Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Instytucja odesłania w zakresie unieważnienia prawa z rejestracji wzorów przemysłowych

100%

Buchalska J.

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2013

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tom XI

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nr 1

43-50

EN

In compliance with the norms of the act of Law of Intellectual Property in the scope of invalidation of the right in the register of industrial designs, the legislator refers the interested party, on the power of Art. 117 of the Law of Industrial Designs, to regulations concerning termination of patents. However, this mechanism raises a series of doubts, especially, in connection with the scope of appropriate application of legal norms. In accordance with Zasady techniki prawodawczej (Principles of Legislative Technique) referring to other regulations is justified in the case in which the regulations being referred to provide norms to situations of a similar character. The legislative technique accepted by the legislator does not fully satisfy the needs of practice, though. The standpoint which maintains that industrial designs, apart from registered designs, patents and topography of integrated circuits belong to the category of invention designs seems unjustified as a matter of fact. What testifies to the above statement is the fact that industrial designs combine in themselves also elements of aesthetic nature, while invention designs provide strictly technical solutions. The need for executing an autonomic regulation of the question of invalidation and termination of the right in the register of industrial designs is also strengthened by the fact that on the ground of previous legislation, that is Law of Inventions, industrial designs were dealt with in a separate act, in the same way as trademarks. The existence of autonomic regulation allows accepting the right standpoint which says that industrial designs cannot be defined as invention designs.

2

ARE QUANTIFIER PHRASES ALWAYS QUANTIFICATIONAL? THE CASE OF ‘EVERY F’

100%

Baumann P.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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tom 20

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nr 2

143 – 172

EN

This paper argues that English quantifier phrases of the form ‘every F’ admit of a literal referential interpretation, contrary to the standard semantic account of this expression, according to which it denotes a set and a second-order relation. Various arguments are offered in favour of the referential interpretation, and two likely objections to it are forestalled.

3

DENOTATION AND REFERENCE

88%

Materna P.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2010

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tom 17

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nr 1

3-20

EN

The terms denotation and reference are commonly used as synonyms. A more fine-grained analysis of natural language as offered by 'Transparent Intensional Logic' (TIL) shows that we can distinguish these terms in the case of empirical expressions. The latter are shown to denote non-trivial intensions while their reference (if any) is the value of these intensions in the actual world.

4

FICTIONAL NAMES AND TRUTH

88%

Vallée R.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2018

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tom 25

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nr 1

74 – 99

EN

By addressing fictional names head on, we risk going back to familiar, ordinary names intuitions and missing what is specific about them. The author proposes a different strategy. His view is grounded on fictional name sentence utterances and on indexed tokens of such sentences, where an index contains the fictional narrator and the time and location of the token. Using the framework of pluri-propositionalism (Perry 2012), the author argues that the semantic relation of reference – ‘x’ refers to y - where ‘x’ is a name, rather than the notion of an object, is central to the debate on fictional names. He also contends that fictional names do not enter into that relation. Tokens of fictional names are individuated with the fictional index of the sentence they originate from. This allows for dispensing with a referent. Indexed fictional name sentence tokens have semantically determined truth conditions, yet they are not truth assessed given facts. In this respect, they have cognitive significance only, and no official or referential content. Indexed fictional name token of sentences are accepted as true, but they are not true.

5

NEURČITOSŤ REFERENCIE A PRETRVÁVANIE V ČASE

88%

Schmidt M.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2016

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tom 71

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nr 8

656 – 668

EN

According to the inscrutability of reference principle, there are source language sentences that have exact counterparts in the target language, yet some of their sentence-parts may refer to different things. One word sentence “Gavagai“ means “There is a rabbit“ though ‘rabbit’ may have different referents, among them the temporal stage of four-dimensional rabbit, or three-dimensional rabbit as a whole. It follows that ‘rabbit’ reference may be bound to either three- or four-dimensional ontologies yet the sentence where it occurs doesn’t shift its stimulus meaning. However, there are recent proposals in meta-ontology that consider the dispute between three- and four-dimensional views of particulars verbal. If that is the case, then one of the Quine’s principal examples of inscrutability of reference (and ontological relativity as well) fails. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the difference between the rival theories of particulars is not verbal and becomes evident mainly in the context of possible worlds.

6

MOŽNÉ INDIVÍDUÁ A POSIBÍLIE (I)

75%

Cmorej P.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2015

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tom 70

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nr 8

585 – 600

EN

The present paper offers (i) a logic-semantic analysis of sentences of the form „(ιx)Φ(x) is C“, where C stands for „possible“ (LP) or „merely possible“ (MP) or „really possible“ (Re) or „impossible“ (NP) and (ii) an explication of intuitive meanings of these expressions using modal temporal semantics. The crucial question concerning this analysis runs: What are the items to which modality C is attributed in these sentences? Is it an individual that is the referent of the description „(ιx)Φ(x)“ or an intension generated by the meaning of the description or the meaning of the description itself? It is argued that the most suitable response is the last one. Unlike some other positions, the present view has it that possibilia are not individuals but meanings of individual descriptions that have referents only at world-time couples where w is not the actual world. Being a possibilium amounts to being the meaning of a description having the property MP that is defined as follows: (ιx)Φ(x) is MP if (ιx)Φ(x) is possible, but there is not exactly one individual having the property (λx)Φ(x) at some world-time couple where a w is the actual world. Apart from the concept of possibilium, another concept of semipossibilium (SP) is introduced namely the meaning of a description which except some referents in the actual world has also at least one referential pause in this world. The first part introduces (i) the notions of semantic reference and user’s intentional reference, (ii) the difference between the actual world and the real world and (iii) the definitions of LP, MP, Re and NP modalities. The second part tries to answer the question whether the intension or meaning of a description is a suitable subject of predication in sentences which have the form „(ιx)Φ(x) is C“. The rest of this part deals with possibilia and semipossibilia.

