Existing research shows that political representatives use public resources to reward their allies while punish their rivals. In region of Central Europe such literature is rather underdeveloped and this article aims to fill this gap. It analyses distribution of environmental grants in Slovakia between 2005 and 2015. The results show that grants are primarily given to towns led by mayors supported by governmental parties. In case of coalition governments a better access to public resources is found for towns led by mayors supported by the party controlling the distribution process than for municipalities with mayors supported by other governmental parties.
The article analyzes the problematic issues of state financial control efficiency and it suggests practical recommendations, which consist in the development and scientific substantiation of ways that help to solve the existing problems of control over use of public resources.
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