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1
Content available remote Idea, číslo, pravidlo
100%
Kolman V.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2009
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tom 57
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nr 5
709-732
EN
The subject of this paper is the general question of what role mathematics, or more particularly the philosophy of mathematics, plays in the work of Wittgenstein, and, also, in philosophy generally; a question I have tackled in a more extensive form, and not always very explicitly, in the book Filosofie čísla (The Philosophy of Number). Just as there, I take as my starting point Frege’s linguistic turn, beginning with the question “what is number?”, and I develop this is in a free relation (1) to Plato’s theory of ideas with mathematical objects as the middle entities, (2) Kant’s anchoring of mathe­matics in the pure intuitions of space and time, and (3) Wittgenstein’s conception of mathematics as one of many language-games, stemming from the understanding of a concept as rule.
2
Content available remote Nedorozumění
100%
Beran O.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2009
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tom 57
|
nr 5
683-708
EN
The text concerns the question of misunderstanding in the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Misunderstanding is analysed in the first place as a language-game situation having “external criteria” – incapacity to adopt the whole habitus (“life-form”) of someone who is a stranger to me, or to orientate in it. A detailed attention is paid to the importance of the emancipation of “external” criteria with respect to “inner” process understood as accessible only indirectly, with difficulty, or not at all. A particular problem is then represented by the language game of lying/pretending, where the situation of misunderstanding is intentionally produced. The philosophical analysis of the concept “pretending” (linking it to its outer criteria – detectability) is shown to contradict the basic motivation usually connected with the language game of pretending (to block the correct understanding).
3
Content available remote Istoty a skeptický problém
80%
Koreň L.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2013
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tom 61
|
nr 5
643-680
EN
The aim of the article is to develop the dialectics and potential of a specific philosophical approach to the problem of epistemological scepticism: Wittgenstein’s ideas about the function of fundamental certainties in our epistemic practices. I begin with an excursion into the problematic of sceptical arguments and explain G. E. Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy, which influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty. I then offer a reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian approach that I favour. On this basis I argue that although there is a grain of truth in scepticism, the idea of an indefinitely-iterated doubt and request for reasons (driving the Pyrrhonian-style of scepticism), as well as the idea of a hyperbolic doubt (driving Cartesian-style scepticism), are philosophical illusions from the perspective of the rules and standards of our epistemic operating - the would-be sceptic offers us no compelling alternative.
4
Uwagi o problemie podążania za regułą
70%
Wcisło B.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
|
2016
|
nr 61
117-136
EN
We consider Kripke’s interpretations of Wittgensteinian rule-following considerations. We claim that the main skeptical argument presented by Kripke fails to address the issue whether it is possible to have an intention of performing certain behavior in certain specific circumstances which a subject is able to recognize. We claim that if the rulefollowing skepticism recognizes possibility of having such intentions, then its findings do not imply its most radical intended consequences concerning semantics. Moreover, we think that in such case the subject might have an intention to compute values of recursive number-theoretic functions. On the other hand, it seems to us that Kripke presents no actual argument against the possibility of this restricted kind of intentions and that it should not be treated as prima facie controversial.
5
Content available Kryzys finansowy, odpowiedzialność dziennikarza i problem etyki szczegółowej
70%
Soin M.
Prakseologia
|
2010
|
nr 150
93-108
EN
The financial crisis as a realization of self-fulfilling prophecy reveals an important ethical dilemma of journalist’s responsibility. The dilemma is expressed in a question, if one should publish the information on crisis, since the publication probably increases the degree of crisis. The difficulty to answer this question points to the shortcomings of the standard conception of moral reasoning and to an approach to the relation between general normative theory and applied ethics. Instead of the standard conception the author proposes a „grammatical” account of general/applied ethics relation, connected with the Wittgenstein’s approach to the question of necessity in mathematics and other non-descriptive disciplines.
