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Odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza NRF w XXI wieku – Próba opisu

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Krzysztof Jerzy Gruszczyński K. J.

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2017

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nr 4(27)

81-115

EN

Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) is considering whether to seek further reparations from German Federal Republic for the massive losses inflicted during WWII. PiS head Kaczynski described the move as a “historical counteroffensive.” World War II (WW II), which began with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, killed nearly 6 million Polish citizens and inflicted huge material losses, including the destruction of cultural treasures, industry and entire cities. Those crimes carry not only a moral price, but a material one as well: In 2004, Warsaw’s then-mayor, Lech Kaczynski, calculated that the Deutsche Bundesrepublik was liable for reparation payments of some $45 billion dollars (38 billion dollars) for the destruction of Warsaw alone. If one were to extrapolate the amount to include the whole of Poland, one would certainly arrive at a figure 10 to 20 times higher. That would be a sum that could only be paid out over decades and across generations. When one considers that German Federal Republic’s (GFR) final reparation payments to France and Belgium for the First World War were not made until 2010, one gets an idea of the dimensions of such a demand. Shortly after the PiS regained power in 2916 its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, announced that Poland and the GFR had outstanding accounts to settle from the WW II. He went on to say that the issue of war reparations between the neighboring countries had never been resolved. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, GFR’s foreign minister at the time, answered Kaczynski’s claims with a letter stating that Poland had no legal basis for demanding such damages. He reminded Kaczynski of Poland’s relinquishment of reparations in 1953. Poland’s government did indeed waive its right to war reparations from its western neighbor at the time – yet that neighbor was the German Democratic Republic (GDR). A few other interesting points. The GFR has paid billions of dollars over the years in compensation for III Reich crimes, primarily to polish survivors, and acknowledges the country’s responsibility for keeping alive the memory of III Reich atrocities. After WW II, both GFR and GDR were obliged to pay war reparations to the Allied governments, according to the Potsdam Conference. Other Axis nations were obliged to pay war reparations according to the Paris Peace Treaties, 1947 an early plan for a post-war GFR was the Morgenthau plan with terms that would have essentially transformed the GFR to an agrarian society... This position was completely changed by the London Agreement on German External Debts, so called the London Debt Agreement. As a consequence of aggression by the III Reich much of Poland was subjected to enormous destruction of its industry (62% of which was destroyed), its infrastructure (84%) and loss of civilian life (16.7% of its citizens during the war- 10% of them Jews). It is estimated that damages incurred by Poland during WWII total $640 billion in 2004 exchange values. As of 2012, the GFR had paid a total of $89 billion in compensation to victims of the war, in Poland and beyond, and GFR officials continue to meet regularly to revise and expand the guidelines for compensation. All in all, after WW II 17 % of Polish citizens perished, 62 % of industry & 84 % of infrastructure was destroyed. The capital Warsaw was raised to the ground as a result of Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Poland could not benefit from US Marshall Plan as other countries (incl. the GFR) as the Soviets decided for Poland to renounce it. The GFR paying WWI reparations to France in 2010 (92 years after WWI). Polish estimates of the damage the country suffered are in the hundreds of billions of dollars, with a government figure from 1945-47 putting material losses at $850 billion, not including human losses. In 2004, Kaczynski’s late twin brother Lech, as mayor of Warsaw, put the damages to the capital city alone at $45.3 billion. Poland is the biggest net beneficiary of the bloc’s 140 billion-euro ($164 billion) annual budget, having been granted more than 250 billion dollars since entry. The monstrosity of III Reich crimes, not only against Polish Jews but also others, including the 150,000 civilians butchered during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, will forever remain a disgrace and an unforgettable injustice. It is all the more so given that hardly any of those Germans responsible for the deeds were ever brought to account. In 2004 a special commission estimated that damages incurred by the Polish capital alone during WW II amounted to more than $45 billion (38 billion dollars). The commission was convened by Lech Kaczynski, then Warsaw’s mayor. The topic has routinely strained German-Polish relations since the national-conservative party PiS returned to power in 2016. On 23 August 1953, the Communist People’s Republic of Poland under pressure from the Soviet Union announced it would unilaterally waive its right to war reparations from the German Democratic Republic on 1 January 1954, with the exception of reparations for III Reich oppression and atrocities. The GDR in turn had to accept the Oder-Neisse border, which