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tom 3
45-60
EN
The article deals with the role of paradigms in the system of religious beliefs. Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach, which indicates that that scientific models are products of the creative analogical imagination, will be used as a starting point of my argument. The data are theory-laden as comprehensive theories are resistant to falsification, and a strict criteria for paradigm choice is difficult to find (if at all). These subjective features are undoubtedly more prominent in the field of religion, where there is a greater diversity of models, a greater influence of the interpretations to data, a greater persistence in fidelity to paradigm, and a greater unclearness in the process of paradigm choice. Although each of these subjective features is more evident in religious beliefs, there is a difference in degree between science and religion rather than an absolute contrast.
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Content available Is normal science good science?
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tom 14
EN
“Normal science” is a concept introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In Kuhn’s view, normal science means “puzzle solving”, solving problems within the paradigm-framework most successful in solving current major scientific problems-rather than producing major novelties. This paper examines Kuhnian and Popperian accounts of normal science and their criticisms to assess if normal science is good. The advantage of normal science according to Kuhn was “psychological”: subjective satisfaction from successful “puzzle solving”. Popper argues for an “intellectual” science, one that consistently refutes conjectures (hypotheses) and offers new ideas rather than focus on personal advantages. His account is criticized as too impersonal and idealistic. Feyerabend’s perspective seems more balanced; he argues for a community that would introduce new ideas, defend old ones, and enable scientists to develop in line with their subjective preferences. The paper concludes that normal science has no one clear-cut set of criteria encompassing its meaning and enabling clear assessment.
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nr 2
177-183
EN
The new edition in Italian of the articles by the Polish microbiologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) edited by Francesco Coniglione offers the opportunity for some considerations around this significant scholar. Fleck anticipates Kuhn's ideas as well as those of the sociology of science. For him, any epistemology that does not take psychological and sociological methods into account, or that does not concern itself with economics, technology, art, and even politics, is an epistemology imaginabilis. Here we discuss some key points of the essays collected in the book, some observations taken from the rich introduction of the editor, and an inevitable question: Why has Fleck been neglected for so long?
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2020
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tom 8/2
177-183
EN
The new edition in Italian of the articles by the Polish microbiologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) edited by Francesco Coniglione offers the opportunity for some considerations around this significant scholar. Fleck anticipates Kuhn's ideas as well as those of the sociology of science. For him, any epistemology that does not take psychological and sociological methods into account, or that does not concern itself with economics, technology, art, and even politics, is an epistemology imaginabilis. Here we discuss some key points of the essays collected in the book, some observations taken from the rich introduction of the editor, and an inevitable question: Why has Fleck been neglected for so long?
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