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BELIEF VS. LOGIC: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY ON BELIEF BIAS

100%

Grežo M.

Studia Psychologica

2024

tom 66

nr 2

121 - 137

Belief bias is a tendency of people to accept logical conclusions because they are believable and not because they are necessarily true. The aim of the present experimental study was to examine the effect of perceived epistemic authority on the occurrence of belief bias in deductive syllogistic reasoning. In addition, personal need for structure was expected to moderate this effect. A total of 404 participants were randomly assigned to five groups and presented with a scenario of two individuals discussing the topic of racism. Thereafter, they were presented a profile of one discussant in which the epistemic authority was manipulated. To measure belief bias, participants evaluated the validity of 12 syllogisms (six conflicts and six non-conflicts) that were constructed as the discussant’s argumentation. The effect of epistemic authority on belief bias was not shown to be significant and personal need for structure did not moderate this effect. Our findings suggest that, unlike informal reasoning, formal deductive reasoning may be protected from the possible negative effects of epistemic authority.

MILLOVA MYLNÁ VÝHRADA PETITIO PRINCIPII VOČI DEDUKTÍVNEJ LOGIKE

88%

Gahér F.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2019

tom 74

nr 9

721 – 734

The critique of logic, as it was taught on the British Isles, intensified at the beginning of the 19th century. A systematic critique of Aristotelian (syllogistic) logic was undertaken from the standpoint of common sense philosophy chiefly by Scottish philosophers, followers of T. Reid. E. Copleston of Oxford came to logic’s defence. His student, R. Whately, later wrote the textbook Elements of Logic (1826), in which he replied to the objections of Scottish philosophers. The textbook correctly explains that systems of deductive logic need not suffer from the petitio principii fallacy. J. S. Mill at first wrote a positive review of the textbook, but later published his System of Logic. In it, he puts forward the contrary view when evaluating the role of Aristotelian (deductive logic), objecting to the supposedly irredeemable fallacy of petitio principii. The fallacy can be avoided, he argues, in an inductive logic proposed by him. Mill’s objection to the Aristotelian syllogism was based on a misunderstanding of the analytic novelty of the knowledge contained in the conclusion of a valid argument. Mill’s explication of logic is contradictory, based on an associative psychologism and sensualism. The objection against deductive logic is simply mistaken. Mill’s logic and his positions were very critically appraised already by S. Jevons and the standard overviews of the history of logic fail to mention it.

ON THE LOGICAL PART OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF 'INTERPRETATION OF PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY AND PROCLUS DIADOCHUS' BY JOANE PETRIZI (Pro lohichnu chastynu pershoho rozdilu 'Rozhliadu Platonovoi filosofii ta Prokla Diadokha' Ioana Petrytsi) Source: Filosofska d

88%

Mchedlishvili L.

Філософська Думка

2010

nr 4

27-34

The meaning of the diagram presented in the first chapter of 'Interpretation of the 'Elementatio theologica' of Proclus' by Georgian philosopher Joane Petrizi (XI-XII centuries) is explained in the article (see the picture-diagram at the beginning of the article). The diagram serves there as an illustration for the laws of Aristotle's 'Organon'. It is identified with one of three diagrams (namely, with the diagram for the Figure I) that are presented in Ammonius Hermiae's (V-VI centuries) comment on Aristotle's 'Prior Analytics', and which are based on Aristotle's idea of a linear formulation of schemes of categorical syllogisms and their corresponding division into three figures.