Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Spiritual Transcendence in Psychotherapy: A Relational, Pragmatic, and Semiotic Approach

100%

Salimi B. , Sandage S. J. , Stavros G. S.

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tom 2

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nr 1

EN

The last several decades have ushered in an abundance of creative activity and wisdom with regard to spiritually and/or religiously informed psychotherapy. Most of these pursuits have led to significant and positive changes, both in thought and practice, in the way that human psychology is seen as intersecting (and interacting) with religious, theological, and spiritual dimensions of experience. At the same time much has been neglected amidst these advances. In the present paper, we submit that one vital area of neglect may be found in an implicit retreat from sacred encounter in favor of instrumentalized approaches to psychotherapy. We argue for a spiritually transcendent psychotherapy that implicitly attends to relational and semiotic phenomenology while retaining pragmatic gain.

2

Pragmatismus jako filozofický základ smíšeného výzkumného designu

100%

Složilová E.

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nr 1

51-69

EN

The paper aims at presenting the philosophy of pragmatism as an epistemological framework for mixed methods research. The author starts with brief characteristics of this relatively recent approach to research in the social sciences and uses Morgan’s clarification of the genesis of „metaphysical“ paradigm for qualitative research as a platform for analysing the main reasons why mixed methods research has been strongly criticized and refused. Then she shifts her attention to classical pragmatists – W. James, J. Dewey and Ch. S. Pierce, and makes an attempt to show mixed methods research as a legitimate approach to research in the social sciences having equally important status as quantitative or qualitative research. In order to prove her point, the author gives a detailed analysis of the pragmatists’ theory of inquiry, their understanding of truth, experience and other philosophical categories. She concludes that mixed methods research has great potential to solve research questions whose solution proves impossible for rigid advocates of either of the two currently dominant approaches.

3

Pragmatism and Science

100%

Marsonet M.

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nr 08

101-109

EN

Logical empiricism gave rise to a powerful paradigm and it took some decades to overthrow it, even though it should be judged respectfully since, after all, philosophy of science and logic as we know them stemmed from that ground. The basic assumptions on which the paradigm of the “received view” rested are essentially the following. In the first place, verificationism seemed almost a truth of faith. Secondly, logical empiricists never offered good arguments in support of their thesis that assertive discourse must be preferred to more pragmatic forms of language. Thirdly, they too easily assumed that something like “objective truth” really exists. Last but certainly not least, the logical empiricists did not fully recognize the historical dimension of the scientific enterprise, which subsequently turned to be something different from the “universal science” they were talking about. In the paper it is argued that scientific realism (and the nature of scientific knowledge at large) is a theme where the originality of pragmatist positions clearly emerge. Nicholas Rescher, for example, claims - against any form of instrumentalism and many postmodern authors as well - that natural science can indeed validate a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. Scientific conceptions aim at what really exists in the world, but only hit it imperfectly and “well off the mark”. What we can get is, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality itself. This means that the scientific knowledge at our disposal in any particular moment of the history of mankind must be held to be “putative”, while its relations to the truth (i.e. how things really stand in the world) should be conceived in terms of tentative and provisional estimation. Even the optimistic visions that see science as growingly approaching the “real” truth have, at this point, to be rejected on pragmatic grounds.

4

Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

84%

Prus R.

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nr 2

10-45

EN

In contrast to those who more characteristically approach emotion as an individual realm of experience of more distinctive physiological and/or psychological sorts, this paper addresses emotionality as a socially experienced, linguistically enabled, activity-based process. While conceptually and methodologically situated within contemporary symbolic interactionist thought (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003), this statement is centrally informed by the pragmatist considerations of emotionality that Aristotle (circa 384-322 BCE) develops in Rhetoric. Although barely known to those in the human sciences, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides a great deal of insight into people’s definitions of, and experiences with, a wide array of emotions. Addressing matters of persuasive interchange in political, judicial, and evaluative contexts, Aristotle gives particular attention to the intensification and neutralization of people’s emotional states. This includes (1) anger and calm, (2) friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, and (7) envy and emulation. Following an introduction to “rhetoric” (as the study of persuasive interchange) and “emotionality,” this paper briefly (1) outlines a pragmatist/interactionist approach to the study of emotionality, (2) considers Aristotle as a sociological pragmatist, (3) locates Aristotle’s work within the context of classical Greek thought, (4) acknowledges the relationship of emotionality and morality, and (5) addresses emotionality as a generic social process. Following (6) a more sustained consideration of emotionality within the context of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the paper concludes with (7) a short discussion of the importance of Aristotle’s work for studying emotionality as a realm of human lived experience on a contemporary plane.