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T.S. Eliot’s Anti-Elitist View of Education

100%

Budziak A.

tom 10

57-64

Born into a family boasting eminent educators—William Greenleaf Eliot, founder of Washington University in St. Louis, and Charles William Eliot, famous Harvard President—T.S. Eliot joined the debate about schools and universities early on, in the era of the great educational reform leading to the development of the system of elective courses. He criticized the changes and the resulting decline of Classics, though his concern with the problem of education was never being purely theoretical. On the one hand, his own education was a product of the elective system, and he himself, as he complained, a “victim” of it. On the other hand, Eliot, for a while, was also a teacher: prior to working at Lloyds Bank, and before his professional and financial investment in Faber and Faber, he taught pupils in grammar schools and, as an extension lecturer under the auspices of Oxford University, evening classes to adults. His interest in educational issues continued over many years, assuming diverse forms—from writing on education to lecturing and giving opening addresses at universities, to recommending poetry books for pupils and asking practical questions about the accessibility of university accommodation for students from abroad. Nevertheless, he was criticized for seeming to oppose the equality of educational opportunity. This essay re-examines the ideas from Eliot’s “Notes towards the Definition of Culture” (1948) and “The Aims of Education” (the four lectures delivered in 1950 and included in “To Criticize the Critic” in 1965) in the context of his ephemeral prose writings, and it reconsiders the question of whether Eliot’s views on education did indeed represent exclusivist elitism.

Czy nauka jest możliwa jako metafizyka?

70%

Kościuszko K.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

2011

tom 47

nr 3(189)

425-431

I try to answer a question opposite to Kant's question, namely I don't ask if the metaphysics is possible as the science, I ask if the science is possible as the metaphysics? I carry on controversy with Ted Harrison's metaphysics of intelligent design (with the metaphysics of projected universes).

Współczesne postaci ontologii. Od Hegla do Quine’a

60%

Paź B.

2012

tom 12

nr 1(16)

9-38

The article presents some prominent figures of modern ontology from Hegel to nowadays. It takes into account the diverse forms of ontology in three distinct trends of philosophy: Hegelianism, phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Each of these trends has its own subject, aim and method of ontology. The subject of Hegel’s ontology is understood as something originally undefined, being on the border of nonentity. When presented this way, the subject presupposes a dialectic method of ontology, which the German philosopher defines as “the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.” It is based on reflection, which, according to Hegel, is both a tool and medium to knowledge, though in his Phenomenology of spirit he identifies it as being by itself. Thus understood ontology is to be found both in the works of Hegel’s students and his critics (S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre). In Husserl’s phenomenology it is not reflection but eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) that is the main method of ontology, and its subject is not just being, but the essence – a correlate to the eidetic intuition. To Husserl’s phenomenological presumptions referred, among others, N. Hartman and R. Ingarden, who understood ontology as eidetic analysis of ideas. Though Heidegger saw the problem differently: the goal of ontology is defining the meaning of Being (Sinn vom Sein), its method is phenomenological. In none of the approaches was the subject of ontology understood in a classic way as Being, but rather as a certain form of its representation, as the content of consciousness (ideas), or as a certain sense for a definite subject. A different approach to ontology is observable within analytic philosophy, which involved lots of different personalities and different traditions, such as the new positivism, scholastics (J.M. Bocheński, E. Nieznański), Leibnizian rationalism (A. Plantinga), empiricism and pragmatism (W.O. Quine, P. Strawson). Remarkable achievements in ontology belong to some Polish logicians, representatives of the Polish school of analytic philosophy, such as S. Leśniewski and T. Kotarbiński. Leśniewski was the founder of formal ontology – logical calculus of names, while Kotarbiński discovered nominalistic and materialistic ontology – reism (from Latin: res ‘thing’) based on Leśniewski’s ontology. The main thesis of reism was the claim that “every object is a body.”