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PEIRCEOVA VERZIA PRAGMATIZMU

100%

Višňovský E.

tom 69

nr 4

307 – 317

The paper discusses Peirce’s version of pragmatism based principally on his logical maxim (its various formulations appeared in 1878-1907) within the context of articulating the character of this philosophical school. The author describes the key features of Peirce’s pragmatist maxim as different from James’s version and shows an open and pluralistic character of pragmatism. Despite the substantial meaning of Peirce’s maxim consisting in providing the „pragmatic meaning“ of thought, the author argues that the pragmatist philosophy can be understood and developed in far more ways.

EXPLODING A MYTH: C. I. LEWIS, PRAGMATISM, AND THE GIVEN

100%

Misak C.

tom 69

nr 4

332 – 341

Clarence Irving Lewis is one of the mostly unjustly neglected philosophers of the last century. This paper shows how he is the inheritor of Peirce’s view; and did not succumb to the myth of the given, but rather, put forward a view that was picked up, almost in whole, by his student Quine.

PEIRCE TODAY

88%

Colapietro V.

tom 69

nr 4

318 – 331

The paper outlines and summarizes the contemporary state of Peircean studies, and sketches briefly the most striking traits of Peirce’s intellectual portrait. The author takes up the challenge of placing Peirce in the context of present-day philosophy, but also reflects upon his relationship with the relevant philosophical past, and emphasizes above all the importance of Peirce’s so often downplayed sentimentalism for the sake of his recognition as a valuable source of any kind of future’s non-reductive naturalism in philosophy. The author moreover argues that Peirce today invites us to read him not so much as a contemporary but as a contributor to philosophy of the day after tomorrow.

ŠTRUKTURALIZMUS V PRAGMATIZME CH. S. PEIRCEA ALEBO KRÁTKY PRÍBEH O STRATENEJ VÍZII

88%

Žiak J.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

2011

tom 66

nr 5

452-457

The article offers an alternative story about the structuralism in science, philosophy, and semiotics based on the exposition of Ch. S. Peirce's philosophical project - pragmatism. Contemporary tendency to consider structuralism as naive and dead is put in contrast with the reassessment of the potential of structuralism in natural sciences and linguistic anthropology.

METODEUTICKÉ INŠPIRÁCIE V MYSLENÍ CH. S. PEIRCEA

75%

Mihina F.

tom 69

nr 4

295 – 306

Charles Sanders Peirce plays a unique role in the history of modern American philosophy. The paper’s focus is on scientific discovery and explanation, i.e. two important issues of Peirce’s thinking. Many types of scientific reasoning have long been identified as supplying important methodologies for discovery and explanation in science, but a lot of questions regarding their logical properties still remain open in the contemporary investigations in philosophy of science, methodology and logic. These styles of reasoning include induction, abduction, deduction, explanation or confirmation. The article offers a logical, or more exactly, metodeutical analysis of a particular type of scientific reasoning, namely abduction, i.e. is, reasoning from an observation to its possible explanations. There is no single logical method in scientific practice in general, and with respect to abduction in particular. Abduction is not a new form of inference, but belongs to the most important ways leading to scientific discovery.

ASOCIANIZMUS V PRAGMATIZME: PEIRCEOVA REKONŠTRUKCIA BRITSKÉHO EMPIRIZMU

75%

Žiak J.

tom 69

nr 4

342 – 354

This article focuses on the consequences of Peirce’s aspiration to reconstruct crucial issues of modern epistemology inherent in Locke’s and Hume’s empiricism. His most important result is a unique doctrine of signs (semiotics), which he developed alongside his well-known doctrine of pragmatism until 1902 – 1903, when these two doctrines undergo a desired synthesis. The article offers an analysis of the difference between Locke’s and Peirce’s accounts of signification and – show us how Peirce reconstructs Hume’s idea of associationism. Peirce analyzes the phenomenon of mental association in three different areas: in psychology, logic, and in the so-called methodeutic inquiry, where logic and psychology cooperate. This inquiry had led Peirce to the point of intersection, where philosophical concept of habit and philosophical concept of inference meet. His pragmatic and semiotic studies resulted in a truly unique conception of meaning. To sum up: Peirce’s deconstruction of Locke’s account of signification via reconstructing Hume’s associationism creates a philosophical base of Peirce’s best known project – his pragmatism.