6
Content available remote Neskorý Wittgenstein a problém vonkajšieho sveta
70%
Greif A.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2016
|
tom 64
|
nr 5
743-759
XX
The aim of this article is to determine how useful to us are the notes from the late work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, in dealing with one of the modern sceptical problems. By determining the usefulness I have in mind whether or not his thoughts and descriptions of everyday linguistic practice help solve the sceptical problem and, if so, in what way. The sceptical problem in question is the Cartesian argument about the external world – the argument of ignorance. We will endeavour to show that if we accept Wittgenstein’s remarks as adequate descriptions of epistemic practice, they will help to make it possible to block the argument in question. However, there arise questions of whether Wittgenstein’s descriptions of epistemic practice are adequate, on the one hand, and whether the sceptical claims about the external world really spring from this practice, on the other hand. I hold the view that these questions are basically empirical. This has the relatively unusual consequence that the worth of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, as well as the cogency of the problem of the external world, cannot be judged in a purely philosophical way.
7
Content available remote Proč jsou elementární věty a stavy věcí v Traktátu vzájemně nezávislé?
70%
Daňková Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2014
|
tom 62
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nr 1
61-76
EN
In this article I attempt to reply to the question of whether, in the framework of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, reasons and arguments are given which might plausibly motivate the claim - made by Wittgenstein himself - that atomic propositions and their correlates (states of affairs) are mutually independent. My first step is to make clear that an answer to this question demands a detailed interpretation of Tractarian objects and, specifically, whether they are only particulars, or properties and relations too. After sketching the evidential support for both interpretations, I incline to a reading that takes properties and relations to be objects. In the context of the narrower and broader conceptions of objects, I then give a detailed analysis of the metaphor “the space of states of affairs” and “logical space”, which I consider to be the principal guide in our understanding the reasons for the independence of states of affairs and thus, more generally, of atomic propositions too.
8
Content available remote My tylko filozofujemy
60%
Łukasiewicz M.
Konteksty - Polska Sztuka Ludowa
|
2014
|
tom 68
|
nr 3-4(306-307)
76-80
EN
A depiction of discreet links between the writings of W. G. Sebald and the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, starting with traces of the thinker’s biography subtly intertwined in the text of The Emigrants, and a scenario written by Sebald for a film about Wittgenstein (Leben Ws.), to more general evidence of the affiliation of both protagonists representing similar sensitivity and intellectual predilections.
9
Content available remote Wittgenstein o istote: praktické rozriešenie skeptických pochybností
60%
Szapuová M.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2016
|
tom 64
|
nr 5
725-741
XX
The aim of this article is to investigate Wittgenstein’s views on doubt and certainty as they are expressed in his work On Certainty in the context of discussions about scepticism. I begin with a critical analysis of the interpretational framework according to which Wittgenstein’s notes amount to the kind of anti-sceptical strategy which demonstrates the meaninglessness of sceptical assertions as flowing from an abuse of language. I note the context of Wittgenstein’s notes and I evaluate the strong and weak sides of the linguistic interpretation. Then I adumbrate the possibility of an alternative interpretation of these notes. Firstly, I offer a characterisation of the “sceptical problem” and I defend the thesis that Wittgenstein’s notes can be read as a reaction to the sceptical problem understood as a challenge which calls for the justification of claims to knowledge as defined by the tripartite definition. In the second part of the article I distinguish several types of reaction to the sceptical problem, and I argue in favour of the view that Wittgenstein’s stance on the question can be best characterised as a reaction to the sceptical challenge which provides a “practical solution” to sceptical doubts. scepticism, anti-sceptical strategy, knowledge, Wittgenstein, certainty, action
10
Content available Konventionen bei der Interpretation von konversationellen Implikaturen
60%
Prasalski D. , Universität Łódź P. F.
|
|
tom 10
EN
This article is an attempt to characterize the conventions employed in the interpreting of conversational implicatures. The main objective is to justify the hypothesis that language utterers confronted with conversational implicatures not only use knowledge about rules of the language system and extralinguistic knowledge but also refer to special instructions for interpretation of implicit meanings. The article presents possibilities of verbalizing such instructions and compares them with linguistic rules showing some differences and similarities between them.
11
Content available The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective
60%
Gomułka J. , Wawrzyniak J.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2017
|
tom 31
|
nr 2
179–199
EN
Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
12
Content available Leon Zawadowski, Szkic z perspektywy osobistej
60%
Bogusławski A.
