In his reflection on the nature of evil, the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus affirms that evil itself (to autokakon) is “also beyond the absolute non-being” (epekeina kai tou mēdamōs ontos). With this assumption, he intends to reinforce the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil, conceived as totally separate from good, and contrasted with the collateral and parasitic existence of evil mixed with good. He thus maintains a distinction between absolute evil and relative evil, conceived with reference to the distinction between absolute non-being (i.e., nothingness) and relative non-being. In Proclus, the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil is presented as a necessary consequence of the non-dualist theory of evil in the sphere of a protology that identifies the first Principle of all things in the primary Good (identical to the supra-essential One), and which aims to reconcile the absolute primacy of the latter with the presence of evil in some orders of reality.
The article is an attempt to answer the question of why Aquinas stops his commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate at question six, article four, whereas this is before the point in the treatise where Boethius gets to the heart of the subject matter. The author shows that Aquinas (1) decides to do so because the treatise cannot afford him the means of demonstrating the existence of the Trinity, (2) holds that, although rational explanations could be given in terms of proof of God’s existence, one cannot come to the knowledge of the truth of the existence of the Trinity by reason alone, and (3) concludes that, although we cannot prove the doctrine of the existence of the Trinity through philosophical demonstration, we can, however, show that this doctrine and other doctrines known through the light of faith are not contradictory.
In his tale entitled The Nameless City, Howard Phillips Lovecraft includes unspecified «paragraphs from the apocryphal nightmares of Damascius» among the «fragments» of the «cherished treasury of daemoniac lore» of the protagonist In the present essay, I suggest that there is a connection between this unusual reference and a note in the writer’s Commonplace Book, which refers to the notice by Photius (Bibl. cod. 130) on a lost work by Damascius that nowdays is generally referred to as Paradoxa and assumed to consist of a variegated collection of extraordinary stories and facts. I, therefore, delineate a general presentation of the testimony by the Byzantine Patriarch (very probably only indirectly known to Lovecraft), upon which I attempt to bring into focus the motivations that led the Providence to make the writer insert the name of Damascius in the fantastic plot of his story.
With my article, I try to show how the Neoplatonist Hermias of Alexandria (c. 410-455 AD) elaborated on Plato’s arguments on the immortality of the human soul in order to forge a coherent psychological and ontological system which is in tune with a precise ethics of salvation. In the final Appendix, I propose that these doctrines of the soul were not just erudite theories but turned out to be an actual and effective tool for coping with the threatening moments of the everyday life (notably for coping with the loss of the beloved ones and for facing death).
In Hermias’ commentary on Phaedrus (In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia), it is possible to identify several direct references to the philosophers and pre-Socratic doctrines, including Pythagoras. We point out to three references to Pythagoras in Hermias: (1) Pythagoras is characterized as an unwritten philosopher, (2) there is a special connection with the divinities and Muses, and (3) there is a special connection with the Phaedrus dialogue, revealed by the affinity between Pythagoras and Socrates. We show how the explicit references to Pythagoras in Hermias constitute a certain method of interpreting Platonism: as a philosophy manifested in writing, but which, at the same time, values the unwritten tradition, represented especially by Pythagoras and Socrates. We also demonstrate how the references translated and examined here reveal the image of this Neoplatonic Pythagoras of Hermias, an image which is not necessarily in tune with the oldest doxography, and which permits the reevaluation of Plato’s position as a philosopher who sought to combine unwritten doctrines with his explicit activity as a writer.
This paper lists and examines the explicit references to Aristotle’s Topics in the Greek Neoplatonic commentaries on the Categories. The references to the Topics by Porphyry, Dexippus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Olympiodorus, Philoponus and David (Elias) are listed according the usual prolegomena to Aristotle’s works. In particular, the paper reconstructs David (Elias)’s original thesis about the proponents of the title Pre-Topics for the Categories and compares Ammonius’, Simplicius’ and Olympiodorus’ doxographies about the postpraedicamenta. Moreover, the study identifies two general trends. The first one is that all the commentators after Proclus share the same general view about: the authenticity of the Topics, Aristotle’s writing style in them, the part of philosophy to which they belong, their purpose, their usefulness and their place in the reading order. The second one is that whereas Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius use the Topics as an aid to understanding the Categories, Ammonius, Olympiodorus and David (Elias) do not.
