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tom 15
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nr 1
235-238
EN
The article reviews the book Filozofia analityczna. Koncepcje, metody, organiczenia [Analytic Philosophy. Concepts, Methods, Limitations], by Tadeusz Szubka.
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38%
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nr 9
245-256
EN
The article characterizes the main features Bocheński’s conception of Analytic Philosophy. In the first part, we present the difference between Analytic Philosophy and different world-views. Then we discuss the forth rules of analysis, and finally we refer to the practical and social role of Analytic Philosophy pointed out by Bocheński.
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Content available Czy można nie być naturalistą?
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nr 63
223-229
EN
A review of: J. Woleński, Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń 2016, ss. 226.
PL
Recenzja książki: J. Woleński, Wykłady o naturalizmie, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK, Toruń 2016, ss. 226.
EN
Karol Frenkel took as the object of his research the inner need to come to terms with the tradition in which he had been brought up. He developed an original conception of independent ethics. In his doctoral thesis, he analysed two competing ethical systems formulated by David Hume and Arthur Schopenhauer, which sought ethical determinants in the affective sphere. These proposals proved unsatisfactory to him, which is why he proposed his own solution, derived from his understanding of the concept of morality. From today’s perspective, it was the first attempt to formulate a concept of analytic ethics, which chronologically speaking preceded the analogous solutions proposed by George Moore in Principia Ethica.
PL
Karol Frenkel za przedmiot swych badań obrał wewnętrzną potrzebę rozliczenia się z tradycją, w której został wychowany. Wypracował oryginalną koncepcję etyki niezależnej. W swojej rozprawie doktorskiej przeanalizował dwa konkurencyjne systemy etyczne sformułowane przez Davida Hume’a oraz Artura Schopenhauera, które doszukiwały się determinant etycznych w sferze afektywnej. Propozycje te okazały się dla niego niezadowalające i dlatego zaproponował własne rozwiązanie, które wyprowadził z przyjętego przez siebie rozumienia pojęcia moralności. Z dzisiejszej perspektywy było to pierwsza w Polsce próba sformułowania koncepcji etyki analitycznej, która – chronologicznie rzecz ujmując – wyprzedzała analogiczne rozwiązania zaproponowane przez Georga Moore’a w Principia ethica.
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nr 23
EN
In contrast to Derrida and Butler, who overemphasized the subversive force of performatives, here the focus is on the immanent (micro-)sovereign power of performative utterances. Hence, what is proposed here is a search for the basic concept of power at the micro-level of speech acts. Before being codified with reference to certain stable power relations or contexts and before being objectified in different forms of domination and/or violence, power must be analyzed at the level of immediate performatives, where the struggle for power-codification could be followed in vivo. A task like this requires a conceptual shift: the illocutionary force of speech acts must be reinterpreted as their immediate evaluative force, i.e. as illocutionary power. Taking into account Derrida’s critique of Austin’s theory of speech acts, we should recognize that performatives arenot singular or atomistic speech acts, nor are they pre-determined by certain already given contexts or procedures. They are embedded in a citation and trace signs, without any final or autonomous signification. And yet, performatives have a specific kind of sovereignty. It is not the sovereignty of the ‘act’ itself but of the act’s performance. The actual (in the sense of ‘ongoing’) performance has an immediate force that is irreversible and also non-citable. Even in the case ofa direct citation, a citing performance sediments into an irreversible arrow, thus immediately reordering and re-evaluating all points in its trajectory. This performance does not fulfill a perspective, but it irreversibly forms a perspective. This effect of the virtuosity of an immediate performance could be called the power effect since it not only demonstrates how we make things with words, but also how we re-evaluate the things that were made through words. If an ongoing performance is such an immediate source of micro-power, then its role is not only to be ironically subversive and resistant to the already existing macro-codifications of power and domination. Performatives have their own sovereign power and are therefore capable of a direct affirmation and re-affirmation of the intersubjective frames of our experience.
PL
In contrast to Derrida and Butler, who overemphasized the subversive force of performatives, here the focus is on the immanent (micro-)sovereign power of performative utterances. Hence, what is proposed here is a search for the basic concept of power at the micro-level of speech acts. Before being codified with reference to certain stable power relations or contexts and before being objectified in different forms of domination and/or violence, power must be analyzed at the level of immediate performatives, where the struggle for power-codification could be followed in vivo. A task like this requires a conceptual shift: the illocutionary force of speech acts must be reinterpreted as their immediate evaluative force, i.e. as illocutionary power. Taking into account Derrida’s critique of Austin’s theory of speech acts, we should recognize that performatives are not singular or atomistic speech acts, nor are they pre-determined by certain already given contexts or procedures. They are embedded in a citation and trace signs, without any final or autonomous signification. And yet, performatives have a specific kind of sovereignty. It is not the sovereignty of the ‘act’ itself but of the act’s performance. The actual (in the sense of ‘ongoing’) performance has an immediate force that is irreversible and also non-citable. Even in the case of a direct citation, a citing performance sediments into an irreversible arrow, thus immediately reordering and re-evaluating all points in its trajectory. This performance does not fulfill a perspective, but it irreversibly forms a perspective. This effect of the virtuosity of an immediate performance could be called the power effect since it not only demonstrates how we make things with words, but also how we re-evaluate the things that were made through words. If an ongoing performance is such an immediate source of micro-power, then its role is not only to be ironically subversive and resistant to the already existing macro-codifications of power and domination. Performatives have their own sovereign power and are therefore capable of a direct affirmation and re-affirmation of the intersubjective frames of our experience.