Linguistica Copernicana
|
2014
|
nr 11
15-28
EN
The author, first, reminds the Reader of the main points of Leon Zawadowski's scholarly career, second, calls the Reader's attention to some of the principal linguistic-theoretical tenets of his works, third, offers an outline of certain events in his pedagogical activity, in particular, as a visiting professor in Warsaw (in the mid-sixties), fourth, presents personal reminiscenses of encounters with Zawadowski at, roughly, the same time, and reports on certain facts concerning the influence that Zawadowski's writing had on his own work in the fifties and sixties. The remarks on Zawadowski's contribution on the theory of language encompass: a short presentation of the fundamental linguistic-theoretical ideas outlined by Zawadowski, a high appraisal of the weight and style of his work, and a comparison of his theoretical approach with that of Wittgenstein as the author of the Tractatus, as well as with de Saussure's works. Both Wittgenstein and Zawadowski are classed among proponents of the knowledge-centered logocentrism in the theory of language (which is a position the author endorses), as opposed to de Saussure's and the later several claims made by Zawadowski, in particular, on account of his claim of the necessity of a unilateral approach to so-called "linguistic signs" in its contrast to de Saussure'a and Wittgenstein's ideas of the primordial status of bilateral units of language (as emerging from Martinet's "first level of (linguistic) articulation").
13
Content available remote Koťátko o chrobákovi vo Wittgensteinovej škatuľke
51%
Čana T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2015
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tom 63
|
nr 2
267-278
EN
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the beetle in the box in the Philosophical Investigations has been the object of a robust critique by Petr Koťátko. In the book Interpretace a subjektivita (Interpretation and Subjectivity) he resolutely opposes the view that mental experiences do not figure in our vocabularies of the mental, which he associates with the metaphor in question. The aim of this article is to show that the critique in question is founded on a misunderstanding of the real sense of the metaphor. Its motivation is quite different. In addition, the aim is to show that, in reality, there is agreement between Koťátko’s critical thoughts and the motivation of Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the beetle in the box.
14
Content available Austrians-in-the-World. Conversations and Debates About Planning And Development
51%
Friedmann J. , School of Community and Regional Planning U. o. B. C. , jrpf@mail.ubc.ca
|
|
tom 21
|
nr 1
EN
John Friedmann has taught at MIT, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, UCLA, the University of Melbourne, the National University of Taiwan, and is currently an Honorary Professor in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. Throughout his life, he has been an advisor to governments in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, Mozambique, and China where he was appointed Honorary Foreign Advisor to the China Academy of Planning and Urban Design.
15
Content available Język gra rolę! Studia performatywne między filozofią a antropologią
50%
Kozłowski M. J.
Tematy z Szewskiej
|
2014
|
nr Performatywność 2(12)/2014
75-108
PL
Artykuł podejmuje próbę krytycznego przedstawienia studiów performatywnych z perspektywy filozofii języka. Fundamentalne idee dla nowego spojrzenia pochodzą z tzw. „późnej” twórczości Ludwika Wittgensteina. Pozwolą nam one na ponowne przeanalizowanie kluczowych koncepcji innych autorów, takich jak Michaił Bachtin, Gregory Bateson, czy John L. Austin, w których kręgu zainteresowania znajdowały się kwestie związane z językiem. Cała trójka wchodzi w skład szerokiego panteonu tzw. prekursorów studiów performatywnych. Redefiniujące ustalenia pomogą w ponownym przyjrzeniu się koncepcji i metodzie „etnografii performatywnej’’ powołanej do życia przez Victora W. Turnera. Prowadzone przez niego próby (w co najmniej dwóch znaczeniach i użyciach), dążące do ożywienia doświadczenia etnograficznego zastygłego w tekście uwidoczniły, że zarówno proces opracowywania wybranych fragmentów dla ich inscenizacji, jak ich późniejsze odegranie, prowadzić może do poszerzenia antropologicznej wiedzy oraz głębszego rozumienia ze strony uczestników takich zdarzeń.
EN
The article undertakes a critical approach to Performance Studies from a philosophy of language perspective. Ideas that originate in “late” works of Ludwig Wittgenstein are fundamental for the presentation of this new perspective, since they enable to reanalyze key concepts of other authors, such as Michaił Bakthin, Gregory Bateson, John Austin, each of whom was interested in different aspect of language. These authors form part of a wide pantheon of Performance Studies precursors. The article’s findings can be useful to once again examine the concept and method of “performing ethnography”, founded by Victor Turner. His attempts-rehearsals (which should be at least dually perceived), which aimed at reviving ethnographic experience, have revealed that the process of preparation of an ethnographic text for performance adaptation as well as the performing experience can lead the participants of such events to deeper anthropological knowledge and understanding.