In the Renaissance there was a kind of linguistic-pictorial osmosis, in which mythological configurations derived from antique literature, the poetic metaphoric of Neoplatonism, semi-fantastic and semi-realistic visions and a visible penchant for decorative rhetoric intertwined with elements of rational thought, the cult of nature, traditional reference to higher authority and practical as well as theoretical acceptance of pictorial symbolic. This language was employed to explore philosophical, ethical, and even natural categories related to issues like the beginnings of the world and nature, death, transience, vanity (vanitas),3 temperance, virtue (virtu), harmony, vita activa and contemplativa— categories in which the people of the era strove to describe youth, maturity, old age and death. In this specific language writing about a truth, idea or moral principle primarily involved presenting it as a picture, a concrete, sensually embraceable form, thing or person. Thus, if it was necessary, logos followed imago, which was genetically precedent and most important in the cognitive sense.
This paper shows the role of ὀνοματοποιεῖν in Neoplatonism and how this practice is ruled by an onto-logical canon. While ὀνοματοποιεῖν itself means the making of a brand new name, its usage is manifold. As Aristotle explains in Rh. III 2, poets take advantage of ὀνοματοποιεῖν to catch the undefined and give it a recognisable image, by means of a metaphorical name. In science, this practice, codified by Aristotle, is twofold: ὀνοματοποιεῖν meant both to re-semanticize words wellknown and to create names ex novo for things not discovered or studied yet. After analysing ὀνοματοποιεῖν’s recurrence in Aristotle, I illustrate that, according to Neoplatonic Commentators, impositio can be, both natural and technical, only of things in actuality, having a solid consistency. Intermediates between contraries, presumed relatives and powers as qualities are nameless – as Philoponus notices in his In Categorias – since they haven’t an independent status and aren’t definable. This bond between the original rhetorical practice and the ontological perspective, sketched in Int. 1, was strengthened by Alexander, who filled Aristotle’s gaps, stating that names signify things’ being, i.e. the form acquired in actuality.
While the aim of the present paper is to analyze Olympiodorus’ commentary to Plato’s Phaedo, particular attention will be paid here to the role of hēdonē. The first part of the text presents the four conceptions of the pleasure that can be found in Plato’s dialogue. Although pleasure does not play the most prominent role either in the Plato’s dialogue or in the Neoplatonic commentary, Olympiodorus’ attitude to this issue reveals an important change and difference between the philosophical views of Plato and those of Olympiodorus. The latter does not seem to discern the possibility that pleasure can have its spiritual dimension (which Plato regards as possible). Thus, the experience of hēdonē is reduced solely to the sphere of the senses and even in this area its role needs to be minimized: in this form it has to be carefully measured and controled. Furthermore, Olympiodorus does not see that so-called hedonistic calculus: whilst it is not strictly speaking connected with virtuous actions, it still can have some significance for the the philosopher’s life.
The author offers a new approach to a phenomenon of social legends of great individuals from a philosophical point of view. He starts with a presentation of his interpretation of the concept of the Platonic tradition of a divine man and a cult or hagiography of such men in the ideal Platonic state, alongside with an explanation, inspired by Platonic authors. He collates this concept and its justification (rationalization) with today’s social and political reception of axiology, in order to present it as an epiphany of higher values. He collates it also with the results of philosophical reflection on a ductility of history, in order to show it as a prototype of something real in its historical efficiency. The author ends with summary and explanation of his proposal.
This paper analyzes and explains certain parts of Syrianus’s Commentary on book M of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which details Syrianus’s response to Aristotle’s attack against the Platonic position of the separate existence of numbers. Syrianus defends the separate existence not only of eidetic but also of mathematical numbers, following a line of argumentation which involves a hylomorphic approach to the latter. He proceeds with an analysis of the mathematical number into matter and form, but his interpretation entails that form is the constituent of number, which has the status and role of a Platonic Form. This solution allows him not only to explain and justify the unity of number, but also to apply the Platonic thesis of the separate existence of numbers, to the mathematical or monadic numbers themselves. It also betrays its tendency to combine theses of the Platonic Ontology with fundamental Aristotelian doctrines.