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Content available Kilka uwag o aktualności filozofii metafizycznej
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nr 31
179-197
EN
The article discusses the characteristics of a philosophical and cultural dispute with metaphysics and about metaphysics itself. The criticism of metaphysics and its revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is discussed here. In the first part, the most important philosophical directions dealing with issues of metaphysics are presented: metaphysical idealism, anti-metaphysical positivism and neo-positivism, analytic philosophy versus metaphysics on the example of L. Wittgenstein, the revision of the metaphysical tradition and new investigations in metaphysics. The second part of the article concerns the picture of natural metaphysics including the mathematical-empirical method of researching the world. In the conclusion of the article, a thesis is put forward on searching for new metaphysics which will include a wider sphere of rationality and existential and spiritual experience.
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Content available "Logika i język" pół wieku później
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nr 2
EN
An extensive Polish anthology Logic and Language, for which Jerzy Pelc selected and translated a number of papers, has been for many years an invaluable resource in teaching and research. It has provided a helpful and instructive picture of some essential debates within analytic philosophy. However, in addition to several crucial essays, which firmly belong to the core texts of this tradition, the anthology includes also marginal and insignificant papers. And what is even more surprising, Pelc has passed over contributions of a few hugely influential philosophers (G. E. Moore, L. Wittgenstein, W. V. Quine, J. L. Austin, and H. P. Grice), and the justification of his selection given in the preface to the collection is incomplete and far from convincing.
PL
Obszerna antologia Logika i język z analitycznej filozofii języka, do której J. Pelc wybrał i przełożył teksty, była przez wiele lat wykorzystywana w nauczaniu i badaniach w Polsce. W udany sposób przedstawia niektóre dyskusje toczone w ramach filozofii analitycznej. Jednakże obok tekstów kluczowych, które weszły do kanonu tej tradycji, zawiera także prace marginalne i mało znaczące. Zaskakujące jest pominięcie przez Pelca kilku bardzo ważnych filozofów i ich dorobku (G. E. Moore’a, L. Wittgensteina, W. V. Quine’a, J. L. Austina i H. P. Grice’a), a podane we wstępie do antologii uzasadnienie tych braków jest niekompletne i mało przekonujące.
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tom 18
137-161
EN
The article discusses key concepts in contemporary philosophy of language (especially analytic), and also philosophy of linguistics, and linguistic philosophy, and the relations between these domains. Whereas linguistics, the scientific study of language, is concerned with theoretical and applied analyses of human natural language and with constructing appropriate levels of linguistic representation, philosophy of language provides (philosophical) investigations into the phenomenon of language in general, concentrating especially on the problems of meaning, reference, truth, and understanding. More recent approaches to philosophy of language considerably extend this field of investigation. Linguistic philosophy can be described as an approach to the philosophy of language, a philosophical method; further on, philosophy of linguistics offers philosophical reflections on linguistic inquiries and linguistic theories. The article investigates mutual relations among these disciplines, offers necessary terminological clarification, and provides an overview of recent studies devoted to philosophy of language.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie podstawowych zagadnień współczesnej filozofii języka (zwłaszcza w ujęciu analitycznym) oraz filozofii językoznawstwa i filozofii lingwistycznej, a także relacji między poszczególnymi dyscyplinami. Dla potrzeb niniejszej dyskusji językoznawstwo można określić jako systemowe badanie języka naturalnego, a filozofię języka jako systemowe badanie podstawowych pojęć związanych z naturą i właściwościami języka (zarówno języka naturalnego, jak i języków formalnych). Filozofia językoznawstwa, jako gałąź filozofii nauki, ma za swój przedmiot systemową refleksję nad teoriami językoznawczymi i metodami badań językoznawczych, natomiast filozofia lingwistyczna jest metodą lub techniką badania języka, również języka potocznego. W artykule dokonano również przeglądu zawartości wybranych encyklopedycznych i podręcznikowych pozycji poświęconych filozofii języka.
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Content available Roman Ingarden on analytic philosophy
26%
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nr 4
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