Chancellor Scholz's speech of 27 February 2022 in which he announced that his government would make fundamental changes to German security policy in the wake of Russia's aggression against Ukraine should, in theory, translate into a more influential role for Germany in Europe. The implementation of Zeitenwende is a test of German security policy in the allied context, but also requires the decision-making centre to create stable conditions in the domestic context. It can be assumed that the effectiveness of the change depends on consensus in the experimental three-party government coalition and securing the support of the Christian Democrats in part as well. A hypothesis can be put forward that the scope and scale of the undertaken turn in the above mentioned two areas were determined not so much by expectations on the part of the US and other allies as by the domestic context, i.e. the limited ability of the decision-making centre to build a broader supra-coalition support and to manage tensions. The author's aim is to clarify the ability of the decision-making centre to manage the tensions arising from the pressure of the Christian Democratic opposition and the widening divergence in the coalition between the supporters of adaptation (the Greens and the FDP) and its opponents (the left wing of the SPD), skeptical of military force. The article, based on the literature of the subject, the press and Internet information, examines two issues: the question of increased defence spending and arms supplies to Ukraine is analysed through the prism of relations in a tripartite set-up: the decision-making centre - the coalition parties - the Christian Democratic opposition
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