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1
Content available remote Problém svobodné vůle a logika kontrafaktuálních výroků
100%
EN
The subject of this article is the traditional problem of free-will. In particular, I address the question of the compatibility of free-will and determinism. I formulate and defend a certain version of Compatibilism (the thesis that free-will is compatible with determinism), which is founded on Moore’s conditional analysis of the problem. I endeavour to elucidate this analysis by means of the modern logic of counter-factual sentences.
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nr 2
317-327
PL
In modern science, the theory of probability is one of the basic tools. Scientists using probability often refer to its objective interpretation. They emphasize that their probabilistic hypotheses concern objective facts, not degrees of belief. Accordingly, the following questions arise: What is the meaning of this type of probabilistic hypothesis? Is the assumption of objectivity necessary? The paper addresses these questions by analyzing objective probability in the context of the scientific debate on determinism. Two types of arguments will be presented. On the one hand, there is the assertion that objective probability can exist only in an indeterministic world. Then, on the other hand - I analyze the assertions of those who believe in the co‑existence of objective probability and determinism. As a result I show that the acceptance of deterministic and indeterministic fields as possible areas where objective probability can occur is extremely problematic. Depending on the chosen area we encounter different types of problems. Therefore, I show that a significant number of these problems are associated with the acceptance of incorrect metaphysical assumptions. And finally, I postulate that the objectivity of probability (and assumptions pertaining to it) can be reduced (without any losses) to the epistemic variant.
3
88%
EN
Recognizable two-dimensional languages (REC) are defined by tiling systems that generalize to two dimensions non-deterministic finite automata for strings. We introduce the notion of deterministic tiling system and the corresponding family of languages (DREC) and study its structural and closure properties. Furthermore we show that, in contrast with the one-dimensional case, there exist other classes between deterministic and non-deterministic families that we separate by means of examples and decidability properties.
4
88%
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tom 15
393-403
EN
From the article we learn how timely and significant are the deliberations, especially on the freedom of human will, of one of the most prominent living German philosophers R. Spaemann. He presents his attitude in the dispute with the representatives of modern materialistic determinism, brain scientists and neurophilosophers. For these intelectuals our decisive acts are nothing more than states of the brain. These acts may come to life by the power of neural processes, not by the power of reasons (motives) initiated by us, as Spaemann convincingly shows. From the main and largest part of the article we learn why thedeterministic vision is not acceptable. Now it leads itself to absurd because of contradictions and mistakes in its assumptions (petitio principii, regressus ad infinitum) and (openly declared) proclaimed dogmatism. Moreover, it is contrary to experience, facts, practice of life, commonly accepted opinions on freedom. The famous Dennett’s experiment, which was supposed to give an argument against the classic thesis on our free will, in reality did not showany connection with our decisive acts.
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2016
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tom 28/2
272-286
EN
From an existential and metaphysical standpoint, the African world is dualised into the physical and metaphysical world. This is bald-faced in the dynamics of the relationship that characterizes the African worldview. In praxis, the metaphysical world is seen to be higher in the scheme of things because, it is from it that the impersonal beings/forces operate and superintend on the physical world of man. It is based on this that the twin issue of destiny and freedom is topical and recurrent in Igbo-African metaphysics. The concern is whether man can be free in the physical world, which seems to be a manifestation of the will/wishes and/or the whims and caprices of the beings/forces in the metaphysical world. It is consequent upon this that this paper undertook an existential analysis of these contending issues of freedom and destiny within the Igbo-African context. From the analysis, it was palpable that, though there can be manipulations from the metaphysical world which can bring about luck (good or ill), the Igbo-African is expected to make effort to excel and work responsibly with his chi; because, a man can have a good or bad luck but his/her practical effort is still expedient.
