Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Transcendentalia - Principles of Being, Knowledge and Causation

100%

Muszynska R.

|

2007

|

tom 16

|

nr 2(62)

31-42

EN

The article presents five transcendental attributes of real existence of being: distinction (aliquid), reality (res), unity (unum), truth (verum) and the good (bonum). These attributes serve as a platform on which first principles of cognition can be rested that underlie the essential claims of metaphysics. These principles can be enumerated as non-contradiction, identity, essentiality and sufficient reason. Whenever any one of them was recognized as a first principle, it began to strongly influence the philosophical construction that was built upon it and shaped its relation to the real world. In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas a similar role was assigned to transcendental attributes which referred to God and and his relation to the created world. God was the cause of existence of being (causa efficiens), the cause of individuation (causa exemplaris) and the cause determining the purpose of being (causa finalis).

2

TRPEZLIVOSŤ AKO CNOSŤ TOLEROVANIA PODĽA TOMÁŠA AKVINSKÉHO

100%

Blaščíková A.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

|

2013

|

tom 68

|

nr 6

493 – 501

EN

The problem of tolerance in Thomas Aquinas is approached in the article as rooted in the virtue of patience. A patience (patientia) as conceived in Christianity is related to hope and preceded by belief. According to Aquinas, this interconnection of patience and hope enables humans conducted by loving their neighbours to tolerate, in certain situations, the evils inflicted by the others. A particular act of patience depends on the practical wisdom (prudentia) which involves setting oneself the right objective and considering the conditions of the deed in question. However, according to Aquinas there is no possibility to choose intolerance against the virtue of patience if one follows the correct reason. Therefore, even an explicitly non-religious person is capable of tolerance, if his or her choice is in accordance with the gift of natural reason.

3

The Truth of Conscience

100%

Krokos J.

|

2007

|

tom 16

|

nr 1(61)

139-153

EN

Following the lead of Thomas Aquinas and taking phenomenological analyses as his starting point the author undertakes to analyze conscience as a specific form of cognition, a source of knowledge about something. He contends that conscience is an axiological awareness that one's own or somebody else's action is recognized and placed within his/her own internal cognitive horizon. This recognition consists in making use of the first norm of action (synderesis) and by observing other principles of moral knowledge that are honored by the conscionable man for whatever reasons. Recognition of an action by conscience proceeds only vaguely when the subject initially realizes no more than he/she or somebody else has done something. Subsequently the character of the action becomes clearer when the 'beam of intention' attaches to it. In this phase the action is identified as either good or bad, and it elicits a response from the evaluating subject. Thus conscience assesses an action adequately if the action is honestly recognized in its complete structure, if it is placed in the horizon of unabridged moral knowledge of the evaluating subject who holds this knowledge as valid and retains it enduringly.

4

Metaphysical Interpretations of 'Veritas est aedequatio rei et intelectus' in Thomas Aquinas

100%

Bartel T.

|

2007

|

tom 16

|

nr 1(61)

111-122

EN

The definition of the truth as:'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus' is not only a description of the truthfulness but it also defines a certain order ('ordo') of acquiring or contemplating truth. The novelty of Thomas's interpretation is largely to be found in the fact that he unwaveringly views truth in a metaphysical perspective, as a relation of things to some sort of intellect. The relation is epitomized in juxtaposing 'res' and 'intellectus'. By establishing this connection in general terms, he could encompass a broad range of learning or perceiving subject, from a human intellect to God's mind. At the same time, he took a stand in a lively discussion on the nature of truth, which developed in the 13th century, and chose a positon which was comparable to Aristotle's rather than Augustine's, Avicenna's or Anselm's.

5

ZÁKLAD STRUKTURY LIDSKÉHO MYŠLENÍ PODLE SV. TOMÁŠE AKVINSKÉHO

100%

Štěpinová M.