gave around 1/4 of GDR’s historic territory to Poland and the USSR. Poland’s former communist government, agreed in 1953 to not to make any further claims on GDR. Poland’s former Communist government waived its right to German post-war compensation back in 1953, as part of its commitment to “contribute to solving the GDR question in the spirit of democracy and peace.” However, many argue that the agreement was unlawful since the government at the time was under pressure from the Soviet Union, and following the reunification of the GFR in the 1990s the matter has faced new scrutiny. As to the GFR the federal government has claimed that its duty to compensate Poland was denounced in the 1950s but insists that it continues to stand by its moral and financial duties to the victims of the war. The GFR hadn’t paid reparations to non-Jewish recipients for the damage inflicted in Poland. The agreement signed by Mr. Gierek and Mr. Schmidt in 1975 in Warsaw, stipulated that 1.3 billion DM will be paid to Poles who, during Nazi occupation, had paid into GFR’s social security system without receiving pension. After German reunification, Poland demanded reparations again, as a reaction to claims made by German refugee organizations demanding compensation for property and land repossessed by the new Polish state that they were forcibly deported from as a stipulation of the Potsdam Agreement and the mentioned Oder-Neisse border. In 1992, the Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation was founded by the Polish and GFR governments, and as a result GFR paid Polish sufferers ca. 4.7 billion PLN. There is still an ongoing debate among international law experts if Poland still has the right to demand war reparations, with some arguing that the 1954 declaration wasn’t legal. According to a statement made by the German government in 2017, the reparations issue was resolved in 1953 as Poland declined receiving any payments from the GFR. However, it’s worth remembering that in 2004, the Polish government reaffirmed that decision when, in return, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised that the GFR’s government would not support demands for damages lodged by expellees against the Polish government. The decision came about dueto the fact that the GFR had relinquished former eastern territories to Poland as compensation for III Reich war crimes. Poland’s ruling officials are stepping up calls to demand compensation from the GFR for damages caused in WW II, potentially deepening a divide between the European Union’s largest eastern member and the bloc’s biggest economy. Between the collapse of communism in 1989 and 2004 when Poland joined the EU, subsequent governments declared the issue of war reparations from the GFR closed, based on a declaration of the 1953 communist administration in Warsaw and treaties from 1970 and 1990 with the GFR. Presently the Polish parliament’s research office is preparing an analysis of whether Poland can legally make the claim and will have it ready by Aug. 11, 2017 according to Deputy Arkadiusz Mularczyk, a lawmaker with the ruling Law and Justice party who requested the report. One of the reasons that the government is reopening the question may be to demonstrate it isn’t intimidated by the EU’s criticism for democratic backsliding. The bloc has opened an unprecedented probe into Poland over the rule-of-law that’s centered on a government push to strip the judiciary of its independence by giving politicians greater control over the courts. In response to the Poland’s new demand Ulrike Demmer, deputy spokeswoman for the GFR government, said that, while the GFR assumed political, moral and financial responsibility for the WW, the question of restitution was closed. The deputy spokeswoman added, that the GFR has made significant reparations for general war damage, including to Poland, and is still paying significant compensation for III Reich wrongdoing. Further it is stated that the federal government has paid billions over the years in compensation, namely to Polish survivors, for war crimes committed during WW II. The country has also acknowledged its responsibility for keeping alive the memory of atrocities committed by the III Reich. As far as German lawyers and scholars are concerned, the issue was resolved years ago and are not afraid of any possible lawsuit in the International Court of Justice. In 2004, Jochen Frowein, an expert on international law and the former director of the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, along with a Polish historian, came to the conclusion that no such demand by Poland had any chance of being upheld in a court of law – and that remains the case today. In his opinion the question has been “legally resolved and definitively settled.” He also points to the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to the GFR, known also as the Two plus Four Agreement. The agreement, signed in 1990, paved the way for German reunification and also made clear that the GFR would not be responsible to pay any further reparations stemming from WW II. Frowein refutes Polish Defense Minister Senor Antoni Macierewicz’s claim that Poland’s 1953 waiver is invalid because communist Poland was not a sovereign state. “Poland’s 1953 renunciation of reparations claims against the GFR remains valid even today. The fact that the constitutional situation in Poland has changed and that it is no longer a communist state does nothing to change the validity of that declaration. Many other treaties that Poland signed at the time have also remained in effect.

