Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 3

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
Wyszukiwano:
w słowach kluczowych:  Russia-Ukraine conflict
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote Raporty i rekomendacje Monachijskich Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa po 2020 r.
100%
EN
The article analyzes the following issues which were presented during the Munich Security Conferences after 2020: the problem of the perception of the position of the West and the transatlantic world, the discourse on confrontation and cooperation in the transatlantic world, and the topic of risk assessment related to the evolution of global threats,. It was hypothesized that the reports analyzed in Munich reflect the sense of insecurity caused by current crises and the diagnosed risk, e.g. resulting from a global pandemic, and are presented on a forum that is an important (albeit not very effective) tool for conducting international policy by states and other international entities. A further hypothesis states that Germany uses the Munich International Conferences as an arena for presenting and promoting foreign policy directions. From among the challenges discussed in the agenda of the Munich conferences, two case studies were selected: responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian- Ukrainian crisis. Considerable attention has been paid to the political and intellectual discourse regarding the latter crisis. The article uses the method of comparative analysis, conducted according to the successive stages of description and interpretation of the impact of the COVID pandemic on internal and international relations, taking into account both the neoliberal paradigm and neorealism.
EN
The objective of the present paper is an attempt at viewing the European Neighbourhood Policy, and especially the Eastern Partnership, from the EU’s standpoint and from the international perspective as well. The situation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood (Russia-Ukraine war) drives EU decision-makers to focus merely on stabilisation and de facto stagnation. The decision-makers are not willing to undertake decisive actions towards a change in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The paper will also consider the following research questions: Will the lack of clear EU membership perspective (even a remote one) for countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, lead to the opportunity for a change of their situation to be forfeit? Will Russia-Ukraine conflict (and Russia-the West conflict in a broad sense) result in the EU being pushed out of the region and enable Russia to reintegrate the post-Soviet space? Was the recent 2015 Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga the beginning of the end of the policy? The paper does not attempt a comprehensive discussion of the issue, but constitutes an outline of particular problems which the EU and Eastern Partnership are faced with.
3
75%
|
|
nr 2
252-267
EN
Cyberspaces can be significantly influenced by simple tools and tactics, and offer cost-effective solutions for states to achieve their objectives. However, it can also be used for conducting cyberwarfare, and its effects remain in gray areas. The spectrum of cyberwarfare activities ranges from minor web disruptions to crippling attacks on critical national infrastructures. Nevertheless, cyberattacks present a unique challenge in applying well-established humanitarian legal principles, particularly regarding the distinction between civilian and military targets. This is because of the interconnectedness and shared infrastructure of cyberspace between civilian and military entities, which blurs the lines between combatants and civilian populations. This article seeks to shift the general perception of the problems associated with this manner of conducting hostilities by building on the learning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, the authors examine the cyber activities that occurred during the conflict and the legal and ethical challenges that arise from classifying these activities and applying international law. They try to distinguish cyber activities as an act of force or armed attack, with a focus on determining the criteria that played a role in this classification, in light of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter. With reference to the United Nations (UN) Charter and the principles of self-defence, the concept of attack is scrutinised. Furthermore, the article addresses the principles of distinction and proportionality in relation to qualified cyber activities as an armed attack in the same conflict, emphasising the importance of the principle of proportionality in assessing cyber warfare.
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.