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1
Content available remote Tři stezky (ke) komunismu
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nr 1
7-29
EN
The aim of this study is to offer a more comprehensive view of communism than is usual in the Czech public arena these days, by means of an exposition of the concept of criticism, using the example of communism itself conceived as radicalized modernity. Three forms of critique are distinguished: 1) Conversion, which refers to the values in the offi cial canon, attempting to interpret them in favour of the unprivileged; communism in this sense thinks through the promises of capitalism. 2) Subversion in the spirit of the „hermeneutics of suspicion“, which seeks the „real“ hidden motive (e.g. instinct, the will to power, class struggle) behind predominant ideas, realizing revolutionary intervention on this basis. 3) Controversy in the spirit of „refl exive modernization“, referring to the unintended consequences of modernity and politicizing private activity. Communism is presented as an example of these forms of criticism, and at the same time the latter are used to interpret its „meaning of history“.
CS
Cílem této studie je nabídnout komplexnější pohled na komunismus, než je v české veřejném prostoru obvyklé, a to skrze výklad pojmu kritika na příkladu komunismu, který se sám považoval za radikální formu modernity. Rozlišeny budou tři formy kritiky: 1) kritika konverzní, která se hlásí k hodnotám oficiálního kánonu a pokouší se je interpretovat příznivě pro vykořisťované; komunismus v tomto smyslu promlouvá skrze přísliby kapitalismu; 2) subverze v duchu „hermeneutiky podezření“, která za převládajícími myšlenkami hledá „skutečné” skryté motivace (např. instinkt, vůli k moci, třídní boj) a na tomto základě uskutečňující revoluční zásah; 3) kontroverze v duchu „reflexivní modernizace”, která se odkazuje na nezamýšlené důsledky modernity a politizace soukromého jednání. Komunismus je ukázán jako příklad těchto typů kritiky, které jsou zároveň použity k výkladu „smyslu dějin”.
XX
The article comments on the experiences of the former anti-communist activists conditioned by their engagement in the contemporary memory politics in Poland. Theoretically, the article presents the notion of memory understood as a social emobodied practice performed in specific material surroundings in a given historical time, structured by larger institutional forms and actions. Ethnographically, the author reflects on the efficacy of the contemporary historical policy for her informants whose sense of closure of the problematic past seems fragile. Her argument is that the complexity of the past violent experiences as lived by her informants cannot be contained in the conventionalized, bureacratized and rigid forms of contemporary memory projects.
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tom 8
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nr 1
29-39
EN
The following text presents the results of sociological survey, conducted by Center for Public Opinion Research, Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, in september 2009. This extensive field survey mapped attitudes and public opinion on selected topics and issues that touch the twentieth anniversary of the November revolution in 1989.
4
Content available Socialism or Death: The Quarantine Edition
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2020
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tom 34(1)
429-442
EN
Slavoj Žižek, PAN(DEM)IC! – COVID-19 SHAKES THE WORLD (New York and London: O/R Books) is a publicity stunt and a logistic achievement at least as much as a proper book. One must admire the speed with which it was produced and the foresight of its author, who began following the topic closely before most commentators in the West. It is all the more disappointing that the book’s central argument is not better organised and supported. This review considers both the moments of brilliance and the flaws of Slavoj Žižek’s most recent publication.
EN
Two of the four historical narratives presented here, the Czech nationalliberal narrative and the Slovak national-European narrative, imbue Czech and Slovak history with national and democratic meaning, by using history to legitimize future aims in these areas. The two remaining historical narratives, the Communist and the Slovak national-Catholic, with their way of using history, take an expressly confrontational stance on values called ‘politically liberal’, though in their renewed versions from the 1990s they no longer call outright for totalitarian power. All four narratives, however, work with their own nations and histories as monolithic categories, and consequently have problems answering questions that do not fi t into their conceptions of the search for their own meanings of Czech or Slovak history. In their endeavours to defi ne new post-Communist values, the main actors have failed to abandon or even to cast doubt on the ethnically determined national framework.
