The author investigates the parallel conceptions of the overall philosophical goal of M. Heidegger and G. W. F. Hegel. He is of the opinion that the main parallel in the philosophical work of these two thinkers is evident when we compare Heidegger’s conception of the first and second beginning of the history of being with Hegel’s historical scheme of the two phases of the return of the absolute idea to itself. Hegel’s moment of one’s own fully-conscious self-understanding determining the mediation of oneself, and thus overcoming one’s own externality is revealed to be the foreshadowing counterpart of Heidegger’s conception of the overcoming of the first beginning. This overcoming, which Heidegger calls a second beginning, is the overcoming of a movement that substitutes being with the highest being. Heidegger takes the first beginning of the history of being as its necessary initial movement, and only thus can being become aware of itself as the mediating movement of the historical possibility of the second beginning. Hegel’s and Heidegger’s thought are thus revealed to follow analogical and parallel paths in expressing the ultimate conceptions of philosophical thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The concept of the BOUNDARY, relevant in the philosophy for designating objects, has the same function also in the language. The word granica, from grań, i.e. a conventional sign set for separating one territory from another, in the process of time started to design not only the names of territories but also abstract names of objects without inherent boundaries. The author proposes to distinguish two lexical units with the sequence granica: granice czegoś 'boundaries of something', and granica między czymś a czymś 'boundary between ... and ...', both of which separate an object from surroundings. Using the first one, the speaker localizes the objects in space, whereas using the second one he separates it from other objects.
In his book, The Fragile Absolute, in the chapter “Why Is the Truth Monstrous?”, Slavoj Žižek discusses Buddhism. Specifically, he claims that Buddhists have always found it difficult to explain, “how is it that the primordial was disturbed, and that desire emerged; that living beings got caught up in the wheel of karma, of attachment to false reality?” (2000. The Fragile Absolute, London: Verso, 73). Ultimately, Žižek suggests that in Buddhism “this fall into perversion is original, the original monstrous cut/excess, and the opposition between nirvana and desire for false appearances is there to conceal this monstrosity” (ibid. 74). Notwithstanding, in his singular views on Buddhism, Žižek does raise the question concerning the source of samsara, the source of cyclic existence, which he explains by using the concept of primordial disturbance that falls into perver-sion. This article discusses this Žižek’s concept and confronts it with the Buddhist un-derstanding of the source, causes, and the mode of emergence of cyclic existence.
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