7

Semantyczne uwarunkowania różnicy między metafizyką a ontologią

75%

Kołodziejczyk S.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2014

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tom 42

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nr 2

5-27

EN

Modern philosophy put forward a concept of ontology that differs from the historically grounded concept of metaphysics. This distinction became much more clear first after Kant's critique of the so-called transcendent metaphysics and then along with new waves in early twenty philosophy, mainly neopositivism and phenomenology. In my paper I argue for the theses that difference between metaphysics and ontology is non-reductive (Thesis about Basic Difference between Metaphysics and Ontology), and based on semantic properties of the terms constituting metaphysical (resp. ontological) judgements (Thesis about Semantic Grounding of Difference between Metaphysics and Ontology).

8

DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AGAIN: SINGULAR REFERENCE, QUANTIFICATION AND TRUTH-EVALUATION

75%

Kotatko P.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2009

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tom 16

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nr 4

552-568

EN

The author defends a combination of Strawson's explanation of definite descriptions as devices of singular reference par excellence with the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences with descriptions. The complex Russellian proposition is, according to the author's view, introduced by such utterances into communication as a by-product of the instrumental side of an attempt to make a singular statement. This, precisely like the instrumental aspects of similar attempts exploiting names or demonstratives has to be reflected by analysis but should not be confused with the communicative function of utterances. The success of all these attempts depends on the fulfilment of empirical conditions of various types, given by semantics of descriptions, names or demonstratives (unless the relevance of these conditions is neutralized by another identification factor dominating in given context). But their communicative function does not consist in claiming that these conditions are fulfilled. The author agrees with Strawson that the first two conjuncts of the complex Russellian proposition are introduced into communication as presuppositions: but argues in favour of defining presupposition (in pragmatic sense) in normative, rather than intentional terms.

9

DOUBTING THE TRUTH OF HUME'S PRINCIPLE

63%

Dozudic D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2010

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tom 17

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nr 3

269-287

EN

Hume's Principle (HP) states that for any two (sorted) concepts, F and G, the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if the Fs are one-one correlated with the Gs. Backed by second-order logic HP is supposed to be the starting point for the neo-logic program of the foundations of arithmetic. The principle brings a number of formal and philosophical controversies. In this paper author discusses some arguments against it brought out by Trobok, as well as by Potter and Smiley, designed to undermine a claim that HP and its instances (such as 'the number of the forks on the table is identical to the number of the knives on the table if the forks are one-one correlated with the knives') are true. Their criticism starts from distinguishing the objective truth from a weak or stipulated one, and focusing on fictional identities such as 'Hamlet = Hamlet' or 'Jekyll = Hyde.' They argue that numerical identities (as occur in instances of HP) are much the same as fictional identities; that we can attribute them only a weak or stipulated truth; and, consequently, that neo-logicists are not entitled to ontological conclusions concerning numbers they derive from HP and its instances. As opposed to that, the author argues that such a criticism is ill-conceived. The analogy between the numerical and fictional identities is far-fetched. So, relative to such a criticism, HP has more prospects than some authors are prepared to admit.

10

MOŽNÉ INDIVÍDUÁ A POSIBÍLIE (II)

63%

Cmorej P.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2015

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tom 70

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nr 10

800 – 816

EN

The present paper offers (i) a logico-semantic analysis of sentences of the form „(ιx)Φ(x) is C“, where C stands for „possible“ (LP) or „merely possible“ (ML) or „really possible“ (Re) or „impossible“ (NP) and (ii) an explication of intuitive meanings of these expressions using modal temporal semantics. The crucial question concerning this analysis runs: To which items in these sentences the modality C is attributed? Is it an individual that is the referent of the description „(ιx)Φ(x)“ or is it an intension generated by the meaning of the description or is it the meaning of the description itself? It is argued that the most suitable response is the last one. Unlike some other positions, the present view has it that possibilia are not individuals but meanings of individual descriptions that have referents only at world-time couples where w is not the actual world. Being a possibilium amounts to being the meaning of a description having the property MP that is defined as follows: (ιx)Φ(x) is MP if (ιx)Φ(x) is possible but there is not exactly one individual having the property (λx)Φ(x) at some world-time couple where aw is the actual world. Apart from the concept of possibilium, another concept of semipossibilium (SP) is introduced – it is the meaning of a description having except some referents in the actual world at least one referential pause in this world (time interval at which the description has no referents). The first part introduces (i) the notions of semantic reference and user’s intentional reference, (ii) the difference between the actual world and the real world and (iii) the definitions of LP, MP, Re and NP modalities. The second part investigates the question whether the intension or meaning of a description is a suitable subject of predication in sentences of the form „(ιx)Φ(x) is C“. The rest of this part deals with possibilia and semipossibilia.