The article explicates the main fields of hermeneutic research activity of Alicja Kuczyńska in which Neoplatonic inspirations, Renaissance models of life, and the values and traditional paradigms for understanding aesthetic categories that are dominant within them—such as image, creation, fiction, and mimesis—are viewed against the background of the phenomena, transformations, and problems that are unique to our own times, thereby providing old frameworks with new forms of philosophical relevance. Kuczyńska’s research topics, i.e. beauty, love, the anthropological dimension of creativity, the role of imagination, and deification of creative personality gain revised interpretations, in which the accent is placed on creative activity and its value-creating dimension consisting in the transcendence of everyday reality. Characteristic of her research attitude is the tendency to consider philosophy and art in the context of transcending the finite dimension of being and undertaking anew and in different ways the effort to reach what is infinite, unconditioned, lost, truly existent in the Platonic sense. Kuczyńska’s research of this tendency takes on the dimension of positive valorisation of the state of “being in between” and exploration of artistic figures of “ascending.”
The article examines how Hegel’s negative view of Byzantium is different from the Enlightenment’s critique and especially from Voltaire’s criticism of medieval history. In order to account for the Hegelian specificity of interpretation an effort is made to translate the chapter on Byzantium from the Philosophy of History in terms of the analysis of the Phenomenology of the Spirit and, more precisely, on the basis of the chapters on sensible certitude and on the domination and servitude. Considering that for Hegel every philosophical school possesses an autonomous value, one has to wonder why the Byzantine moment of the Spirit is destined to stagnation. The question about Hegel’s Neoplatonism, especially his affiliation with Proclus’s system, shows how the distance separating the Hegelian system from the Proclusian one explains the inadequacy of the latter as to drawing the consequences from the Byzantine spiritual stagnation.
FR
The article examines how Hegel’s negative view of Byzantium is different from the Enlightenment’s critique and especially from Voltaire’s criticism of medieval history. In order to account for the Hegelian specificity of interpretation an effort is made to translate the chapter on Byzantium from the Philosophy of History in terms of the analysis of the Phenomenology of the Spirit and, more precisely, on the basis of the chapters on sensible certitude and on the domination and servitude. Considering that for Hegel every philosophical school possesses an autonomous value, one has to wonder why the Byzantine moment of the Spirit is destined to stagnation. The question about Hegel’s Neoplatonism, especially his affiliation with Proclus’s system, shows how the distance separating the Hegelian system from the Proclusian one explains the inadequacy of the latter as to drawing the consequences from the Byzantine spiritual stagnation.
This paper presents Olympiodorus’ and Damascius’ explanations of the philosopher’s practice of dying in Plato’s Phaedo. It also includes a presentation of Ammonius’ exegesis of the practice of death (meletē thanatou). The Neoplatonic commentators discern two kinds of death, the bodily or physical death and the voluntary death. Olympiodorus suggests that bodily death is only an image of voluntary death and cannot be recognized as an original death, because original death presupposes the preparation for death and the constant effort for the purification of the soul during the philosopher’s life-time. Only preparation for death and purification can ensure the complete separation of the soul from the body. Relative to this distinction is that between apothnēskein and tethnanai; these infinitives denote the dual meaning of death: death as an event or a process and death as a state. Our study examines thoroughly the subtle distinctions made by Olympiodorus and Damascius and offers a comparative analysis of the two definitions of death as well as that of purification. It reaches the conclusion that apothnēskein is a necessary condition of tethnanai, i.e. of a definitive release and parting of the soul from the body. On the other hand, the process of eventual purification, a notion which betrays the religious character of purification, can be identified with apothnēskein, which is the practice of dying by the true philosopher. Finally, our study also emphasizes and explains the difference between the voluntary philosophical death and the voluntary unphilosophical suicide; the latter guaranteeing only bodily or physical death.