CS
Dva ze čtyř historických narativů, český národně-liberální a slovenský národně-evropský, sytily českou a slovenskou historii národním a demokratickým smyslem, využívajíce historii k legitimizaci budoucích cílů v těchto oblastech. Dva zbývající historické narativy, komunistický a slovenský národně-katolický, zaujímaly se svým způsobem využívání historie vysloveně konfrontační postoj vůči „politicky liberálním” hodnotám, třebaže se ve své obnovené verzi z devadesátých let dvacátého století již neodvolávaly otevřeně k totalitní moci. Všechny čtyři narativy nicméně pracují s vlastními národy a dějinami jako s monolitickými kategoriemi, a následně nezvládají odpovídat na otázky, které nezapadají do jejich konceptu významů české a slovenské historie. Ve snaze definovat nové postkomunistické hodnoty mnozí protagonisté nezvládli opustit, nebo alespoň zproblematizovat etnicky podmíněnou představu národa.
EN
This article examines a form of Party training in Czechoslovakia called DKV (Dny komunistické výchovy - Communist Education Days). This programme of mass indoctrination of Czechoslovak Communist Party members after the Communist takeover in February 1948 ran from August 1948 and to June 1949. The article is more generally focused on the reconstruction of everyday life within the local Party networks. It first considers the formal aspects of the DKV. Here, Party members attended lectures on a topic of the month, familiarizing themselves with the basic doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. The article reconstructs the running of the DKV in Brtnice (in the Jihlava region) and Břežany (in the Znojmo region), demonstrating that the demands of Party headquarters were considerably adapted to local circumstances and that the whole operation ended up being not quite as intensive as Party headquarters had planned. The two local organizations considered in the article often preferred other, more urgent activities, to the ideological equipping of its members. When indoctrination eventually did take place there was not as much of it as Party headquarters had planned, nor was it of the quality they had anticipated.
CS
Článek se zabývá typem stranického školení v Československu, který se nazýval DKV (Dny komunistické výchovy). Tento program masové indoktrinace členů KSČ probíhal po převzetí moci komunisty v únoru 1948 od srpna 1948 do června 1949. Článek se obecněji soustředí na rekonstrukci každodenního života uvnitř místního stranického aparátu. Nejprve sleduje formální aspekty DKV. Členové strany během nich navštěvovali přednášky podle měsíčních témat, seznamovali se základními doktrínami marxismu-leninismu. Článek rekonstruuje průběh DKV v Brtnici (kraj Jihlava) a Břežanech (kraj Znojmo) a ukazuje, že požadavky ústředního vedení byly značně uzpůsobeny místním podmínkám a celá operace tak zdaleka nebyla natolik intenzivní, jak ústřední vedení plánovalo. Obě místní buňky, sledované v článku, dávaly často přednost jiným, naléhavějším aktivitám, před ideologickým vyzbrojováním svých členů. A i když se indoktrinace nakonec uskutečnila, nebylo jí tolik, kolik bylo vedením požadováno, a ani kvalitou nedosahovala očekávání.
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nr 12
309-320
EN
The reality of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, which on the one hand has eradicated the notion of violence from the ideational sphere, the sphere of constructing social-political entities, on the other hand, by eradicating violence as a tool of building new social orders, has kept and appropriated its modus, or the ways of organizing of the world, its time and space, associated with the conditions of violence. In the modern and postmodern world, violence turns out to be, not seldom, the basis of sanctioning and reinforcing the mechanisms of power. Symbolic violence – as Bourdieu wanted – the tool of influence by the dominant classes, or the violence resulting from communicative oppression – legitimization of common agreement, consensus, which, transformed into an idea – the basis of the construction of the modern world, are becoming a form of oppression, a form of imposing the only one, worked out as (seemingly) common, vision of this what is and can be a question of a conflict. The sources of such understood visions should be looked for, according to Jean-Luck Nancy, in a particular desire of man, desire, which, when started to be embodied, acquired total forms, and, finally, totalitarian ones: in the desire of transformation of the society into a “masterpiece”. The thing, which was supposed to be cemented by the realized desire (society as a masterpiece), was community, communion [communio], and, finally (as the embodiment of the postulated unity in its total form) communism.
