The guiding question of this paper encourages the search for aspects of the Richard Hönigswald’s theory of objectivity that would allow it to be seen as a kind of ontology. Those can easily be found if the theory is interpreted as a positive theory of reality. However, considering the psychology of thinking in Hönigswald’s theory of objectivity raises important doubts barring the definitive answer to that question. Hönigswald stops short of giving an ontological description of the formal structure of human subjectivity, instead reducing it to the statement: “I do think something”.
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Richard Hönigswald speaks against theories, which are based on ontological or metaphysical arguments, in his philosophical plan. Above all, his philosophy is the theory of cognition. In this context Hönigswald states that philosophy cannot determine the thing in itself. This lack is supposed to be made with the theory importances (Geltung) in the form of the self-excuse.
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