Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

The hat problem on a union of disjoint graphs

100%

Krzywkowski M.

Commentationes Mathematicae

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2011

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tom 51

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nr 2

EN

The topic is the hat problem in which each of n players is randomly fitted with a blue or red hat. Then everybody can try to guess simultaneously his own hat color by looking at the hat colors of the other players. The team wins if at least one player guesses his hat color correctly, and no one guesses his hat color wrong; otherwise the team loses. The aim is to maximize the probability of winning. In this version every player can see everybody excluding himself. We consider such a problem on a graph, where vertices correspond to players, and a player can see each player to whom he is connected by an edge. The solution of the hat problem is known for cycles and bipartite graphs. We investigate the problem on a union of disjoint graphs.

2

The Netherlands in the Face of the Problem of Direct Democracy – the Case of the Constitution for Europe

88%

Kużelewska E.

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2011

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tom 29

157-179

PL

Casus Konstytucji dla Europy – System polityczny Holandii wyraźnie faworyzuje demokrację przedstawicielską nad demokracją bezpośrednią. Głosowanie ludowe w 2005 r. w sprawie ratyfikacji Konstytucji dla Europy było pierwszym (i ostatnim) referendum ogólnokrajowym w Holandii. Decyzja o przyjęciu Traktatu konstytucyjnego w drodze referendum podyktowana była różnymi czynnikami, lecz wynikała głównie z przekonania, że wyborcy podzielają stanowisko polityków wobec potrzeby przyjęcia Konstytucji dla Europy. Tymczasem w referendum Holendrzy odrzucili traktat. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie powodów odrzucenia Traktatu konstytucyjnego Unii Europejskiej, a także próba odpowiedzi czy o wyniku referendum zdecydowały postawy wyborców wobec Europy, czy raczej postawy wobec partii politycznych i rządu.

EN

The dutch political system clearly favors representative democracy over direct democracy. Popular vote in 2005 on the ratification of the Constitution for Europe was the first (and the last) a nationwide referendum in the Netherlands. The decision to adopt the Constitutional Treaty by referendum was dictated by various factors, but mainly resulted from the belief that voters agree with the politicians about the need for a Constitution for Europe. Meanwhile the Dutch rejected the treaty in referendum. The purpose of this article is to show the reasons for the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, as well as to make an attempt to answer whether the outcome of the referendum was the result of voters’ attitudes towards Europe, or rather the attitudes towards political parties and government.

3

Hegemon or loser? Analysing Germany’s success in theCouncil of the European Union

75%

Kirpsza A.

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nr Special Issue 2023

27-51

EN

This paper aims to empirically test the hypothesis, derived from voting power theory, that Germany is the hegemon in the Council of the European Union (the Council), determining bargaining outcomes in this institution and being the most successful in attaining its preferences. This claim, deeply rooted in public opinion and academic literature, is tested by analysing the bargaining success of member states, including Germany, in the Council, as measured as the number of times they contested (voted against or abstained from voting) EU legislative acts in the years 2009-2019. To this aim, three statistical techniques are used: descriptive statistics, linear regression and multidimensional scaling. Overall, the hypothesis of German hegemony has not been corroborated. On the contrary, this country was found to be among the least successful countries in the Council. This conclusion comes from the following findings. First, the analysis of descriptive statistics showed that Germany is one of the countries that most often contests legislation and loses votes in the Council. Second, the linear regression analysis demonstrated that Germany’s success in the Council is statistically significantly lower than that of the other states. As a result, the country is in the narrow group of the three biggest losers in the institution. Third, the multidimensional scaling analysis revealed that Germany has serious difficulty in building winning coalitions and blocking minorities in the Council as it has essentially no permanent or close coalition partner. The paper argues that such a peripheral position for Germany in the Council is due to the radicalism of its preferences and its low propensity to grant concessions in negotiations. The article also predicts that after the UK leaves the EU, Germany will continue to be isolated in the Council and its voting success in this institution will remain low.

4

= “Études de théologie, de philosophie et d’histoire” – Magazine of Russian Jesuits in France

71%

Cierniak U.

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tom LXVII

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nr 3

5

Pierwsza i druga „reforma federalizmu” w Republice Federalnej Niemiec – zmiany Ustawy Zasadniczej z 2006 i 2009 r. w odniesieniu do kompetencji prawodawczych i stosunków finansowych Związku i krajów

44%

Przybysz M.

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2017

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nr 1 (35)

137-154

PL

Tekst zawiera opis i analizę zmian Ustawy Zasadniczej RFN z 2006 i 2009 r. dotyczących kompe-tencji prawodawczych i relacji finansowych federacji i landów. Tekst otwiera krótkie przedstawienie postępującego przez ponad 50 lat „|procesu przenikania się polityk”, określanego już w 70. latach ub. wieku jako „pułapka”. Z tej perspektywy istotna była próba rozwiązania problemu w drodze dwóch, dużych nowelizacji niemieckiej konstytucji w latach 2006 oraz 2009 (tzw. pierwsza i dru-ga reforma federalizmu). Autor opisuje założenia i instrumenty zastosowane w drodze pierwszej reformy tj. wzmocnienie własnych kompetencji prawodawczych Związku i krajów, zmniejsze-nie liczby spraw co do których Bundesrat może stosować bezwzględne veto, ograniczenie tzw. „mieszanego finansowania”, utrudnienie „blokowania się” przez Związek i kraje poprzez nowe uregulowanie spraw wymagających zgody Bundesratu, jak również dostosowanie Ustawy Zas-adniczej do wyzwań związanych z członkostwem RFN w Unii Europejskiej. W tym kontekście analizie została poddana również druga reforma federalizmu. Znowelizowała ona system wza-jemnych relacji finansowych Związku i krajów, wprowadziła tzw. hamulec długów (Schuldenbrem-se) jednocześnie ograniczając niektóre rozwiązania ustrojowe wprowadzone trzy lata wcześniej.

EN

The text contains description and analysis of changes of 2006 and 2009 in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany concerning legislative powers and financial relations of fed-eration and länder. The text begins with a description of advancing for over 50 years “process of policies’ merging”, described already in seventies of 20th century as a “trap”. Therefore, it was important to try to resolve the problem by two large amendments of the German consti-tution in 2006 and 2009 (i.e. the 1st and the 2nd reforms of federalism). The author describes assumptions and instruments applied by the first reform, ie. strengthening of legislative com-petences of the Union and länder, reducing the number of cases towards which the Bundes-rat may apply the absolute veto, limiting so-called “mixed funding”, making “blocking up” of the Union and the countries through new regulation of matters more difficult by requir-ing the approval of the Bundesrat, as well as the adjustment of the Basic Law to the challeng-es of membership of Germany in the European Union. In this context the second reform of federalism was also the subject of analysis. The reform amended the system of mutual finan-cial relations of the Union and countries and introduced a so-called “debt brake” (Schuld-enbremse) but also limited some solutions which had been introduced three years before