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Philippa Foot's Theory of Natural Goodness

100%

Levy S. S.

Forum Philosophicum

2009

tom 14

nr 1

1-15

Philippa Foot's book, Natural Goodness, involves a large project including a theory of natural goodness, a theory of the virtues, and a theory of practical rationality. Natural goodness is the foundation for the rest and is used to support a more or less traditional list of the virtues and a theory of reasons for action. Though Foot's doctrine of natural goodness may provide an account of some sort of goodness, I argue that it is not adequate as a foundation for practical rationality or as a defense of more or less traditional virtues.

Dispenzace přirozeného zákona u Tomáše Akvinského

75%

Dvorský P.

Studia theologica

2018

tom 2

109-128

The paper describes and explains the position of Thomas Aquinas regarding the possibility of the dispensation of certain precepts of the natural law by man. It situates this concept into the broader context of his views concerning God’s action within practical reason and human participation in providence which is also the basis of his comprehension of every law used by men. The meaning and the relationship between certain key notions (law, dispensation, obligation, moral, natural and divine law) in the discourse of Aquinas is explained. Aquinas is revealed to be a thinker who is very much aware of the limits bound to more particular rules in their attempt to translate the first imperatives of practical reason into a singular situation. Without despising these rules he asks for more than their blind application: he asks for their use in accordance with reason (and with reason) which has originated them and which sometimes requires it to be done otherwise.