The paper examines the relation of esotericism and oblique politics in the Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos (11th century) on the basis of Eva De Vries’ study of the letters that Psellos addressed to the statesman Leo Paraspondylos. Traditionally, the name of Psellos signifies a revival of Neoplatonism in medieval Constantinople according to researchers like Chr. Zervos in the beginning of 20th century. Contemporary researchers such as Anthony Kaldellis and Stratis Papaioannou point to a more organic than speculative theorization in Psellos’ work while another contemporary scholar, Frederick Lauritzen, undertakes a synthesis of the two approaches. In any case, as this paper supports, it would be inadequate to consider the relation of esotericism to politics without referring to the evolution of the moral standards considered in a contextualized manner.
FR
The paper examines the relation of esotericism and oblique politics in the Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos (11th century) on the basis of Eva De Vries’ study of the letters that Psellos addressed to the statesman Leo Paraspondylos. Traditionally, the name of Psellos signifies a revival of Neoplatonism in medieval Constantinople according to researchers like Chr. Zervos in the beginning of 20th century. Contemporary researchers such as Anthony Kaldellis and Stratis Papaioannou point to a more organic than speculative theorization in Psellos’ work while another contemporary scholar, Frederick Lauritzen, undertakes a synthesis of the two approaches. In any case, as this paper supports, it would be inadequate to consider the relation of esotericism to politics without referring to the evolution of the moral standards considered in a contextualized manner.
In the fragments of Damascius’ Vita Isidori one can observe a significant presence of the “marvellous.” In many cases, the marvellous seems to manifest a sacral and anagogical value in line with the philosophical and religious conceptions of late Neo-Platonism. A similar value of the marvellous can also be found in a passage of De Principiis (I, 14, 1–19), where Damascius hails the totally ineffable Principle as supremely marvellous, upon which he presents it as absolutely unknowable and expressible only in an aporetic way.
The aim of this study is to discuss an original philosophical contribution made by Philoponus, who in In Cat. 18, 14–22 equates koinon in its most peculiar meaning with the concept of koinônia understood as a particular case of Platonic methexis. First, the paper analyzes the passages where the Neoplatonic commentators of the Categories distinguish four distinct meanings of the Aristotelian concept of koinon. Subsequently, this article emphasizes the differences between Philoponus’ hermeneutical suggestions and those of the other commentators. Philoponus clarifies that while every koinon is methekton, Aristotle’s koinon is characterized by the fact that the participation is ex isou and kata meros. Thus, koinônia, according to Philoponus, is a particular case of methexis, where everyone participating in something participates in it equally and singly. The example cited by Philoponus to explain Aristotle’s koinon is that of men participating equally and singly in human nature. The study concludes with a discussion of the relationship among the concepts of koinon, koinônia and methexis.
18
Dostęp do pełnego tekstu na zewnętrznej witrynie WWW
Synesius rejected the ideas of the generation of the soul after the body, of the corruptibility of the world, and of the resurrection understood too literally in 411 AD. The objections by the future bishop can be evaluated differently in each particular case. His reservations about certain impiously gross ideas concerning the resurrection (of Christ, or humanity?) were quite expectable by the Christian authors of the day and cannot therefore be viewed as a legitimate argument of Synesius against the faith of the Church. In contrast, the idea of the eternity of the world is part of non-Christian Platonism in the strictest sense. Yet another type of Cyrenaean’s disapproval of some of the (allegedly) ecclesiastical concepts is his rejection of the notion of bodies existing before their souls. It even seems that this strange issue could have been a mere strategy on Synesius’ part creating a false problem for Theophilus to ensure that his future bishop did not object to anything too serious. It was not actually an official article of faith, since the Church of the day still only held the relatively vague Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed as dogma, which was only relevant extremely generally in relation to the themes of the resurrection and eternity. From a rhetorical point of view, Synesius as an experienced sophist created to his advantage an interface between the public and private in Ep. 105. He was able to avoid the possible danger caused by his objections thanks to the formally private status of the letter addressed to his brother. He consequently allows both Theophilus and the church in Libya to fully publicly know his actual philosophical positions.