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2022
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tom 93
209-225
EN
In connection with criminal negligence, the focus is regularly on whether the perpetrator “could have” recognized and avoided the situation he brought about, whether (s)he “could have” acted more carefully or complied with the requirements of due diligence. When examining guilt, it is also important (in the case of intentional as well as negligent offenses) whether the perpetrator “could have” recognized the wrongfulness of his/her act and “could have” acted according to this insight. If the “(s)he could have” perspective is rejected, the offender remains unpunished. On the other hand, there is a controversy regarding the extent humans can freely choose their perceptions and behaviour at all or whether these are ultimately determined by external and internal circumstances. The article explores the question of how a “(s)he could have” requirement can be conceived in law and especially in criminal law in a way that remains unaffected by the unsolved debate between “free will” and “determinism”. The author proposes that in the phrase “(s)he could have” the word “can” should not be understood in the (indeterministic) sense of alternative perceptions or behaviour, but simply as the existence of specific psycho-physical properties which, according to empirical knowledge, are necessary for compliance with a norm, just as it can be said, for example, that someone “can” speak French or that he “can” play the piano. It is also compatible with the function of “punishment” in modern (secular) criminal law to understand the “(s)he could have” requirement of punishability as a mere statement about existing, empirically ascertainable psychophysical properties of a person (and in this way to decouple it from the problem of determinism).
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2007
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nr 40
59-75
PL
There has been a long-standing debate in philosophical literature about the relationship of predictability and determinism. Some philosophers have claimed that determinism implies predictability; some have claimed the opposite and the others that there are no direct implication relations between these two concepts. According to the above, there are various notions of determinism and predictability at work in the philosophical literature. In contrast, in scientific tradition, the belief that any deterministic system is predictable has long history and is based on the power of the intuitions lying behind the concept of physical determinism, confirmed by many experiments. In this essay, the author focuses on the Laplacean vision for determinism and predictability (or more precisely on what he takes to be such a vision). While many forms of predictability are inconsistent with this vision, he argues that a suitably modified notion of predictability, defined within a framework of model notion of physical determinism, is implied by the Laplacean concept of determinism and, after some modifications, by other modern theories in physics, chemistry and related sciences. It is also argued, that such modified concept of predictability is consistent with common practice of scientists, and any attempt to find out whether a given scientific theory is deterministic, should be accompanied by careful analysis and appropriate modification of constituent elements of modern notion of determinism.
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nr 2
193–208
EN
I develop a new argument to the effect that past causal chains cannot extend back infinitely, but must instead terminate in a first uncaused cause (or causes). It has the advantage of sidestepping a historically prominent objection to cosmological arguments of this general type, one leveled by Aquinas and various other Scholastics.
EN
The theory and practice of co-evolution offers a way forward for humanity that goes well beyond the deterministic confines of an outmoded mechanistic science that still inhabits much academic thought and research; and also goes well beyond post-deterministic efforts to exempt the human mind and will from its presumed inexorable embeddedness in the mechanistically perceived life and motions of the body. Co-evolution rejects both and goes to the root of the matter regarding nature. It decisively affirms the post-mechanistic understandings of nature by quantum physics, feminist critique of patriarchy, and ecological philosophy. Co-evolution affirms that nature’s relational and animated being situates the human being and all individual human beings in an interactive mode. From this, dialogue is a natural, instead of a contrived, out-growth and fulfillment of the human project. The way then is clear for humanity to co-evolve interdependently with natural forces for mutual benefit.
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tom 2
EN
Lawyers who deal with applying law in practice very often are not aware of many hidden suppositions, which justify the existence of law and make it reasonable. It is obvious that in discovering them philosophy can be helpful. The main part of this article is the analysis of the thought of two European philosophers: S. Kierkegaard and B. Spinoza. The important field of their interest was a philosophy of human existence. Its significant element is liberty. The attitude to it creates their visions of being.Kierkegaard is well known as the author of „three periods of human life (esthetical, ethical and religious)” concept. In his opinion the necessary element of any progress in existence is taking the plunge and changing the way of life. It is possible by dint of liberty. A totally different vision can be found in Spinosa’a „Ethics more geo-metrico”. The author wants to convince us that the potentiality of making decisions is only an illusion.The possible consequences of the acceptance of such a vision were shown very briefly; the goal of the paper is also to demonstrate that since the beginning of our civilisation we have had to assume a concept similar to Kierkegaardian’s.
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tom T. 11, nr 42
163-170
PL
W pracy przedstawiono zagadnienia dotyczące badania determinizmu układów mechanicznych z zastosowaniem metody diagramów rekurencyjnych, której istotą jest wizualizacja rekurencyjności stanów badanych układów w przestrzeni fazowej. Metodę zastosowano do badania własności płyt aluminiowych: płyty nieuszkodzonej i płyty z pęknięciem, wzbudzanych do drgań za pomocą sygnałów harmonicznych o częstotliwościach pierwszej, trzeciej i szóstej postaci drgań własnych badanych płyt.
