The text is a reflection on emergence of the social model for provision of public services in Poland and, in particular, on the state of our current knowledge of this process. The paper consists of two parts. The first presents, in a developmental approach, the main components of this model, i.e. co-planning, co-production, co-governance and co-management. The second part contains a brief description of the state of affairs with regard to each of the components, in the light of recent research. As it turns out, co-planning and co-production remain largely unrecognised phenomena in Poland, whereas the knowledge of co-governance and co-management is remarkably greater, thanks to research on the socalled intersector cooperation, i.e., the cooperation between public administration and the third sector. The research indicates that the state of current cooperation is characterised by a strong asymmetry.
Depopulation is a fundamental problem of the local governments in highly developed countries. The article presents the results of the research into the perception of this phenomenon in Poland. In the introduction, theoretical determinants of the problem of the “shrinking” of cities were indicated. Then, the process of depopulation in Poland was discussed, based on the analysis of strategic documents of the selected cities (64), particularly those at risk of depopulation. The text ends with the conclusions of the research. The added value of the article is presentation of the local government’s perspective.
W niniejszym opracowaniu przedstawiono kilka argumentów, które negują ideę współzarządzania parkiem krajobrazowym. Są to argumenty podnoszące samą naturę parku krajobrazowego, argumenty systemowe (samoregulacja czy zarządzanie, część i całość), argumenty prakseologiczne (problem kooperacji), organizacyjne (zasada przystawania) prawne (administracja samorządowa i rządowa) oraz strategiczne (rozwój a przetrwanie). Z przeprowadzonej dyskusji wynika, że w parku powinien być ustanowiony jeden ośrodek dyspozycyjny w postaci dyrekcji bądź zarządu parku, który posiadałby odpowiednie uprawnienia decyzyjne po to, aby chronić wartości przyrodnicze, krajobrazowe i kulturowe. Istnieje zgoda co do tego, że wartości te są dobrem ogólnonarodowym. Jeśli nie będzie jednego ośrodka dyspozycyjnego w tym zakresie, to park krajobrazowy można uznać za zagrożoną formę ochrony przyrody.
EN
The paper presents a number of arguments contesting the idea of landscape parks co-management. Some of them refer to the nature of such parks, others point out to difficulties in systemic arrangements (self-regulation or management, the part and the whole), praxeology (the corporation problem), organization (the suitability principle), legislation (local and central administration) and strategy (growth vs. survival). In conclusion, the debate suggests that landscape parks should rely on a single decision-making body in the form of a park management board vested with the power to protect natural, landscape and cultural values. There is general consent that such values are national assets. If no single decision-making authority is established, landscape parks may become an endangered form of nature protection. The arguments should inspire a general debate on the best method of managing landscape parks.
We draw on the concept of ‘fit’ to understand how co-management and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as governance instruments could better acknowledge local social complexities. Achieving ‘participatory fit’ requires well-designed and fair processes, which enhance local acceptance towards the implemented rules. Thus, such fit can contribute to establishing new institutions in conservation governance. However, previous literature on participation has had strong focus on properties of decision-making processes, which often neglects the question on how local realities effect on local people’s ability and willingness to participate in the work of governance instruments. We approach ‘participatory fit’ by identifying six properties of heterogeneous local social systems that governance instruments need to acknowledge to nurture balanced bottom-up participation: 1) economic resources and structures, 2) relationships to land, 3) level of education, 4) relationships between diverse actors, 5) divergent problem definitions, and 6) local identities. We discuss related sources of misfits and develop proposals on how conservation instruments could function as bridging organizations facilitating polycentric institutional structures that fit better to the social systems they are intended to govern. Such hybridization of governance could avoid pitfalls of considering one particular instrument (e.g. co-management or PES) as a panacea able to create win-win solutions.
The article is devoted to the origin of the concept of the workers’ participation in the management, and then to its implementation in the EU and in Poland. The history of implementing common principles of workers’ self-management in the EU is quite complex; the participation model, the so-called Mitbestimung introduced after World War II in Germany (the act was passed in 1976) was then slowly and in a limited range (informing and consulting) introduced on the basis of the EU Directive of 1977 into the legislation of particular member states. Implementation became quicker when the EU decided to establish, as one of variants, the so-called European Company. In this model the European company committee was provided for. The directive was implemented in Polish legislation by the act of 2002; in companies acting in more than one country there is an obligatory company committee. Similarly, there should be a company committee in the so-called European Company and European Economic Interest Grouping. The European Company is an alternative legal form of company, the same on the territory of the whole EU. The history of workers’ participation in management in Poland, broadly discussed in the article, is much more complex. It started in 1981, under the pressure of the “Solidarity” trade union, with introducing the acts on the state company and the workers’ self-management in the state company. These acts, although they are included in the participation current, broadly outlined the rights of the workers’ committee and of the workers’ (delegates’) general meeting, actually granting them part of the rights to make decisions, that in fact belong to the owner (e.g. dividing the profit, sometimes electing the manager). The intention of these solutions was to introduce a reformed model of an independent company in a still planned economy, and they started a broad current of discussion on efficiency of these solutions and limitations of workers’ participation not only in managing, but also in ownership after 1989. The model of the state company of 1981 (actually, in the practice of the 1980’s significantly reduced by the martial law authorities) turned out to be a temporary one and under the conditions of market economy was substituted by a form that made it possible to introduce direct or indirect privatization. However, it is characteristic that Poland has, independent of the EU, its own ample experience and traditions in solving the problem of workers’ participation in management. The author, who in the 1980’s was a workers’ self-management advisor, synthetically compares arguments for and against introducing solutions that include workers’ participation in company management, and decidedly defends the limited participation model in the EU’s version introduced in Poland by the act of 2006.
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