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2017
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tom 17
PL
Artykuł oparty jest na kwerendzie archiwalnej wykonanej w zespole GUKPPiW (Głównego Urzędu Kontroli Prasy Publikacji i Widowisk), przechowywanym w Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie. Jego zakres chronologiczny obejmuje lata 1948–1960, co wiąże się z dostępnością źródeł i zakresem przeprowadzonych badań. Autorka opisuje – na wybranych przykładach – kwestię cenzurowania tematyki rosyjskiej w literaturze pięknej polskiej (XIX–XX w.) oraz tłumaczonej na polski z języka rosyjskiego (XIX–XX w.). Na podstawie opisu losów edytorskich niektórych dzieł Mickiewicza, Słowackiego, Gałczyńskiego, Andrzejewskiego, Szymborskiej, Puszkina, Kuprina, Erenburga dochodzi do kilku wniosków. Stwierdza, że w interesującym okresie wątki rosyjskie cenzurowane były z najwyższą uwagą i ostrożnością, zawsze w odniesieniu do współczesnej sytuacji historycznej (politycznej zależności od ZSRR). Cenzorzy nie dopuszczali do prezentowania prawdy historycznej, bez zrozumienia czytali klasyków, z atencją traktowali natomiast pisarzy – komunistów. O sposobach kontrolowania tematyki rosyjskiej w latach 1948–1960 decydowały zawsze czynniki wobec tekstu zewnętrzne.
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tom 2
335-359
EN
Overview: Wojciech Materski. 2017. Od cara do “cara”. Studium rosyjskiej polityki historycznej [From the Tsar to the “Tsar”. A Study of the Russian Politics of History]. Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. 371 pp. ISBN 9788364091889.
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80%
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2013
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nr 3(25)
189-199
EN
The article describes Josef and Stanislaw Mackiewicz’s, polish publicists, views on the problem of communism, its nature and origins. Main point of difference in their critiques of communism was connected with their views on the relation between communist state and Russian tradition. Stanislaw Mackiewicz after the end of the Second World War was changing his previous opinion and began to see Soviet Union as a new form of Russian imperialism. In this way he could renew the tradition of conservative political realism of Wielopolski. In 1956 r. Stanislaw Mackiewicz came back to Poland and started to act in order to widen polish autonomy in the circumstances of soviet domination. Josef Mackiewicz claimed that communism was a new form of political slavery and that there was no possibilities to act according to traditions of nineteenth century political realism. New dangerous form of political power of Soviet Union exclude any political compromise. In his opinion Soviet Union and its political orbits were no partner for political dialog but an ultimate enemy not only for slaved nations but whole human civilization.
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tom 39
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nr 3
23-47
EN
The author seeks to determine the impact of the legislation that emerged in connection with the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981 on civil law. She starts by referring to axiology as well as the basic principles of civil law in the socialist state. This provides abackground for her discussion of the changes introduced after 13 December 1981. In her conclusion the author notes that even today there are still unresolved problems concerning damages and compensation for losses suffered during the martial law period by individuals who were interned as well as those who suf­fered injuries or were forced to emigrate. Some judges are not familiar with the legislation in force at the time and with the consequences of its application, as can be seen in rulings and statements of reasons dismissing some of the claims.
PL
Pope John Pauls II is the most famous person in Polish history. He has been acclaimed as one of the most infl uential leaders of the 20th century. It is widely accepted that he was important in ending communism in Poland and eventually all of Europe. He also helped Poland to enter European Union. After his death the Church in Poland feels like an orphan, but sees chances in the heritage, which John Paul II left for the Church in his own Homeland.
13
Content available remote Bolszewizm, Komunizm, Stalinizm w prasie Polski podziemnej (1939–1945)
80%
EN
Communism and bolshevism are fundamental ideas characteristic of the Soviet Union which were discussed in underground newspapers. This subject gave the possibilities of becoming familiar with essence of the Soviet Union’s policy. This problem when the Red Army was getting closer to the border of the Republic of Poland became a current issue. It allowed to recognise the reality of the Soviet Union, reality which Polish communists tried to inculcate to the Polish society. This subject was extensively introduced and analysed by the underground newspapers, simultaneously showing the attitude of Polish underground organisations to Soviets and their policy.