EN
The paper concerns research into determinism of mechanical systems with the use of the Recurrence Plots method. There are presented the results of Recurrence Plots method application to the research into properties of two aluminium plates (undamaged and cracked). The plates were excited to vibrations with the use of harmonic exciting signals of frequencies corresponding to the frequencies of their first, third and sixth natural mode shapes.
EN
The article includes a reflection on contemporary problems of the humanities. It poses questions about the relevance of the scholarly legacy and the future of this academic field whose once high social standing has declined. The discussion focuses on the value of learning and the purpose of studies, in particular: the aspiration to grasp the truth about man, the choice of methods appropriate to the subject of the research, the relevance of old and efficiency of new procedures, as well as ideological commitment of a humanist scholar and the concept of national literature and culture. Against a wide historical background, in the context of the remarks on the current condition of the humanities and humanist scholars, the author maps out the paths she believes worthy of following in the future.
EN
This paper will examine the motivations behind Jan Łukasiewicz’s rejection of the principle of bivalence. In particular, the relationship between the category of possibility and the logical value of judgements will be examined. This category is clearly linked to the view of the determinism/ indeterminism controversy presented by Łukasiewicz. The paper will close with remarks on the statute of possibility and an attempt to answer the question whether Łukasiewicz’s approach can be treated as something more than an intellectual exercise in constructing formal tools corresponding to certain conventions.
PL
W artykule przeanalizowane zostaną motywacje odrzucenia przez Jana Łukasiewicza zasady dwuwartościowości. W szczególności badanie dotyczyć będzie relacji między kategorią możliwości a wartością logiczną sądów. Kategoria ta jednoznacznie łączy się ze spojrzeniem na kontrowersję determinizm/indeterminizm prezentowanym przez Łukasiewicza. Pracę zamkną uwagi o statucie możliwości i próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy podejście Łukasiewicza może być traktowane jako coś więcej niż tylko intelektualne ćwiczenie w konstruowaniu narzędzi formalnych odpowiadających pewnym konwencjom.
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tom R. 105, z. 1-Ś
25-39
PL
W artykule badano dobową zmienność procesu przepływu rzeką w zlewni Raby w celu określenia jego deterministycznej bądź losowej natury. Na podstawie szeregów czasowych przepływów dobowych dla posterunków na cieku głównym i dopływach przeprowadzono test statystyczny SSS. Jego wyniki uzyskane dla wszystkich rozważanych przekrojów wodowskazowych wskazują na istnienie krótkoterminowej dynamiki potwierdzającej nielosową, deterministyczną naturę badanego procesu przepływu.
EN
In the paper deterministic or stochastic nature of daily flow in the Raba river catchment was investigated. The statistical test SSS was based on the series of daily flows from gauging stations in Raba basin. The results of the test obtained for all cross-sections show that there is short-term dynamics in irregular fluctuations of flow, so the determinism was detected by this test.
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tom 12
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nr 4
513-543
EN
The article focuses on the phenomenon of free will in Paul, taking as the starting point Rom. 8:16. At the beginning, a concise exegetical analysis of Rom 8:16 is presented, placed in the rhetorical context of Rom 8. Subsequently, a comparison is drawn between Paul’s and Epictetus’s views on divine and human agency. First, the Epictetus’s idea of freedom is presented with a special emphasis on the notion of proairesis, understood as the true self of a person, responsible for free moral choices and actions. Next, the similarities and differences between the Epictetus’s and Pauline vision of free will are discussed. What connects the apostle and the philosopher are convictions that free will can exist in a divinely determined world and that human volition requires continuous education and subordination to God’s will. The elements that clearly distinguish Paul from Epictetus are the natural image of deity to be imitated in the human pursuit of freedom, and a genuinely relational, corporeal and emotive character of free will in the apostle. The psycho-somatic nature of human personality and will in Paul invites a dialogue between the apostle and modern science but it has to be carried out cautiously, bearing in mind the different methodologies, the idea of transcendent deity and Christological foundation upon which the Pauline idea of freedom and free will is built.
