Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

TWO CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC: TWO POLITICAL MODELS OF THE POLISH STATE

100%

Kowalski J.

Myśl Ekonomiczna i Prawna

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2008

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nr 1(20)

50-83

EN

The author presented the evolution of constitutionalism in the 2nd Polish Republic (1918-1939).This evolution was expressed through the change of the basic principles of the two successive constitutions (of 1921 and 1935). It determined the process of developing two diverse models of the Polish state political system after the period of regaining independence. The first constitution established a republican-democratic political system (a system of parliamentary democracy). The second constitution (of 1935) changed the political model of state, introduced an anti-democratic model based on authoritarian principles. Their basis was a conception of uniform, undivided power of the president. However, in the Polish political realities of 1935-1939, the model of an authoritarian government cannot be explicitly considered equivalent to the ruling system typical of fascist countries. So the Polish specific political system was defined as something in between a democratic liberal country and a totalitarian country. The author of the article characterized three stages of the development of constitutionalism in Poland and in this way the process of changes in the political system (I - a period of establishing a parliamentary democracy and a model of parliament - cabinet governing system of 1918-1926; II - 1926-1935: limitation of the parliamentary system and a process of preparing a change of constitution; III - 1935-1939: a new constitution introduces an authoritarian governing system). The author discussed the basic political solutions typical of the two constitutions. Special attention was drawn to important changes in the relations between Sejm (the Parliament) and the executive, and the supreme position of the president in the country, above the legislative and the Cabinet. In the description of the successive political solutions, a historical political context, both the European one and internal conditions, was taken into account.

2

ÚSTAVNÉ ZVYKLOSTI A MOC PREZIDENTA V SR

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Káčer M.

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nr 6

554 – 565

EN

Is it the case that according to Slovak constitutional conventions president is authorized to request parliament to defeat the government in motion of no confidence? Ján Mazák, who defended the manner in which president Kiska tried to solve the political crisis triggered by the murder of journalist Kuciak, suggests that it is. In this article I will argue for the opposite: there is not such convention in the Slovak constitutional system because the social practice on which Mazák relies in his argument does not have the components of legal custom. In addition, I will consider whether it would be more appropriate to look at our constitutional conventions with British eyes, i.e. not as a law enforceable by courts, but as political principles enforced directly and only by political actors themselves.

3

ÚSTAVNOPRÁVNE POSTAVENIE PREZIDENTA V ÚSTAVE SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY

75%

Nikodým D.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

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2012

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tom 95

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nr 5

418 – 431

EN

Over the period of twenty years the Constitution of the Slovak Republic underwent extensive changes, which manifested themselves among the others in the constitutional position of the President. The author points out problems that influenced the division of power in the relationship of the head of the State to the parliament, the government and the judiciary. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic No. 460/1992 Coll. showed several conceptual deficiencies that were not adequate to the parliamentary form of government and the others that required specification to avoid problems with its application. The amendments of the constitution from the years 1998 – 2010 were implemented in order to remove these deficiencies. The author also offers some suggestions de lege constitutione for the purpose of legal regulation of the competences of the President in his neutral position. The author regards as inappropriate the amendment of the constitution through the Constitutional Act No. 356/2011 Coll. which provides that in case of loss of trust in national government the President may grant the prior consent to some of the competences entrusted with the national government until the appointment of a new government.

4

JOZEF TISO JAKO HLAVA STÁTU A NEJVYŠŠÍ VOJENSKÝ VELITEL (OD PŘEDSEDY VLÁDY K PREZIDENTOVI)

75%

Pejs O.

Vojenská história

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2018

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tom 22

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nr 2

7 - 34

EN

In the study, the author deals with the position of J. Tiso as the Prime Minister as well as the creation of his position as the highest military commander at the time when the institutions of the newly originated Slovak Republic were constituted and their mutual relationships still were not exactly determined. The author states that during this constitutional provisional arrangement already, the function of the head of the state was personified in the personality of the Prime Minister, Jozef Tiso. The author argues convincingly that from this point of view, Tiso was accepted also as the highest military commander even prior to the adoption of the Constitution. In this context, he observes his interventions in the matters of national defence, building, personal structure and operation of the army. Logically, the greatest attention is paid to Tiso’s relationship to the Minister of National Defence, gen. Čatloš. The author states here that Tiso did not profile himself in the function of the highest commander of the Slovak military power, which was expressed in his dependence on Čatloš. According to the author, he often proceeded autonomously and had his decisions approved by the government retroactively.

5

PÔSOBNOSŤ PREZIDENTA V PARLAMENTNEJ FORME VLÁDY

75%

Nikodým D.

Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)

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2013

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tom 96

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nr 6

582 – 596

EN

The author compares individual republic forms of government and examines the position of President of the Slovak Republic within a parliamentary form of government. He points out to amendments of the constitution since its adoption in 1992, which seem to be adequate in a parliamentary form of government. The author´s criticism aims at the provisions of Article 115 of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitutional Act 356/2011. This amendment has affected the dualism of executive power which is typical for a parliamentary form of government. It constitutes an excessive limitation of powers of the government in case of loss of trust, expression of distrust. Moreover, certain acts of the government are made conditional upon previous approval of the President. Suggestions de lege constitutione for amendment of competences of the President as neutral constitutional actor are made. The author points out to the problems in the application of acts of the creative right of the President, which enter the division of power. Long-term constitutional customs, which supplement the constitutional practice in accordance with a parliamentary form of government, also play an important role in the exercise of powers by the President and other constitutional bodies.