Studia theologica

|

2011

|

tom 13

|

nr 3

24-41

EN

The entire cognition of the human being is based on the concept of being (ens). Being is grasped by the intellect as its first concept. Every subsequent cognition consists of a development of what have been implicitly given in the concept of being. The article aims at explaining the basic structure of thinking; how exactly the concepts are divided. According to Aquinas, being non¬ being are grasped by the intellect as its first concepts; because of them the intellect is able to grasp the meaning of division and the concept of the One (unum) as the negation of the division. The concept of the One is a condition for understanding the multitude; an understanding of the multitude is a necessary condition for comprehension of the being as a thing – as something. The clue for understanding the entire cognitive process is obviously the concept of non¬ being and as such is being treated in the article.

6

Avicebron - A Giant of Circumstances in Existential Metaphysic

100%

Milcarek P.

|

2007

|

tom 16

|

nr 1(61)

123-137

EN

Avicebron deserves the appelation 'a giant of circumstances in existential metaphysics' because he neither proposed to hold a distinction between essence and existence, nor did he try to abolish it. In this sense his teaching was impoprtant but adventitious for the history of some philosophical ideas. Avicebron made an important contribution to the creation of a new theory. His original and controversial thought was frequently discussed by Franciscan theologians of Paris and seemed to be of interest to Thomas Aquinas. The inventive aspect of his thought consisted in the proposal to challenge the idea that potentiality is indistibnguishable from matter, or, in more concrete terms, that potentiality was to be identified with bodies. Avicebron put forward that potentiality can also reside in angels and in rational spirits. However, this assumption in turn led him, along with a number of his followers, to the belief that there existed various kinds of non-corporeal matter. This specific assertion drew attention of Thomas Aquinas who observed that the concept of potentiality is wider than the concept of matter, and, consequently, some form of potentiality may have nothing to do with matter at all. Furthermore this proposal was complemented in Aquinas with two theses - first, that, as can be found in Avicenna, existence is different from essense, and secondly, that, as had been upheld by Aristotle, actuality is different from potentiality. By combining these three beliefs Thomas Aquinas could formulate a thought which proved fundamental for the entire Christian philosophy that God as the essence of being by possessing full being wheras other things exist only by participation in him. In this way Avicebron helped in the formulation of the most important metaphysical thesis of Thomas Aquinas.

7

Aposteriorní modální důkazy Boží existence

88%

Dvořák P.

Studia theologica

|

2006

|

tom 8

|

nr 2

91-97

EN

The article is an analysis of the logic of a posteriori modal proofs of the divine existence. A certain general principle of modal proofs is being identified: namely, the inference to some stronger modal ontological status (of the divine being) either seen to ground a weaker modal-existential status or to be incompatible with it. The aforementioned stronger status guarantees the actual existence of such a divine being. The Third Way of St. Thomas Aquinas is used as a departure point for such a general analysis. The general principle of inference is then applied to other proofs; namely, the one found in the works of J. D. Scotus.

8

Stoic and Epicurean Elements in the Theory of Knowledge of Thomas Aquinas

88%

Pawlikowski T.

|

2005

|

tom 14

|

nr 2(54)

85-102

EN

An interpretation which Thomas Aquinas has offered as a solution of the problem of 'cognitive apprehesions' (conceptiones) of the human intellect bears clear marks of an Epicurean-Stoic understanding of 'prolepseis' and 'ennoiai' insofar as it underscores a specific innate character of 'conceptiones communes' and 'conceptiones universales' as evidenced by their anticipatory function. Some conceptiones are what we call today propositions, very much like Augustine's 'notiones' or Epicurean-Stoic 'prolepseis', or 'katalepseis'. Such concepts cannot be found in Aristotle who, moreover, did not have terms with which he could identify 'cognitive apprehesions'. He discusses concepts as a separate topic in the context of the origin and nature of the universals (katholou), and regards propositions which are not distinguished from sentences (logos) as either affirmations (kataphasis) or negations (apophasis). Aquinas took over from Aristotle the idea that all human knowledge originates in the experience of being, and from Stoics and Epicureans the conception of the anticipatory nature of human cognitive concepts. He merged these two traditions with the help of Augustinian conception of illumination, a theory of 'conceptiones universales' and a theory of transcendental concepts and first principles which he called 'conceptiones communes'.

