The paper deals with the so-called predicates of taste. There seems to be the following conflict concerning such predicates: Let “…P…” be a sentence involving a predicate of taste, P. It may happen that one speaker, A, utters “…P…” and another one, B, utters “It is not the case that …P…” without contradicting each other. On the other hand, it may also happen that if A utters “…P…” and B utters “It is not the case that …P…” they do contradict each other. The purported conflict is solved within a theory called minimal indexicalism. It is claimed that the conflict disappears when we admit that, in the first scenario, A and B, though using the same words, express different propositions and that, in the second scenario, A and B adopt different criteria for evaluating the same proposition.
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