In the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent a complex process of political, economic and social transformation which coincided with the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. The fast pace of ongoing changes and the FR movement towards democracy inclined Poland to redefine relations with Russia and to seek new opportunities for their development. The expression of these was the visit of President Walesa in Moscow and the signing of Polish-Russian Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation on 22 May 1992. Shortly, however, a number of problems in relations with Moscow emerged, e.g. historical occurrences (including Katyn Massacre), Soviet army withdrawal from Poland, compensations and financial settlements, and others, which impeded current relations, despite the fact that presidents Yeltsin and Walesa had made an attempt to open a new chapter in Polish-Russian relations. It soon became apparent that the strategic interests of both countries are completely inconsistent in relation to fundamental matters. Evidently, it revealed conflicting aspirations concerning the entry of Poland to NATO , which resulted in significant cooling in Polish-Russian relations in the years 1994 to 2000. The change of authorities in Kremlin on 31 December 1999, which marked an end of a certain period in Russian history, unexpectedly created favourable conditions for improvement in relations with Poland. It was reflected in President Putin-s visit in Poland in January 2002, which yielded a number of spectacular results. However, the two-year balance of 'detente' of 2002-2003 presented itself rather poorly. Once more, a substantial discrepancy of Polish and Russian interests was exposed during the events of 2004. Polish entry to the EU in May 2004 and the presidential election in Ukraine, where Poland and President A. Kwasniewski played a significant role in the victory of 'the orange revolution'. This resulted in further cooling of Polish-Russian relations. The following years did not provide any improvement. At the end of 2005 the issue of locating elements of American missile defence shield on Polish territory appeared which posed a new problem in Polish-Russian relations. As in the case of NATO enlargement, the Russians employed the method of intimidation to counteract this undertaking. In retaliation for the shield, a number of higher Russian officers and politicians announced that the latest Russian anti-missile systems would be located near Polish border and that mid-range missiles would be aimed at Poland. This best illustrates the significance of East-Central Europe for Moscow.
The present article was inspired by Eve M. Thompson's 'Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism' (London 2000) and can be registered in the context of postcolonial studies. In the article, the analysis is focused on 'The White Regiment' (1925), a novel by a Russian writer Mikhail Bulgakov. The present author proves that, in the course of narration, Bulgakov highlights a typically Russian point of view when describing the events that took place in Kiev at the turn of 1918. In those days Kiev was the capital of the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian People's Republic, being in the very process of its formation. Bulgakov disparages the idea of Ukraine's independence and discredits not only the language and history of Ukraine but also the mentality of its people and qualities of its national leaders. He does it on purpose to enhance the views of the Russian heroes of the novel, an educated family of the Turbins and their friends, in line with colonial interests of the Russian Empire - common good of all Russian people - irrespective of the form of the system, whether a monarchy or a communist republic.
The geopolitics of the area of the South Caucasus in the 18th century after the death of Nadir Shah, was the cause, for the rising of the independent de facto Karabakh khanate, whose founder was Panah Ali Khan. It became one of the strongest countries in the area of Azerbaijan; however, it was unable to defend itself from constant Persian invasions. The only military force that could oppose them was the Russian Empire. On 14th May 1805, khan Ibrahim Halil and general Pavel Tsitsianov signed up the Kurekhay Treaty. Under its terms Karabakh became a part of the Russian Empire and its previous ruler retained administrative powers. The confirmation of such a state of affairs was armed peace between Russia and Persia concluded in 1813 in Gulistan. Under its terms, most of the North Azerbaijan's khanates got under the power of the tsar. For Karabakh the consequence of getting under the new reign was the change of the ethnic structure of the whole area, which was connected with the far-flung Armenian colonization.
Karosta (Military Port) in the town of Liepāja used to be one of the strategically most important military objects in the Russian Empire. Its aesthetic aspect was implemented in high-quality forms of Historicist architecture, general planning and every building of Karosta, then dubbed the Port of Alexander III. After the failed Crimea War, the Russian Empire maintained its aggressive policy and decided to establish a new naval base to secure its presence on the Baltic Sea. Fearing growing German strength in these waters, Russian officials quickly devised an action plan. In 1890, the Tsar approved the decision to begin construction works in Liepāja. Engineer General Ivan Alfred McDonald designed a rational layout for Karosta consisting of four historical military port districts. From the direction of the sea, the first is the officers’ residential district. This is the most representative part of Karosta, containing not only officers’ dwelling houses but also administrative functions; the dominant object is St. Nicholas Naval Cathedral designed by Vasily Kosyakov in the Neo-Russian style. The most impressive and lavish building of Karosta is the Neo-Baroque Naval Officers’ Meeting House designed by Stefan Galenzovsky. The entire officers’ district is filled with decoratively rich, refined, Historicist-style buildings. Soon after the approval of the Karosta plan, construction works began on the Tsar’s Palace, the Naval Commander’s House along with other noteworthy objects, like the Naval Telegraph, the Gendarme Unit and the Naval Military Court House as well as the Post Office of Emperor Alexander III. Every two-storey officers’ house has a different décor. One reflects elements in line with Neo-Classicist style while others echo Neo-Baroque and Neo-Renaissance; even the new tendencies of Art Nouveau are present. The uniqueness of Karosta is revealed in its peculiar relationships with the Liepāja Fortress and its quick abolishment that cut development short. In seventeen years of rapid construction works, a modern, rationally structured port was created, intended as a significant element of the Russian Empire’s military policy. The entire complex and each particular building was adapted to the spirit of the epoch and the imperial taste.
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