16
Content available Do Scientists Seek the Truth?
43%
Gurczyńska-Sady K.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
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2014
|
tom 50
|
nr 4(202)
301-312
EN
In this article I try to answer the question if it is true that scientists discover the truth. The question is based on the tradition which the existence of objective truth about reality treats like a myth. I recall the hermeneutics tradition, according to which there is nothing like an objective truth, but there are truths. According to Gadamer, a human being is not the subject who discovers the objective reality, but the interpreter, one who brings out the meaning. On the basis of these framework assumptions I ask two questions. The first of these concerns the object of research for scientists. What is the reality of an interpreter built from? Using a variety of traditions, as referring to Fleck, Wittgenstein and Derrida I give an answer that these are cultural and historical components, not the objects as they are understood in the mathematical sciences. The second question concerns the issue of consciousness of the scientist. In reply I conclude that, despite the fact that the concept of objective truth is empty, it has a character of a white lie. The myth presents in philosophy is false but useful: the conviction of scientists that this myth is true allows for the new meaning to appear.
PL
Artykuł stanowi próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie czy naukowcy odkrywają prawdę? Pytanie to postawione zostaje w oparciu o tradycję, w której istnienie obiektywnej prawdy na temat rzeczywistości jest mitem. Przywołana zostaje tradycja hermeneutyczna, zgodnie z którą istnieją prawdy, a nie prawda. Według Gadamera podmiot nie jest podmiotem poznającym obiektywną rzeczywistość ale interpretatorem, który wydobywa znaczenie, sens w jakim jawi się rzeczywistość. Na bazie tak sformułowanych założeń postawione zostają dwa pytania. Pierwsze z nich dotyczy przedmiotu badań naukowców. Co jest budulcem rzeczywistości interpretatora? Korzystając z różnych tradycji, bo odnosząc się zarówno do Flecka, Wittgensteina, jak i Derridy formułuję odpowiedź, że są to kulturowe i historyczne komponenty, nie zaś przedmioty tak jak się je rozumie w naukach matematycznych. Drugie zaś pytanie dotyczy kwestii świadomości naukowca. Rozważania na ten temat konkluduję twierdzeniem, że mimo tego, że pojęcie prawdy obiektywnej jest puste, przybiera charakter białego kłamstwa. Jest użytecznym – bo pozwalającym by świat ukazał się w pewnym ze swych znaczeń – ale jednak mitem przekonanych o jego prawdziwości naukowców.
17
Content available Who Am I? Taylor's Selfhood and the Transcendental Condition of Conversation
41%
Chrzanowska K. , Jagielloński U.
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2017
|
tom 39 (4)
EN
Through a close reading of a small section of Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, this paper aims to highlight what is, in the author’s view, a particularly significant aspect of Charles Taylor’s conception of the constitution of selfhood. Namely, its entanglement in speech. “We don’t have selves in the way we have hearts and livers”, Taylor argues. We ‘have selves’ through the constant effort of articulation, which we are only capable of because we learned it from and with others in what Taylor calls the original situation of conversation. If the human ability to speak is the underlying feature behind self-interpretation, morality, and community – all important components of identity in Taylor’s view – then the very way we ‘have language’ will strongly impact the way we ‘have selves’. Language theory must thus become an important element of considerations on human identity and selfhood.
18
Content available remote Kategorizace mluvních aktů řeči víry
41%
Fajmon B.
Studia theologica
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2014
|
tom 1
182-195
EN
Briggs’ analysis of the confession “Jesus is Lord” implicitly indicates the limitations of Searle’s categorization of speech acts. In an attempt to classify the confession of faith according to Searle’s categorization, the theologically relevant properties of confession remain blurred. The main area of our interest is “faith discourse”, defined by means of the concept of “pneumatic intentionality”, which functions as a theological supplement to Searle’s intentionality of mind. In this article, we aim at establishing the categorization of speech acts of faith discourse on the basis of their transformative and communicative dimensions.
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