The author claims that specific legal instruments in the so‑called external administrative supervision over the activities of the courts, which – according to the above‑mentioned bill – are to be granted to the Minister of Justice, do not enter into the realm of judicial independence, nor do they relate to the substance of the hearing of cases. Therefore, they are consistent with the constitutionally enshrined principle of judicial independence and the principle of division and balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers.
The author finds the submitted proposal for amendments to be consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The above‑mentioned proposal extends the competence of the Minister of Justice in the field of supervision of administrative activity of the common courts, which is however limited to new opportunities for obtaining information of the activities of the courts, and does not breach the balance of powers principle. In the author’s view, in the proposed Article 37f §1 (2) of the Law on Common Courts Organization a reservation should be added to explain that it is just about the exercise by the Minister’s of Justice actions “specified in the Act” that are indispensable to counter the irregularities in the administrative work of the courts, or to be applied in case of their occurrence. Moreover, he raises objections to the proposed Article 37f § 1 (3) of the above‑mentioned Act, according to which an external administrative supervision has to include “an analysis and assessment” of application of the law by the courts. That provision is in conflict with Article 8 (2) of the Act and lacks precision. According to the author, it would be advisable to supplement the proposed bill with an obligation to adjust the implementing provisions to the amended Act and to extend the period of vacatio legis.
The opinion relates to the compliance of a Deputy’s bill with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The author, following the presentation of the essence of the modifications proposed in the bill, argues that they cause significant extension of the powers of the Minister of Justice. This situation cannot be confused with the inconsistency of the proposed changes with the Constitution. Quoting the relevant judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, the author shows that the administrative operations of the courts may be subject to external supervision by the Minister of Justice and, therefore, the purpose of the bill aimed to maintain administrative supervision over the activities of the courts and the granting of new powers to the minister cannot be questioned. The modifications proposed in the bill should be considered to be in conformity with the Constitution.
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The article attempts to show the parliamentary discussions around the systemic model of the prosecutor’s office, which was one of the knotty issues during the work on the 29 December 1989 amendment to the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic. Research methods characteristic of legal sciences and political sciences, primarily the formal-dogmatic method, the institutional method, and the comparative method have been used to achieve this goal. Through the aforementioned research methods, sources were analysed (mainly transcripts from the work of the 10th Sejm, especially the Parliamentary Legislative Committee, the 1st term Senate, the law and court reform sub-team functioning during the Polish Round Table negotiations, as well as memoirs of participants and observers of the late 1989 discussion on the optimal systemic model of the prosecutor’s office), subsequent laws on the prosecutor’s office and drafts of the December amendment, and a review of the literature. Alongside the regulation of political parties, the question of the location and functions of the public prosecutor’s office was among the most contentious issues during the drafting of the content of the December amendment. Particularly involved in these debates was the proposal to combine the functions of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice. The previous model of separating these offices in People’s Poland was seen as one of the reasons why the prosecutor’s office was used by the communist regime for various abuses, including those targeting opposition activists in the Polish People’s Republic. Thus, the personal union of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice, in place since 1990, was more an aftermath of these negative experiences than the result of extensive substantive polemics around the optimal systemic model of the prosecution service. This recognition constitutes the main hypothesis of this article. The article briefly presents the ‘starting point’ for parliamentary discussions on this issue, which was the output of the law and court reform sub-team operating under the political reforms team of the Round Table. The subject scope of the December amendment and the course of discussion on the place of the prosecutor’s office in the changed socio-political reality were also presented. During these discussions, the possible deconstitutionalisation of the prosecution institution also remained an important issue.
The institution of a judicial assistant was established in order to relieve judges of all ranks from office administration duties as well as to ensure that they have proper support in examining the cases they have been entrusted with adjudicating. The author presents the requirements to be met by candidates for judicial assistants, specifies their duties and competence as well as analyses the Order of the Minister of Justice of 10 June 2014 on judicial assistant internship that will enable judicial assistants to prepare better for performing their duties and verify their fitness for this profession.