14
Content available The Status of Women in the Soviet Union
80%
EN
For centuries, many women have been at the forefront of the struggle for emancipation and political changes. Efforts at integrating the idea of emancipation into society was an important part of the Bolshevik ideology; thus, the October Revolution of 1917 brought women new hope and new expectations. The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to successfully open the door to new economic and educational opportunities for women. In 1917, the Bolshevik legislative initiatives provided them with full political and civil rights while new legislation made women legally equal to men. The constitution adopted in July 1918 secured the political and civil equality of women and men. However, the gender policy developed and implemented by Lenin significantly changed after his death. Until the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet Union remained the world leader in terms of providing women with equal rights. However, after the new leader of the Soviet Union, Stalin, came to power, the government policy on women and equality substantially transformed. During Stalin’s rule, the concept of “a new type of woman” was created. The early Bolshevik policy, which started with a radical liberal vision of individual freedom and women’s rights, devolved into an abyss of cynicism that burdened women with a disproportionate responsibility for unpaid work in the household. The purpose of this work is to study the role of women during the early Soviet period and to examine legal and political changes in women’s status. The study aims at explaining what the main goal of the Soviet gender policy was in fact, whether it actually changed the status of women and what crucial changes it ultimately brought to them. Using the method of content analysis, the content of official documents, press and scientific literature was analyzed. At the same time, attempts were made to identify and analyze the positive and negative results of the Soviet policy by applying the method of critical research.
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2006
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tom 153
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nr 1
EN
The I National Congress of Delegates of Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity [NSZZ “Solidarnos´c´”] meeting in Gdan´sk in September and Ocober, 1981 is considered the crowning achievement of the “Solidarity’s” organizational and ideological development. No serious and comprehensive monography has yet been written, historical or sociological. The lack of a complete text of the eighteen days of talks was one of the reasons. A shorthand report of the first tour which has been made available recently makes it possible to make some preliminary analyses of the Congress’ topics and dynamics, behaviour of the delegates and mechanisms of their decision-making. It also permits to describe their “union-like” way of thinking as well as understanding and practicing democracy. The author of the article recalls the basic statistics of the community of delegates-a sui generis trade union elite. He moreover poses questions regarding the scale of the secret services’ [SB] controlling the course of the Congress. The author favours the assumption that it was surprisingly negligible.
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2014
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nr 33
157-176
EN
Neoliberals claim that the Manifesto of the Communist Party is utopian. In fact, Marks and Engels did not use the term “capitalism” or refer to the communistic rule of division based on one’s needs. Their programme was prepared on the basis of experience gained after the Revolution which took place in France in 1789. According to them, the main idea of communism is the abolition of the contradictions of the bourgeois society. Nationalisation is the first formal step taken to achieve this goal. It is necessary to socialize the means of production. However, during “real socialism” people were not aware of it. Human needs are historical and cultural needs. Their function is to make reproduction of the relations of production easier. Pervasive advertising proves it.
17
70%
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nr 30
137-160
EN
Just like after World War I Italy experienced a transition from modernism to fascism, after World II Poland experienced a passage from modernism to quasi-communism. The symbol of the first stage of the communist revolution in Poland right after the war, the so-called “gentle revolution,” was Pablo Picasso, whose work was popularized not so much because of its artistic value, but because of his membership in the communist party. The second, repressive stage of the continued came in 1949–1955, to return after the so-called thaw to Picasso and the exemplars of the École de Paris. However, the imagery of the revolution was associated only with the socialist realism connected to the USSR even though actually it was the adaptation of the École de Paris that best expressed the revolution’s victory. In the beginning, its moderate program, strongly emphasizing the national heritage as well as financial promises, made the cultural offer of the communist regime quite attractive not only for the left. Thus, the gentle revolution proved to be a Machiavellian move, disseminating power to centralize it later more effectively. On the other hand, the return to the Paris exemplars resulted in the aestheticization of radical and undemocratic changes. The received idea that the evil regime was visualized only by the ugly socialist realism is a disguise of the Polish dream of innocence and historical purity, while it was the war which gave way to the revolution, and right after the war artists not only played games with the regime, but gladly accepted social comfort guaranteed by authoritarianism. Neither artists, nor art historians started a discussion about the totalizing stain on modernity and the exclusion of the other. Even the folk art was instrumentalized by the state which manipulated folk artists to such an extent that they often lost their original skills. Horrified by the war atrocities and their consequences, art historians limited their activities to the most urgent local tasks, such as making inventories of artworks, reorganization of institutions, and reconstruction. Mass expropriation, a consequence of the revolution, was not perceived by museum personnel as a serious problem, since thanks to it museums acquired more and more exhibits, while architects and restorers could implement their boldest plans. The academic and social neutralization of expropriation favored the birth of a new human being, which was one of the goals of the revolution. Along the ethnic homogenization of society, focusing on Polish art meant getting used to monophony. No cultural opposition to the authoritarian ideas of modernity appeared – neither the École de Paris as a paradigm of the high art, nor the folklore manipulated by the state were able to come up with the ideas of the weak subject or counter-history. Despite the social revolution, the class distinction of ethnography and high art remained unchanged. 
