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Część ogólna prawa cywilnego i prawo zobowiązań w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego

100%

Podkowik J.

nr 3

521-558

The article discusses case-law of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland concerning provisions of civil law, in particular, general provisions and obligation law of the Civil Code. Constitutional case law under the Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 r. serves as the reference point. At the outset, the nature of judicial review of the civil law as the standards governing horizontal relationships is discussed. It has been shown that the specificity of civil law provisions affects the methodology of adjudication and the effects of judgments itself. Moreover, it was pointed out that while there are public entities in the legal relationships under civil law, there are no grounds for applying constitutional guarantees of freedom and rights to such entities. Then the most important rulings and constitutional problems were discussed, i.e. incapacitation, protection of personal rights, freedom of contract, legislative interference in the ongoing contractual relationship, as well as liability for damages.

Wyrażanie obowiązku w traktacie 'De officiis' M.T. Cycerona

75%

Górska M.

Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium Graecae et Latinae

2011

tom 21

nr 2

5-26

Modality, understood as a language category determining the speaker’s attitude towards the communicated content, can be divided into several types. One of them is deontic modality which relates to the notions of permission and obligation. The speech acts by means of which a speaker imposes an obligation upon the addressee are called directives. A speaker can express the necessity of realization of a state of affairs by addressee explicitly, refering to him directly, or implicitly, by means of the general expressions which lack an explicit agent. These general expressions may constitute directives only under specific conditions, first of all when the expression is marked by a present or a future tense and when the deontic source of the obligation and the addressee are indicated in some way. In Cicero’s De officiis explicit directives are realised with morphological means, such as the imperative mood, the first person plural subjunctive, the second person singular and first person plural future indicative, and with lexical ones: the performative verbs postulo and hortor. Whereas implicit directives are expressed by morphological means: the third person subjunctive and the third person future indicative, by lexical markers: the modal verbs debere and oportet, the impersonal phrases officium est and munus est, and by syntactic means: the periphrastic gerundival construction and the est + genetivus possessivus construction. However particular markers much differ with respect to their frequency in chosen corpus.

Dispenzace přirozeného zákona u Tomáše Akvinského

75%

Dvorský P.

Studia theologica

2018

tom 2

109-128

The paper describes and explains the position of Thomas Aquinas regarding the possibility of the dispensation of certain precepts of the natural law by man. It situates this concept into the broader context of his views concerning God’s action within practical reason and human participation in providence which is also the basis of his comprehension of every law used by men. The meaning and the relationship between certain key notions (law, dispensation, obligation, moral, natural and divine law) in the discourse of Aquinas is explained. Aquinas is revealed to be a thinker who is very much aware of the limits bound to more particular rules in their attempt to translate the first imperatives of practical reason into a singular situation. Without despising these rules he asks for more than their blind application: he asks for their use in accordance with reason (and with reason) which has originated them and which sometimes requires it to be done otherwise.