PL
Instytucja asystenta sędziego została powołana w celu odciążenia sędziów wszystkich szczebli od czynności administracyjnych oraz zapewnienia im należytego wsparcia w rozpoznawaniu powierzonych im spraw. Autor przedstawia wymagania, jakie muszą spełniać kandydaci na asystentów sędziów, określa ich obowiązki i kompetencje, a także analizuje rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dnia 10 czerwca 2014 r. w sprawie stażu asystenckiego, który umożliwi asystentom sędziów lepsze przygotowanie do wykonywania swoich obowiązków oraz weryfikację ich przydatności do wykonywania zawodu.
The functioning in practice of the independence of the public prosecutor’s office and individual prosecutors in Poland has been examined. First, the solutions adopted upon completion of the Round Table discussion are presented, taking into consideration the constitutional provisions then adopted. Next the European standards approved by European organisations and in particular the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission regarding assurance of the independence of the judiciary are discussed and confronted with the statutory solutions that have till date applied in Poland. A fair assessment of the functioning and the regime of the public prosecutor’s office has been made in the context of the implementation of the amendments of 2009 to the law on the public prosecutor’s office, showing that no further amendments to, or changes in the existing status quo are necessary. In the third part of the paper, the recent provisions adopted directly with regards to the independence of prosecutors and the public prosecutor’s office are presented, although their actual assessment will only be possible once the new law has come into force.
PL
W artykule zaprezentowano zagadnienia związane z funkcjonowaniem niezależności prokuratora i prokuratury jako jednolitego organu. W ramach uwag wprowadzających wskazane zostały rozwiązania, jakie w obrębie niezależności wypracowane zostały po zakończeniu obrad Okrągłego Stołu wraz z uwzględnieniem przyjętych w tym zakresie zapisów konstytucyjnych. Ponadto omówiono standardy europejskie przyjęte przez organizacje europejskie, w szczególności Komitet Ministrów Rady Europy i Komisję Wenecką, w zakresie zapewnienia niezależności funkcjonowania organów wymiaru sprawiedliwości z równoczesną konfrontacją przyjętych dotychczas przez Polskę rozwiązań ustawowych. Rzetelnie przedstawiono funkcjonowanie i ustrój prokuratury w kontekście realizacji postulatu niezależności wraz z wprowadzeniem nowelizacji z 2009 r. i zmianą ustawy o prokuraturze. Prowadzone rozważania w sposób w miarę jednoznaczny wskazały na wątpliwość potrzeby wprowadzania zmian w do stanu prawnego wypracowanego w 2009 r., a w części III publikacji zwrócono uwagę na przyjęte w Prawie o prokuraturze zapisy pozostające w bezpośrednim związku z niezależnością prokuratury i prokuratorów. Przy czym, jak przyjęto w wniosku końcowym, realna ocena wprowadzonych ustawą Prawo o prokuraturze rozwiązań będzie mogła nastąpić z chwilą wejścia ustawy w życie.
The aim of this paper is to present the profession of the court bailiff in Poland. This paper also presents issues related to the rights of the Minister of Justice who may recall the court bailiff after he reaches 70 years of age. According to the authors, this law must not be regarded as unjust, as the court bailiff carries out his duties alone and he is not an employee, but a public official. Moreover, the same kind of regulation applies also to notaries and judges.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy zawodu komornika i kwestii związanych z uprawnieniem Ministra Sprawiedliwości do odwołania go ze stanowiska po ukończeniu 70 roku życia. W ocenie autorów taki przepis nie jest dyskryminujący, egzekucje bowiem komornik musi prowadzić samodzielnie i nie jest on pracownikiem, a funkcjonariuszem publicznym. Ponadto jest to regulacja podobna do tych, które obowiązują notariuszy czy sędziów.
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