The purpose of this paper is to offer a logico‑philosophical critical overview of the theory of multiple realities (TWR). The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I present a brief history of the development of some ideas, which combined together form the conceptual framework of the theory in question, whose main thesis is that there is more than one reality. In the second part I present (and try to address) some interpretations of TWR, which can be described as: ontological; epistemological; esthetical; logical ad mixed interpretations. When doing so, a special emphasis is laid on the presentation of an explication of TWR based on theory of models, an explication authored by Teresa Kostyrko. This explication rests on a conditional recognition of the particular ‘realities’ of Chwistek’s theory as proper models (i.e. those, which fulfill the condition of the identity of meaning of theory’s fundamental notions) of the theories of reality, with the provision that such models are indeed constructible. In the last section of my paper I propose a preliminary appraisal of the TWR as well as a way to reengineer this theory in order to avoid some of its difficulties. By appealing to Kostyrko’s idea on one hand and the spirit Quinean ontological relativism on the other, I wish to argue as follows: (1) ‘reality’ is the name of the set comprising all meanings of the term ‘reality’; (2) under particular conditions these meanings can be arranged in a theory, which posseses a proper model (scientific discourse, some forms of the common talk); (3) model proper designate by definition classes of objects, which we regard as existent on the grounds of a given theory. The above set of theses forms the core of a concept, which I propose to call the ‘manifold reality’ in order to differentiate it from TWR, the development of which theory it is, as well as its modification towards a new kind of ontology.
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The aim of the article is to present a few criticisms of the foundations of Leon Chwistek’s philosophy. Completeness postulate, imposed on all correct philosophical systems by Chwistek, and which is supposed to be in conflict with conventionalism, is criticised. Correctness of some Chwistek’s axioms is called into question. Axioms for six intermediate realities are given. I argue in favour of model theory interpretation of manifold reality.
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