Differentiating between formal positions condition and the conditioned (i.e. if-vector) as well as between the content’s exemplars (occurring in these positions, i.e. vector of relevance) and a direction of grammatical tenses (i.e. time vector) enables us to de-fine two types of reasoning, based on the cause/effect relationship: deductive prediction and retrodiction (positive time direction) and abductive prediction and retrodiction (negative time direction). Although these predictions and retrodictions are formulated in form of conditionals, they are in fact elided expressions for reasons. A producer of deductive predictions and retrodictions picks up from a complex set of effects producing conditions one main condition, which, as a cause, is indicated in the antecedent. At the same time it is supposed that the effect indicated in the consequent is implied deductively. However, this holds only if the ceteris paribus principle (other things being equal), as well as the tacit set of true statements (the majority of which the producer need not know) are true.
The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals building on both Rescher’s epistemic and Tichy’s semantic approaches. The core of the latter is the thesis that a speaker when expressing a true counterfactual assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We argue against Pollock’s impossibility objection concerning revision of the producer’s beliefs. In accordance with the linguistic solution we distinguish between a relative and an absolute unreality of a course of events described in the consequent. Likewise, we draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. Drawing on our previous paper, Deductive and abductive retro dictions and predictions, we take counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition to be elided deductive judgements, i.e. deductive retro dictions, without any appeal to a special non-classical logic. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a positive time vector and a potentially unreal condition to be elided deductive predictions.
The article discusses the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. It offers an explanation according to which in the case of the latter the negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e. explanations of unreal effects by introducing possible causes while the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The counterfactual abductive retrodictions´ backtracking time direction is in accordance with the postulating the positive time direction from cause to effect. Thus we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals there is no need to consider the backtracking impact of the present on the past. Further, there is no need to violate natural laws or to have a special logic. What we need is to take into account the third parameter, i.e. a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as our background. When the power of logic is not overestimated, there is no need to change the direction of causality. And a correct analysis does not require any special logic. Last, but not least, we showed, how to correctly make the abductive retrodiction by the contraposition of the deductive retrodiction.
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