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From the very beginning of the First World War, the military operations failed to meet the initial expectations of the German Army Supreme Command which had believed in an easy and – in particular - quick victory. Very soon, the war acquired the form of dragging position and trench battle. Therefore, some German politicians were considering the possibility of separate peace with one of the enemy powers, primarily with the Tsarist Russia, which was a conservative monarchy and it was hoped that in order to preserve its traditional system it would oppose the liberal-democratic and republican West. Berlin tried to establish a number of contacts by means of behind-the-scene diplomacy, trial talks in neutral states, use of relations between German and Russian aristocrats, activation of prewar contacts of financial and business circles, and by sending various emissaries. In these efforts, the Germans relied on strong Germanophile circles in Russia and on the Imperial Court camarilla that strongly influenced the Tsar’s decisions in important personal and political matters. Inside Germany, however, these attempts were opposed mainly by the Army Command representatives who were convinced that Germany’s future was closely linked with a victory in the war. Unlike that, similar efforts in Russia were opposed by the pro-Entente, nationalist and liberal groups. As a result, the separate peace question was also of great importance for the internal events in both hostile countries. The most important factor, however, was the development of military operations, where Russia was initially quite successful and was therefore little willing to negotiate peace. Contrary to that, it was Germany that achieved much success on the eastern front as of the summer of 1915 and wanted to make use of it and force Russia to sign a separate peace treaty. Thus, Berlin hoped to have a “free hand” to concentrate on the preparation of a large offensive in the West in 1916.
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