This paper attempts to offer a different assessment of Austrian Chancellor Metternich’s role in the Eastern Question as well as the diplomatic concert to the one generally held. Additionally, it refutes the widely held fallacy that at the wellknown meeting in Münchengrätz in September 1833, Metternich acceded to Nicholas I’s interests in the East in return for his support against the revolutions in the West, particularly in the Apennines. The paper tries to prove that Metternich did not fear Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire in the early 1830s and no Austro-Russian quid pro quo was agreed upon in Münchengrätz because both countries’ interests in the East and West were identical: the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and the fight against revolutionary movements. Consequently, Austria and Russia supported each other in both these matters because it was in their mutual interest to do so. By providing relevant evidence, the paper also demonstrates that the Eastern Question concerned not only the Balkans, but also other parts of the Ottoman Empire including, for example, Egypt, and this comprised an important agenda within Metternich’s foreign policy.
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