9

Historical Sources of the Classical Conception of Truth in Thomas Aquinas

88%

Pawlikowski T.

|

2007

|

tom 16

|

nr 1(61)

95-109

EN

Thomas Aquinas undertook to examine various definitions of truth in 'Quaestiones disputate', 'De veritate', q.1, a.1; 'Scriptum super I Librum Sententiarum', dist.19, q.5, a.1; 'Summa theologiae', I, q.16, a. 1,2. In these writings Thomas relied on four formulations of truth that were used in his time, namely (i) a definition by Isaac Israeli in 'Liber de definitionibus', par.26, and the formula of the principle of the excluded middle found in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', IV, 7; (ii) a definition by Avicenna in 'Metaphysics', I, 8; (iii) a definition given by Saint Anselm in his 'De veritate', 11; and (iv) a definition proposed by Saint Augustine in 'Soliloquia', II, 5. After analyzing and comparing them all, the Angelic Doctor adopted the well known definition: 'veritas est aqaequatio rei et intellectus'. It is interesting to note that before this formula won common acceptance, no single definition of truth had been universally recognized either in philosophy or theology. Moreover, as some pronouncements of Albert the Great indicate, it had not been common to assume that truth consists in the agreement between an intellectual judgment of a state of affairs and the state of affairs itself. Consequently, it seems right to claim that the classical concept of truth can be traced as far back as Thomas Aquinas.

10

Hodnocení suicidality v biblicko-křesťanské tradici

88%

Šrajer J.

Studia theologica

|

2008

|

tom 10

|

nr 2

1-14

EN

The paper reflects the classification of suicide in the context of the biblical-Christian tradition. It shows that the ultimate condemnation of suicide does not occur in the Bible. It presents the condemnation/denunciation of suicide by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Finally it deals with ecclesiastic-Christian praxis towards suicide, where taboo and pre-Christian elements are quoted. But recently there has been an evident tendency to a more differentiated and humane attitude towards the classification of suicide or more precisely those who commit it and their environment.

11

ESENCE MATERIÁLNÍCH JSOUCEN V KONTEXTU PSYCHOLOGIE U TOMÁŠE AKVINSKÉHO

88%

Slováček P.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

|

2014

|

tom 69

|

nr 9

765 – 776

EN

Thomas Aquinas advocates a noticeably anti-dualistic anthropological position, which forces him to explain human beings as metaphysically complex beings. This would be impossible on the physical level alone. However, the problem of the essence of material forms is still elaborated insufficiently. As to my knowledge, there are still two questions, which have not been properly answered: (a) How should be the matter in the essence of particular beings comprehended; b) how it is possible to combine the existence of an indivisible soul with its being the very basis of intellect and the form of the body. The paper unveils Aquinas’s differentiated approach to these questions in order to suggest a new interpretation of the essence of material beings. Rendered in a wider context of Thomas’s psychology, it would comply with following requirements: a) historical-philosophical coherence, by which we mean primarily a meaningful categorization of the elaborated concept into the historical philosophical framework; b) metaphysical coherence and c) philosophical-psychological coherence.

12

ROVINY FILOZOFICKÉ PSYCHOLOGIE TOMÁŠE AKVINSKÉHO

75%

Slováček P.

Človek a spoločnosť. Internetový časopis pre pôvodné teoretické a výskumné štúdie z oblasti spoločenských vied

|

2014

|

tom 17

|

nr 2

-

EN

The objective of the article is to characterize the complex standing of psychological heritage of Thomas Aquinas’s concept of soul in view of previous tradition. Further, the article attempts to demonstrate that Thomas´ psychology is significantly wiser than traditional interpretations resting on the concept of soul as substantial form would indicate. A novel approach to the concept of soul in Thomas Aquinas´ works is suggested, based on the possibility of relating to the soul in terms of various philosophical levels or disciplines, namely the metaphysical, physical and moral-theological levels. The argumentation presented rests on a basic assumption that metaphysical concepts allow for analyzing all that falls in the scope of other disciplines – physics, and to some extent, even theology. The latter assumption constitutes a key for the analysis of the levels of Thomas Aquinas´ philosophical psychology.