18
Content available remote Rola Kościoła polskiego w odzyskaniu skarbów wawelskich
70%
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tom IX
221-234
EN
The paper discusses the backstage of the negotiations concerning the return to Poland of the priceless collection of the so-called the Wawel treasure, which had survived the wartime storm being deposited in Canada. The negotiations were, in its major part, carried out by the Polish Church. The authorities of the Polish People’s Republic, beginning with 1945, constantly pressed the Canadian government and demanded that the deposit should be returned. On the other hand, the guardians of the treasure were of the opinion that it would not be safe in Poland – at that time remaining a satellite state to the Soviet Union, and „Russians once again can behave like in 1795, when they took away the tapestries and other objects of value from the Wawel”. In the end, the valuable deposit (136 tapestries and other museum exhibits packed into 24 boxes) returned to Poland on 16 January 1961. That would not have been possible had it not been for intensive negotiations lasting a few years prior to that, which were conducted by the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. With the authority of the Church, the Cardinal supported the efforts to have the treasure returned to the nation who was its righteous owner. The second part of the publication presents some information relating to the subject matter in question, which was found in the Western media.
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tom 39
111-134
EN
The Polish Government’s proposal, submitted in autumn 2017, for a comprehensive reprivatisation bill revived the international discussion on the scope of Polish authorities’ obligations to return property taken during World War II and subsequently by the communist regime. However, many inaccurate and incorrect statements are cited in the discussions, e.g. the argument that the duty of the Polish authorities to carry out restitution is embedded in the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocol No. 1. This article challenges that claim and analyses the jurisprudence of the Convention’s judicial oversight bodies in cases raising issues of restitution of property taken over in Poland before the accession to both of the above-mentioned international agreements. In the article I argue that there is no legal basis for claiming that there exists a legal obligation upon the Polish State stemming directly from international law – in particular human rights law – to return the property and that the only possibly successful legal claims in this regard are those that can already be derived from the provisions of the Polish law applicable to these kinds of cases. In its latest rulings, issued in 2017–2019, the European Court of Human Rights determined the scope of responsibility incumbent on Polish authorities in this respect.
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2018
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tom 104
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nr 3
755-770
EN
The study presented deals with the relationship of the Catholic Church to the ideology of Communism. It is a relatively long and complex “story” of clashes, which has several levels – political, religious, economic, social and societal. It is possible to date its beginning to the middle of the 19th century, when the two sides confronted each other for the first time and openly, and when unsustainable difficulties for mutual good relations arose, because relations very soon moved from the political-religious plane to the economic and social sphere, considering the numerous working classes, when both sides tried to solve the social question on the basis of their own principles and beliefs. The ascension of Communism to power in Russia in 1917 deepened these conflicts, because the radical left-wing regime acted openly against the Church and severely restricted religious life in Russia. The popes of the first half of the 20th century thus firmly and repeatedly rejected Communist ideology, as evidenced by numerous encyclicals, most notably in 1937 when Pope Pius XI described communism as a dangerous, godless system that seeks a complete disruption of the social order and completely defies the Christian way of life.
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