esta cuestión pasó a ser discutida por sus discípulos, pasando luego revista por los autores más significativos que han tratado el tema en la modernidad y en la contemporaneidad filosófica.
The notions of Central Europe and East-Central Europe (in opposition to Naumann’s Mitteleuropa), as well as Europe médiane, have replaced after the fall of Communism the term Eastern Europe, which was in universal use since the war. The metaphors offered by Miłosz, Kundera, and Braudel inspired the studious historical works of Halecki, Kłoczowski, Wandycz, Bibó and Szűcs, and Snyder, which, in turn, have revealed from their longue durée point of view a cohesiveness in the structures and identities of nations situated “between Germany and Russia;” the three historical kingdoms of Bohemia, Hungary, and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The distinctive identity of this region was expressed in the nineteenth century under the influence of Herder’s philosophy and Romantic poetry, by the figure of a “national poet” and the idea of “cultural nationhood,” which was distinct from the “nation state” associated with the Enlightenment paradigm. National “culture canons” and the “paradigmatic” type of identity of these countries were the result of specific cultural patterns. Meanwhile, a positional (“syntagmatic”) type of identity prevailed in bourgeois Western states. The transformation of countries after the fall of Communism, the political liberalization and pluralization of opinion, as well as the lack of a clear identity discourse in the West, have to some extent inspired the evolution towards politics of memory – an affirmation of the “paradigmatic” identity, which is not necessarily well suited for the conditions of modernity.
PL
Terminy Europy Środkowej, Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (w opozycji do Mitteleuropa Friedricha Naumana), jak też Europy Pośredniej (médiane), zastąpiły po upadku komunizmu używany na świecie od wojny termin Europy Wschodniej. Metafory Czesława Miłosza, Milana Kundery i Fernanda Braudela dały impuls do poważnych prac historycznych Oskara Haleckiego, Jerzego Kłoczowskiego, Piotra Wandycza oraz Istvána Bibó i Jenő Szűcsa, jak też Timothy’ego Snydera, które ukazały w perspektywie „długiego trwania” jedność strukturalną i tożsamościową narodów „pomiędzy Niemcami i Rosją”, trzech królestw historycznych Czech, Węgier i Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów. Oryginalny typ tożsamości regionu skrystalizował się w XIX wieku pod wpływem filozofii Herdera i poezji romantycznej, poprzez figurę „poety narodowego” oraz typ „narodu kulturowego”, odrębny od „państw narodowych” pozostających pod wpływem paradygmatu Oświecenia. „Kanony kultury” narodowej i typ tożsamości „paradygmatycznej” tych krajów związany był ze wzorami kulturowymi. Typ tożsamości pozycyjnej („syntagmatycznej”) dominował natomiast w mieszczańskich krajach Zachodu. Przemiany krajów po upadku komunizmu, liberalizacji ustrojowej i pluralizacji opinii oraz braku jasnego dyskursu tożsamościowego Zachodu ewoluowały częściowo w stronę polityki historycznej – afirmacji tożsamości „paradygmatycznej”, niekoniecznie zaadaptowanej do warunków nowoczesności.
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