Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Commercial Maritime and Cyber Risk Management

100%

RANA A.

Safety & Defense

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2019

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tom 5

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nr 1

46-48

EN

The starting point of the paper is the recognition of the growing threat of cyber-attacks to commercial maritime. Constantly growing dependency on technology has obvious advantages, on the other hand, however, it makes commercial maritime vessels progressively more vulnerable to cyber-crime, including GPS signal interference, malware attacks or even gaining control over ships’ systems and networks. The main objective of the paper is to present and discuss the Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships developed by the International Maritime Organization, including best practices for implementation of cyber risk management. The article’s goal is to summarize the guidelines and to familiarize the reader with the reasons why and the methods how they should be implemented. The paper is concluded with an example how the Guidelines can be adopted by national authorities, i.e., a brief presentation of “Code of Practice: Cyber Security for Ships” – a document developed by the British government that transposes the IMO guidelines.

2

Commercial Maritime and Cyber Risk Management

100%

Rana A.

Safety & Defense

|

2019

|

tom 1

46--48

EN

The starting point of the paper is the recognition of the growing threat of cyberattacks to commercial maritime. Constantly growing dependency on technology has obvious advantages, on the other hand, however, it makes commercial maritime vessels progressively more vulnerable to cyber-crime, including GPS signal interference, malware attacks or even gaining control over ships’ systems and networks. The main objective of the paper is to present and discuss the Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships developed by the International Maritime Organization, including best practices for implementation of cyber risk management. The article’s goal is to summarize the guidelines and to familiarize the reader with the reasons why and the methods how they should be implemented. The paper is concluded with an example how the Guidelines can be adopted by national authorities, i.e., a brief presentation of “Code of Practice: Cyber Security for Ships” – a document developed by the British government that transposes the IMO guidelines.

3

Development of decision support system based on feature matrix for cyber threat assessment

86%

Kartbayev T. , Akhmetov B. , Doszhanova A. , Lakhno V. , Malikova F. , Tolybayev S.

International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications

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2019

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tom Vol. 65, No. 4

545--550

EN

The article herein presents the method and algorithms for forming the feature space for the base of intellectualized system knowledge for the support system in the cyber threats and anomalies tasks. The system being elaborated might be used both autonomously by cyber threat services analysts and jointly with information protection complex systems. It is shown, that advised algorithms allow supplementing dynamically the knowledge base upon appearing the new threats, which permits to cut the time of their recognition and analysis, in particular, for cases of hard-to-explain features and reduce the false responses in threat recognizing systems, anomalies and attacks at informatization objects. It is stated herein, that collectively with the outcomes of previous authors investigations, the offered algorithms of forming the feature space for identifying cyber threats within decisions making support system are more effective. It is reached at the expense of the fact, that, comparing to existing decisions, the described decisions in the article, allow separate considering the task of threat recognition in the frame of the known classes, and if necessary supplementing feature space for the new threat types. It is demonstrated, that new threats features often initially are not identified within the frame of existing base of threat classes knowledge in the decision support system. As well the methods and advised algorithms allow fulfilling the time-efficient cyber threats classification for a definite informatization object.

4

Shielding the Spanish Cyberspace: An Interview with Spain’s National Cryptologic Centre (CCN)

86%

Arcos R.

Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance

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2023

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tom Vol. 2, No. 1

1--7

EN

This interview between Rubén Arcos and Spain’s National Cryptologic Centre (CCN) was conducted via email on 24 October 2022. CCN is part of Spain’s National Intelligence Centre (CNI), and through its national alert and response centre against cyberattacks and cyber threats, CCN-CERT, it contributes to the cybersecurity of Spain. The discussion focuses on Spain’s approach to cybersecurity, existing tools for information sharing/management of cyber incidents and tools supporting the production of intelligence on cyber threats. It also deals with current and emerging trends in the cyber domain and developments and activities in the fields of prevention, detection and response. Finally, the interview highlights measures in the March 2022 National Cybersecurity Plan and initiatives against potential cyber-attacks during elections.

5

The impact of COVID-19 pandemic on cybersecurity in electronic banking in Poland

72%

Macierzyński W. Ł. , Boczoń W.