13

Pragnienie, wola i powinność. Spór o rolę samowiedzy w filozofii średniowiecznej i współczesnej

75%

Płotka M.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

|

2015

|

tom 43

|

nr 1

79-97

EN

The aim of the article is to present the role played by the will in human action in the accounts of Thomas Aquinas and John Buridan. The achievements of contemporary analytic philosophy are the context for considering medieval theories of action. First, I focus on second-order volitions whose objects are desires (John Buridan and Harry Frankfurt). Next, I present the modifications of this theory carried out by Thomas Aquinas and Lawrence A. Blum. They agree in postulating some kind of self-cognition as the source of second-order volitions; however, it would seem that Aquinas, who argues for placing the source of such acts in obligation (God’s principles), offers a significant improvement on Blum’s account.

14

Svědomí jakožto kritérium správného jednání

75%

Štěpinová M.

Studia theologica

|

2006

|

tom 8

|

nr 4

55-65

EN

St. Thomas Aquinas' definition of the conscience is well known. Nevertheless, from one point of view it is surprising. According to him, it is the same human reason which (designated as practical reason) can consider one and the same thing as being good and (designated as conscience) bad at the same time. To understand his conception of the conscience, it is necessary to look into the historical background. St. Thomas developed his conception of conscience explicitly in relationship with the Augustinian tradition of higher and lower reason, with Aristotle's explication of an incontinent man and with the contemporary discussion on synderesis; and he connected it implicitly with the problem of 'two wills' from the Augustinian tradition and with the question of man's possibilities to act rightly. The article aims to explain the content of Aquinas' conception of the conscience on the basis of its historical background.

15

Problém vedeckosti teológie u Jána Dunsa Scota

75%

Chabada M.

Studia theologica

|

2007

|

tom 9

|

nr 1

68-80

EN

In the light of Aristotle's criteria for scientific knowledge, Duns Scotus maintains theology is not a science, but a specific and independent (autonomous) type of knowledge that is neither subordinated to any other type of knowledge, nor makes any other type of knowledge subordinated to itself. At the same time, Scotus modifies Aristotle's understanding of science: certainty and evidence are not based upon the necessity of a subject, but rather upon the perfection of knowing mind. Even though 'our theology' is not a science, it has more dignity compared to other sciences, since it offers 'more', i.e. it offers knowledge aiming at making man more perfect. At the same time, it demonstrates the fact that the goal of man is not theory, but rather practice in the sense of love.

16

Od „anima in corpore“ k „anima forma corporis“

63%

Machula T.

Studia theologica

|

2004

|

tom 6

|

nr 4

44-52

EN

The article deals with the concept of a human being with respect to its composition from soul and body. The discussion of this topic was very important and fruitful in the 13th century. It was stimulated by Aristotle's writings appearing at that time in Christian Europe. The article focuses on the most important 13th century authors who contributed to that discussion: Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Latin averroists. During this discussion of soul and body, there was a shift from a platonic philosophical framework to an Aristotelian one. It also resulted in the Church doctrine of human soul.

17

How Arabian Philosophy Contributed to Transform Metaphysics into Ontology

63%

Lisowski A.

|

2007

|

tom 16

|

nr 1(61)

155-169

EN

Medieval Arabian metaphysicians of the 10th and 11th centuries (Al-Farabi and Avicenna) identified being conceived as the subject of metaphysics with an essence so thoroughly indeterminate that it was impossible even to contemplate its definition. That was an approach radically different from the essentialist metaphysics of Aristotle, and even more conspicuously it was different from the metaphysics of the act of existence as proposed by Thomas Aquinas, where the process of abstraction was not conducive to identification of being with a concept of utmost generality and inherently unsusceptible to particular determinations. The Arabian concept of the totally indeterminate essence (esse commune) had strong influence on Duns Scotus (end ut equvocum ??) and consequently, through the followers of Duns' metaphysics in the 16th and 17th century on several schools, such as traditional Thomism (Thomas de Vio Caietanus and John of Saint Thomas), Jesuit philosophers (Fonseca and Suarez) and ontology as the 'first philosophy' of Christian Wolff. The fundamental premises of ontology that identifies being with internally consistent, indeterminate nature persisted until the second half of the 20th century in contemporary versions of the 'classical Thomism', on the one hand, and in the reconstructions of 'fundamental ontology' meant as a substitute of the classical Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics on the other hand.

