The paper presents and discusses Roman Ingarden's solution to the problem of free will vs. determinism. The solution is placed in the context of various philosophical positions related to the dilemma of determinism (hard determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism). Ingarden's position can be characterized as a non-revisionist compatibilism: the act of free will is understood as an event that is causally determined, but solely by internal causes. Freedom is thus conceived as a subject's independence from external causal determination. Real freedom (juxtaposed to the phenomenon of freedom) is ontologically possible in a moderately deterministic world containing relatively isolated systems. This theory does not require any revision of social practices based on the conviction of the existence of free will.
The aim of the article is to present those elements in classical phenomenology which inspired Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923 – 2014) to develop her own concept of the phenomenology of life and the creative human condition. Therefore, her philosophical position will not be presented with references to the key questions of transcendental phenomenology, since she never argued with Edmund Husserl. Tymieniecka clearly emphasized the fact that it was otherwise, claiming that she conducted a polemic on the ontological and metaphysical, and consequently also anthropological ground with Roman Ingarden (1893 – 1970) – her teacher and mentor from the time of philosophical studies at the Jagiellonian University in Poland in 1945 – 1947. And this philosopher’s thought was the main reason for the phenomenological path she chose.
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