W ostatnich latach pojawiło się kilka ważnych publikacji podkreślających znaczenie szeroko pojętej interpretacji alegorycznej w literaturze starożytnej (prace Petera T. Strucka, Mikołaja Domaradzkiego). Interpretacja alegoryczna widzi w odczytywanym tekście zagadkę, która ma doprowadzić czytelnika do głębszej wiedzy szczególnego rodzaju, która zakryta jest przed oczyma „niewtajemniczonych”. Stąd w tego typu interpretacji ogromną rolę odgrywa język, który „odkrywając - zakrywa". Szczególnego znaczenia interpretacja alegoryczna nabrała w nurcie neoplatońskim, w którym filozofii zostały przypisane funkcje religijne (upodobnienie do boga, powrót do ojczyzny). Najważniejsze cechy tej neoplatońskiej alegorezy przedstawił Peter T. Struck w artykule Allegory and ascent in Neoplatonism, pokazując, w jaki sposób interpretacja alegoryczna mogła się stać drogą prowadzącą do mistycznego zjednoczenia. W niniejszym artykule uwaga autorki została skupiona na tych elementach alegorycznej egzegezy, które mogą być użyteczne w prezentacji specyfiki Eriugeny egzegezy motywu wygnania i powrotu do raju.
EN
Over the recent years we have welcomed a number of significant publications (in particular the contributions by Peter T. Struck and Mikołaj Domaradzki) highlighting the importance of allegory and allegorical interpretation in ancient literary culture. The allegorical approach to literary text identifies the literary work as a puzzle, the solving of which introduces the reader to a profounder kind of knowledge, a knowledge that is hidden from the eyes of the “uninitiated” This kind of interpretation implies a special understanding of the function of language, Which “by revealing conceals”. Allegorical interpretation assumed paramount importance in Neoplatonism, the philosophy which attributed religious functions to the philosophical endeavor of man (such functions as assimilation to God and return to man's (spiritual) fatherland). The most salient features of the Neo-platonic allegorism have been presented by Peter T. Stuck in his article Allegory and ascent in Neoplatonism complete with the account of the role attributed to allegory as a guide along the path leading to mystical union. In this article attention has been focused upon those elements of the Neoplatonic allegorical exegesis, which may be of use in exploring the specifics of Eriugena’s interpretation of the themes of the exile from and return to the paradise.
The article presents an interpretation of Plotinius’ concept of eternity, which is defined in his treatise On Eternity and Time III.7 [45] as the “life of being.” The textual and philosophical analysis of a number of related passages from Plotinus’ Enneads concludes that the description of eternity as the life of being is neither metaphorical nor analogical. It should be understood in a technical philosophical sense, which contains direct metaphysical and phenomenological implications. Life is not an effect of intelligible reality but an ontological condition, the limit, source of activity, background for the identity of Intellect. The life of being is not identical with partial aspects of the intelligible universe, but is implied and covered by them. In the context of the Plotinian noetics, the notion of life expresses the wholeness of being in its totality—this is applicable not only to the life of intelligible being, but also true for the life of Soul, which assumes the totality of Soul’s time. Life is recognizable and experienced by living and existing beings on the basis of common liveliness and their common ontological status, so life establishes, develops and intensifies the connection of our own being with eternity via eternal in us. There are notable functional similarities between the Plotinian concept of eternity as the life of being and the image of Aion as reconstructed from fragments of Chaldean oracles—a mystical philosophical text widely read by later Neoplatonic philosophers, albeit never openly referred to by Plotinus. The comparative analysis and philosophical interpretation of the Plotinian and Chaldean concepts and images related to eternity suggest that both the sources maintain similar metaphysical roles of mediation, the transfer of unifying and animating light, causing the motion of reality. It is also significant that the Plotinian parallelism of eternity and “eternal in us” is comparable to the Chaldean image of “flower of the mind,” which is described both as a metaphysical attribute of Aion and as a specific power of Soul, which could be used by a person to acquire knowledge of divine reality.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.