This paper examines in detail David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for his thesis that it would have been better for all people not to have begun to exist. Confused attempts to construe the thesis itself are dismissed, including some by Benatar himself (1). A more fitting reading is proposed: in all people self-regret due to one’s own coming into existence would be adequate (2). Benatar’s basic asymmetry of harms and benefits is accepted as a mere truism (3). The lack of any articulate transition from the asymmetry to the thesis on Benatar’s side is exposed. Although the transition is reconstructed from hints provided by him, it is found wanting (4). Finally, the novelty of the asymmetry argument is highlighted.
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