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tom 23
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nr 2(56)
209-222
EN
The concept of a person has gone through several stages of development in the history of thought. In the classical tradition, a person is considered to be a substance. In modernity, John Locke brought forward the notion that social existence and consciousness are the most salient properties of a person, which brought about a possibility of renouncing one’s personhood because of a lack of some perceivable and observable traits. This is why in a Christian anthropology there is such an emphasis on personalism, which from the very beginning of the twentieth century has been opposed to the treatment of people as obscure elements of matter, or elements be manipulated unquestioningly. In this paper we have indicated some elements of anthropology that demonstrate important limitation of any attempt at explaining away the mystery of being a human person.
PL
Pojęcie osoby przeszło wiele zmian w historii myśli ludzkiej. W tradycji klasycznej osoba jest uważana za substancję. W oświeceniu John Locke przedstawił pogląd, że egzystencja społeczna i świadomość są najważniejszymi właściwościami osoby, co spowodowało możliwość utracenia godności osobowej z powodu braku pewnych dostrzegalnych i możliwych do zaobserwowania cech. Właśnie dlatego w antropologii chrześcijańskiej kładzie się tak duży nacisk na personalizm, który od samego początku stanowi przeciwwagę wobec traktowania ludzi li tylko jako elementów materii, którymi można dowolnie manipulować. W niniejszym artykule przedstawimy taką charakterystykę antropologii, która ukazuje istotne ograniczenie wszelkich prób wyjaśnienia tajemnicy bycia człowiekiem.
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2016
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tom 59
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nr 2
47-60
EN
Is human life is determinated? On this question I try to answer through the analysis of the Stoic philosophy. The Stoics believed that whole world, including God, is material substance, and every thing has a particle of God. The cosmos is the result of the action of God and exists from one fire to the next. God is the active principle which is understood as Providence (pro,noia) and Fate (ei`marme,nh), and He takes care of the world and directs from the inside. However, there is a difference between Providence and Fate. Divine providence is a power – God extends the providence to the whole world, but fate is a chain of causes.
PL
Czy życie ludzi jest zdeterminowane? Na to pytanie próbuję dać odpowiedź poprzez analizę filozofii stoickiej. Stoicy wierzyli, że cały świat jest tą samą materialną substancją, w tym również Bóg. Kosmos jest wynikiem działania Boga będącego aktywną zasadą, rozumianą jako Opatrzność czy Przeznaczenie. Bóg-Logos troszczy się o cały świat i kieruje nim od wewnątrz. Istnieją jednak różnice pomiędzy rozumieniem przeznaczenia będącego pewnym łańcuchem przyczyn następujących po sobie, a opatrznością, która jest boską mądrością czuwającą nad światem. Wszelkie pozostałe różnice ukazują filozofię stoików jako przemyślany i spójny system logiczno-wierzeniowy.
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Content available Necessity and morality
51%
20
Content available remote O pewnym eksperymencie myślowym przeciwko determinizmowi woli
51%
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2013
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nr 35
84-92
PL
W niniejszym artykule zaprezentowany jest pewien eksperyment myślowy, skierowany przeciwko deterministycznej koncepcji świadomości resp. woli, co jest konsekwencją naturalistycznego (materialistycznego) i fizykalistycznego podejścia do problemu świadomości, przeważającego we współczesnej filozofii umysłu. Fizykalistyczne podejście zakłada możliwość opisu działającego w świecie fizycznym człowieka z trzecioosobowego punktu widzenia, a fortiori zasadniczą przewidywalność jego zachowań. Eksperyment uwypukla niektóre konsekwencje takiego podejścia, w szczególności sygnalizuje pewne problemy natury logicznej powstające na tym tle.
EN
The article presents a thought experiment against the deterministic theory of consciousness (i.e. free will), which is a consequence of a naturalistic (materialist) and physicalist approach to the problem of consciousness, prevailing in contemporary philosophy of mind. The physicalist approach presupposes the possibility of third-person descriptions of human actions in physical terms, and a fortiori the predictability, in principle, of human behaviour. The experiment emphasizes some consequences of this approach, especially some logical problems to which it gives rise.
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