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1

Are we Facing a Crisis of Law? Reflections in Reference to the So-called Claim to Correctness Problem

100%

Skuczyński P.

|

2016

|

tom 68

333-352

EN

What is usually acknowledged as a topicality indication of Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy is the theoretical interest in and practical application of his ideas – known as the Radbruch’s formula – on abominable law, statutory non-law and the refusal to apply it by public authorities, the judiciary in particular. The article’s main argument is that we can point to other than Radbruch’s formula elements in his philosophy of law which are still applicable and present in the recent discussion on the concept of law itself, its validity and application. What this means is basic to Radbruch’s thought the distinction between the concept of law (Rechtsbegriff), the idea of law (Rechtsidee) and the relationship between the two. The solution accepted by Radbruch in this matter is very broadly applied by the representatives of the nonpositivist concept of law. However, the solution may be ascribed a more general meaning, which manifests itself in the “claim to correctness problem” (Anspruch auf Richtigkeit). Such a claim has to be an element not only of law itself but also of all legal statements including acts of applying the law. The point I endeavour to defend is that out of the three interpretations of the claim to correctness problem, the one which refers not only to the correctness of legal order and law application acts, but also to lawyers’ professional obligations and responsibility is the best justified. This is because such a view most fully addresses the challenges of modern law, which has become increasingly professional in character, but on the other hand more prone to factors typical to fully professionalised walks of life – to critical factors especially. The question of how much the interpretation is compatible with Radbruch’s perspective, is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, some arguments suggesting higher degree of concordance will be presented.

2

Are we Facing a Crisis of Law? Reflections in Reference to the So-called Claim to Correctness Problem

100%

Skuczyński P.

|

tom 68

333-352

EN

What is usually acknowledged as a topicality indication of Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy is the theoretical interest in and practical application of his ideas – known as the Radbruch’s formula – on abominable law, statutory non-law and the refusal to apply it by public authorities, the judiciary in particular. The article’s main argument is that we can point to other than Radbruch’s formula elements in his philosophy of law which are still applicable and present in the recent discussion on the concept of law itself, its validity and application. What this means is basic to Radbruch’s thought the distinction between the concept of law (Rechtsbegriff), the idea of law (Rechtsidee) and the relationship between the two. The solution accepted by Radbruch in this matter is very broadly applied by the representatives of the nonpositivist concept of law. However, the solution may be ascribed a more general meaning, which manifests itself in the “claim to correctness problem” (Anspruch auf Richtigkeit). Such a claim has to be an element not only of law itself but also of all legal statements including acts of applying the law. The point I endeavour to defend is that out of the three interpretations of the claim to correctness problem, the one which refers not only to the correctness of legal order and law application acts, but also to lawyers’ professional obligations and responsibility is the best justified. This is because such a view most fully addresses the challenges of modern law, which has become increasingly professional in character, but on the other hand more prone to factors typical to fully professionalised walks of life – to critical factors especially. The question of how much the interpretation is compatible with Radbruch’s perspective, is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, some arguments suggesting higher degree of concordance will be presented.

3

Explikativní zdůvodnění lidských práv

81%

Sobek T.

|

nr 8

713-728

EN

In my text, I will deal with the so-called explicative argument formulated by Robert Alexy. This argument shows that any attempt to intersubjectively justify the non-existence of human rights necessarily commits the so-called performative self-contradiction. But Alexy’s argument can be objected to: What if the human rights sceptic avoids discursive commitments? Alexy responds that an individual needs to make an existential decision that fully realizes his or her discursive potential. But the objection continues: What if he or she doesn’t make that decision? The issue can be addressed by analyzing the speech act of assertion. To assert A is to present A as true to anyone. A speech act that is not open to the universal community of all rational agents cannot be aimed at sharing objective facts. But this solution has limited applicability to moral discourse because it is burdened with the controversial metaethical assumption that there are universal and objective moral facts. This is a very serious limitation, because human rights sceptics are mainly recruited among moral subjectivists, relativists and nihilists. To overcome this limitation, I proposed the so-called ascriptive argument, which is more metaethically inclusive: An individual takes his own moral views seriously only if he also takes seriously the moral views of others. And the only effective way to mediate this interaction is through participation in moral discourse. Alexy’s explicative argument is only applicable against human rights sceptics who participate in the discourse. The ascriptive argument appropriately complements it because it is applicable against sceptics who avoid discourse. It is directed against discursive insulation, but at the same time can be sensitive to the social contexts of moral views.

CS

Ve svém textu se budu zabývat tzv. explikativním argumentem, který zformuloval Robert Alexy. Tento argument ukazuje, že každý pokus o intersubjektivní zdůvodnění neexistence lidských práv se nutně dopouští tzv. performativní kontradikce. Jenomže proti Alexyho argumentu lze vznést námitku: Co když se lidskoprávní skeptik vyhýbá diskurzivním závazkům? Alexy odpovídá, že jednotlivec musí udělat existenciální rozhodnutí, že plně realizuje svůj diskurzivní potenciál. Ale námitka pokračuje: Co když takové rozhodnutí neudělá? Problém lze řešit analýzou řečového aktu tvrzení. Tvrdit A znamená prezentovat A jako pravdu pro kohokoli. Tvrzení, které není otevřené k univerzální komunitě všech racionálních aktérů, nemůže být zaměřené na sdílení objektivních faktů. Jenomže toto řešení má omezenou použitelnost pro morální diskurz, protože je zatíženo nesamozřejmým metaetickým předpokladem, že existují univerzální a objektivní morální fakty. A to je velmi závažné omezení, protože lidskoprávní skeptici se rekrutují zejména mezi morálními subjektivisty, relativisty a nihilisty. K překonání tohoto omezení jsem navrhl tzv. askriptivní argument, který je více metaeticky inkluzivní: Jednotlivec bere své vlastní morální názory vážně jenom tehdy, když bere vážně také cizí morální názory. A jediný efektivní způsob, jak zprostředkovat tuto interakci, je participace na morálním diskurzu. Alexyho explikativní argument je použitelný jenom proti lidskoprávním skeptikům, kteří se účastní diskurzu. Askriptivní argument jej vhodně doplňuje, protože je použitelný proti skeptikům, kteří se vyhýbají diskurzu. Je namířený proti diskurzivní izolaci, ale přitom může být citlivý ke společenským kontextům morálních názorů.