Central European Review of Economics & Finance

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2022

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tom 39

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nr 4

39-55

EN

Purpose: The purpose of the article is to present both theoretical and practical basis for cybersecurity in electronic banking in Poland during the COVID-19 pandemic. During this period a major reorganisation of IT solutions occurred, which allowed to extend the range of online products and services offered both to bank customers and employees. As our life is more and more dependent on digital technologies, cyber attacks have become more costly and more dangerous. Driven by dynamic technological development regulations have changed, which resulted in cybersecurity becoming a key priority in financial institutions. All the more so because the rapid technological development has been followed by more and more advanced techniques used by criminals searching for easy financial profits. Methodology: The paper uses the method of literature review - mostly electronic sources, descriptive and comparative analyses. Findings: From customers, perspective, the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on cybersecurity in electronic banking in Poland may be recognized as negative. The years 2020-2021 brought a dynamic growth in the number of digital banking customers, especially mobile banking. In those years financial institutions recorded an enormous increase in online payments, which was the result of strong, forced by the pandemic, surge in sales in E-commerce. At the same time, there was a sharp rise in the crime rate targeted at banks, but most of all, at bank customers. While the security of the very financial institutions remained unthreatened, there was an explosion in the number of cybercrimes targeted at E-banking users, with the losses giving dozens of millions PLN in total. That is reflected by the data provided by the National Bank of Poland, numerous complaints to the Financial Ombudsman, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, as well as the police investigations. Practical implications: The analysis of relations between theoretical and practical bases of cybersecurity in E-banking in Poland during the COVID-19 pandemic is a key factor for financial institutions. Cybercrime undermines customers' trust in E-channels and therefore negatively influences how banks are perceived, the level of the users' activity in digital channels, and consequently, activity and sales in E-channels. Besides the image and financial risks, banks need to take into consideration the increase in reputation, operation and legal risks. On these grounds, it is possible for state organisations and financial institutions to develop professional education concerning cybersecurity, not only for E-banking customers, but for the whole society.

6

Company Cybersecurity System: Assessment, Risks and Expectations

72%

Kuzior A. , Yarovenko H. , Brożek P. , Sidelnyk N. , Boyko A. , Vasilyeva T.

Production Engineering Archives

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2023

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tom Vol. 29, Iss. 4

379-392

EN

The consequences of Industry 4.0 have adverse side effects on cybercrime growth, which requires creating an effective cybersecurity system for companies. Therefore, this study aims to develop a composite indicator of company cybersecurity to assess its development needs. For this purpose, the authors modified Porter's method by constructing a superposition matrix based on the growth rates of cyber threats and risks, calculating their quantitative characteristics and a composite indicator. The computations are based on indicators for 2016-2022 characterizing cybersecurity vulnerabilities and the consequences of cyber threats: the share of companies experiencing one, six or more successful cyberattacks, considering the likely and very likely success of cyberattacks on them in the next 12 months, security threat and concern indices, the share of companies with a growing security budget affected by ransomware and experiencing a shortage of skilled IT security personnel, the cost of stolen or compromised credentials. As a result, cybersecurity needs increased significantly for 2020-2022, mainly due to digital transformation and the cyber threats growth after the COVID-19 pandemic. A comparative analysis of the proposed indicator with those characterizing the development of Industry 4.0 showed that the need for a reliable cybersecurity system is much more important than the active development of modern technologies. Spending on IT is also increasing, but not enough to meet the needs of cybersecurity development, except for the 2022 results. The proposed indicator is defined for companies worldwide, but its versatility allows the methodology to be applied to enterprises of various industries and sizes.

7

Phishing wall - jak zbudować ludzką zaporę przeciwko cyberatakom?

72%

Masztalerz Ł.

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tom nr 5/6

70--71

PL

O cyberzagrożeniach łatwo mówić, gdy doszło już do incydentu bezpieczeństwa. Wówczas dowiadujemy się, że firma musiała zapłacić okup za uzyskanie klucza do zaszyfrowanych przez złośliwe oprogramowanie danych. Biznes na chwilę obniża poziom ciśnienia krwi, a cyberprzestępca liczy wpływy. Jak wynika z rynku zachodniego i badań zajmującej się cyberbezbieczeństwem firmy Infrascale: już 78% małych i średnich przedsiębiorców działających w modelu B2B zapłaciło pierwsze okupy w wyniku cyber ataku1.