The article deals with an empiric analysis of behaviour of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts. In the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behaviour of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. Theories observing behaviour of bureaucracy – no matter how well they are reasoned – mostly meet the problem of empiric verifiability. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts from 2010 – 2014. We can consider the main findings to be the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with the regulator. These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behaviour of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative strategy. However, the final result is the same. In the authors’ opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is enforced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.
This article examines the impact of selected factors of public contracts on the efficiency of public procurement with an emphasis on decentralization. We analysed the influence of these factors using an econometric model applied to data on public procurement, specifically on pubic construction contracts for 2013 – 2014. To achieve a higher degree of assurance we have verified these results by analysing public contracts for the purchase of gas for the years 2013 – 2014. In the context of the available data, this public contract procedure has a relatively homogeneous subject of performance. The research conclusions which have been reached are significant, partly for the considerations regarding the centralization vs. decentralization of purchases, but they also represent a valuable contribution to the empirical investigation of the decentralized production of public goods and services.
Post-communist states of the European Union traditionally score in various rankings of indicators that deal with the degree of (perceived) corruption significantly worse than most of the old EU member states. One of the factors that strongly influence the unfavourable rating in these areas is a situation on the public procurement market. The presented paper aims by use of quantitative analysis to determine the extent to which are the level of corruption and public sector efficiency linked to selected indicators dealing with the situation on the public procurement market. The paper deals with two main topics. Firstly we discuss the procurement market from the macro-perspective. Secondly we have prepared two econometric models, which are analysing the relationship between level of corruption/efficiency of the public sector and selected indicators of the situation on the public procurement market (e.g. average number of bids, intensity of the competitive effect). The results show, that there is statistical significant relationship.
The paper examines use of electronic auctions (e-auctions) as an allocation mechanism in public procurement in Slovak public sector. It is based on data from 32 procurement bodies and 725 procurements in the public sector in the period 2008 – 2010. Our findings are that e-auctions bring average savings of 10 – 12% though their implementation is not free. We recommend that future research quantify costs associated with introduction of e-auctions. The paper also demonstrates that the key variables influencing level of savings can be influenced by the procuring body: number of participants and form of auction (open vs closed).
Public procurement is one of the forms of provision of public goods and services. Empirical studies analysing public procurement show, that one of the weaknesses of public procurement in the Czech Republic is its low transparency and resulting insufficient resistance to corruption. This study defines base for establishment of transparent and corruption free system of public procurement. It specifies conditions for creation of competitive environment, basis for demand driven system of public procurement and gives proposals for interconnection of transparent decision making procedures and the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
In the case when a contracting authority uses its own resources, it is exempt from using the public procurement procedures. In this regard, we refer to the so-called ‘in-house exemptions’ or ‘internal procurement’. The fundamental conditions for the application of in-house exemptions are based on three criteria, i.e. i) a control criterion, ii) a business activity criterion, and iii) a private capital criterion. That is to say, the contracting authority exercises over the person to whom the contract has been directly awarded (in-house entity) a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments, more than 80 % of the activities of the controlled in-house entity are carried out in the performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling contracting authority or by other legal persons controlled by that contracting authority and there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled in-house entity. In these circumstances, the in-house exemption can also be applied to the cases of the cooperation amongst contracting authorities. However, the participating contracting authorities have to perform on the open market less than 20 % of the activities concerned by the cooperation. It is submitted that, the contracting authorities now hold in their hands a tool for the effective fulfilment of their needs by using own resources. However, these exemptions must be interpreted restrictively and therefore it will be interesting to see how the practice deals with the ‘in-house’ issues.
This paper investigates the purposes for overpricing of public procurement for construction works in the Czech Republic. We tested two potential factors influencing final process – the level of competition and the level of transparency. According findings, each additional bid decreases the final price by 2.19%. In reality this means that the chance for cost savings increases with the number of competing suppliers. The final price also depends on the type of procedure. Our recommendation is to organise public tenders for works in manners allowing for the highest possible level of competition, to do as much as possible to motivate potential suppliers for participation.
The article analyses post-contractual behaviour on a sample of 200 randomly selected public works contracts, awarded in 2013, where it was possible to trace information about the final price. The study looks for factors, which have a statistically significant effect on the ratio between the actually paid price and tendered price. The findings are compared with similar studies in Slovakia. The model identifies a number of bids for a statistically significant indicator having a positive effect on the relationship between the actually paid price and the tendered price. Conversely, the ratio between the estimated and actual tendered amounts, as well as the use of subcontractors is seen as the factors with a negative impact.
When the Czech Republic became a member state of the European Union, the new act n. 40/2004 Col., on public procurement, came into a force. In the meantime there were issued some new directives on the public procurement and sector procurement (2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC). The member states were obliged to transpose these directives into the national legislation till 31st December 2006 at the latest. The Czech Republic enacted the relevant legislation, the new act n. 137/2006 Col., that entered into a force on 1st July 2006. The Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public services contracts and the Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors were implemented. The European legislation regulates only the so called excess limit procurements it means the procurement of the presumed value which will reach the limits settled in the EC legislation. The act n. 137/2006 Col., regulates also the procurements that do not reach these limits. While interpreting the act n. 137/2006 Col., on public procurement it is important to follow its provisions and also respect the uniform interpretation made by ECJ.
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