18

Teoria przyczynowania narzędnego jako przyczynowania sprawczego w tekstach Tomasza z Akwinu

63%

Szczepkowska W.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

|

2011

|

tom 39

|

nr 2

99-122

EN

The article is an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s theory of secondary causation, in which instrumental causation which plays the role of efficient causation. Since Thomas never wrote a complete theory of secondary causation, a reconstruction is needed. What is at stake is a coherent interpretation of the difference between God's efficient causation and secondary causation. Because Thomas claims that God is the First Cause in all orders of causation, secondary causation should be interpreted as instrumental causation. However, this leads to the problem of the autonomy of secondary causation. The article calls attention to five aspects of the issue. (1) Of the two different orders that appear in Thomas's metaphysics, those of creation and efficient causation, only the second is referred to in terms of "instrumental causation". (2) Since an instrumental cause acts only when the first cause gives its own power to it, the resulting double causation leads to two kinds of effects, those from the First Cause (the act of being) and those from the instrumental cause and the first cause (the nature or essence). (3) Thomas uses various terms to explain the theory of efficient causation. (4) Since he claims that accidentality is a result of secondary causal activity, the effect of instrumental causation in a particular remains to be defined. (5) Although Thomas claims that the human soul is exclusively an effect of God's creative causation, he never analyzes the soul in the order of efficient causation. Thus, one may ask about the ontological status of the soul in the order of efficient instrumental causation. I claim that this kind of inquiry would contribute to a reconstruction of Thomas's full theory of causation.

19

Realita mysle ako podmienka identity ľudskej osoby

63%

Volek P.

Studia theologica

|

2008

|

tom 10

|

nr 4

33-51

EN

This paper argues for the thesis that the reality of mind is a necessary as well as sufficient condition for a diachronic identity of human person. The impossibility of elimination of qualia and intentionality and thus the impossibility of eliminative materialism was proved here. An impossibility of the theory of identity of types and individuals, together with the impossibility of functionalism as one of the versions of eliminative materialism was proven through a careful consideration of Libet's experiments. Subsequently, dualism surfaced as further option. The views of interactive dualism of Popper and Eccles and that of pragmatic dualism of Carrier and Mittelstrass turned out to be unsuitable in some of their consequences. Hylemorphic dualism turned out to be the best explanation from the sorts of dualism discussed in this paper. Through its understanding of mind as a form, hylemorphic dualism enables us to explain causality as formal and final and thus to separate it form the efficient causality of empirical objects. By this, it also explains the diachronic identity of human person possible.

20

TOMÁŠOVA METAFYZIKA ČLOVĚKA - ČLOVĚK JAKO PROSTŘEDNÍ ČLÁNEK HIERARCHIE STVOŘENÍ

63%

Slováček P.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

|

2016

|

tom 71

|

nr 6

462 – 473

EN

The article sheds light on how Thomas Aquinas philosophically explained and founded the unity of human being as the centre of the created universe, establishing the continuity between the spheres of nature and intellect. Thomas’ conception is explored with respect to older doctrines drawing on Aristotle’s hylemorfic approach, especially to human soul, showing at the same time the development of Thomas’ conception itself. In Thomas the traditional problem of a possible uniting the soul as a form with the soul as a founding principle of thinking is successfully eliminated by transposing the psychological problematic as a whole to metaphysical level (especially in his later writing De substantiis separatis). This shift enabled him to explain the continuity of universe as well as the unity of human being thanks to the distinction between essence and being taken from Avicenna.