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„Wprowadzenie Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego do Polski”. Studium o polityce transatlantyckiej większości parlamentarnej Zjednoczonej Prawicy (2015–2019)

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Paruch W.

Przegląd Sejmowy

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2020

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nr 2(157)

97–123

EN

“Introducing the North Atlantic Treaty to Poland”. The study of trans-Atlantic policy of the parliamentary majority of the United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica) (2015–2019)

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Polish Democracy Under Threat? An Issue of Mere Politics or a Real Danger?

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Jankovic S.

Baltic Journal of Law & Politics

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2016

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tom 9

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nr 1

49-68

EN

Poland has recently experienced a constitutional crisis. The crisis involves the role of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in the election of judges and amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal Act which threatens the independence of the Tribunal. The situation is exacerbated by changes in the media, civil service, police, and prosecution laws introduced by the ruling party. This article analyses the changes, as well as the domestic and international reactions to the crisis, and considers whether the heavy criticism of the PiS is justified, or whether it results from, for instance, specific characteristics of the Polish political system and an unfavourable opinion in Europe about the Law and Justice party.

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Stanowisko Prawa i Sprawiedliwości wobec wpływu gazociągów Nord Stream 1 oraz Nord Stream 2 na bezpieczeństwo energetyczne państw Europy Środkowej

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Paszkowski M.

Przegląd Zachodni

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2023

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nr 3 (387)

135-148

EN

The Law and Justice Party (PiS) has voiced specific opposition to the construction ofthe Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. Politicians of this party have repeatedlynegatively assessed Russian-German energy cooperation, raising the possibility that CentralEuropean countries may become reliant on Russian Federation energy supplies. Under these circumstances, they emphasized the necessity of implementing projects (such as the LNGterminal in Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe pipeline) to diversify the sources and routes of natural gas supplies to Poland and Central European countries. The aim of the article was to analyse the political thought of Law and Justice on the construction of Russian-German gas pipelines Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 and the impact of these investments on the energysecurity of Central European countries. The starting point of the analysis was the thesis that Law and Justice viewed the construction of the Russian-German gas pipelines as posing a serious threat to Poland and other Central European countries’ ability to secure their energy supplies and took active measures to mitigate that threat. The study, for the most part, analyzes the statements of representatives of various political parties, including those made during sessions of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and in interviews with the media.

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W stronę idealnej wizji dziejów Polski w XX wieku. Polska polityka historyczna po 2015 roku

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Stobiecki R.

Dzieje Najnowsze

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2023

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tom 55

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nr 4

153-182

EN

The article attempts to critically look at the history policy of the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) after 2015, with particular emphasis on the new vision of twentieth-century Polish history created within the PiS framework. According to the author, it is beginning to disturbingly resemble a historical utopia – an ideal picture of the past, with a clear emphasis on the conflict of absolutely understood “good” and “evil”, with model heroes who should become role models for subsequent generations.

PL

Artykuł jest próbą krytycznego spojrzenia na politykę historyczną Prawa i Sprawiedliwości po 2015 r., ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem tworzonej w jej obrębie nowej wizji dwudziestowiecznych dziejów Polski. Zaczyna ona niepokojąco przypominać historyczną utopię – idealny obraz przeszłości, z wyraźnym zaznaczeniem konfliktu absolutnie rozumianego „dobra” i „zła”, z modelowymi bohaterami, którzy winni się stać wzorami dla kolejnych pokoleń.

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The Objectives and Tasks of the Internal Historical Politics Imposed by the Law and Justice Party in the Years 2005–2007

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Słowiński K.

Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne

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2019

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tom 63

185-198

PL

Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie wewnętrznej polityki historycznej Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (PiS) w okresie sprawowania przez tę partię władzy w Polsce w latach 2005–2007. Już od samego początku swej działalności ugrupowanie to przywiązywało niezwykle istotną wagę do kwestii patriotyzmu i pamięci narodowej, czyniąc z nich jeden z głównych filarów swej polityki. Z chwilą objęcia władzy w 2005 r. jej przywódcy wyraźnie zadeklarowali, że ważnym celem ich działań stanie się przywrócenie pamięci historycznej, czemu służyć miało zainicjowanie „nowej polityki historycznej”. Analizując politykę historyczną prowadzoną przez PiS w wymiarze wewnętrznym, należy stwierdzić, że koncentrowała się ona na kilku zasadniczych elementach. Pierwszym z nich było budowanie wśród społeczeństwa postaw patriotycznych. Drugim celem polityki historycznej PiS stało się historyczne rozliczenie czasów komunistycznych. Przeszłość zaczęła być wykorzystywana przez liderów tej formacji także do piętnowania politycznych oponentów. Posłużyła ona także braciom Kaczyńskim jako skuteczne narzędzie mobilizacji własnych sympatyków.

EN

The article deals with the issue of the internal historical politics of Law and Justice party (PiS) during their years of power in 2005–2007. From the very beginning, the party put an extreme importance to the issue of patriotism and national memory, making them one of their main objectives. With the inception of power in 2005, the leaders of this group clearly declared that the important goal of their actions would be to restore historical memory, which was to be initiated by the “new historical politics”. When analyzing the historical policy pursued by Law and Justice in the internal dimension, it should be noted that it focused on several key elements. The first of them was building patriotic attitudes among the Polish society. The historical settlement of the communist times became the second goal of the party’s historical politics. The past has begun to be used by the leaders of this formation also to stigmatize political opponents. Moreover, it served as an effective tool to both Kaczyński brothers for mobilizing their own supporters.

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Kilka uwag o polityce historycznej w Polsce

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Zieliński K.

Wschód Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne

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2022

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tom 8

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nr 1

163-187

EN

Quite a lot has already been written about the historical policy of the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) and the United Right Camp (Obóz Zjednoczonej Prawicy). Some predict its bankruptcy and discredit, others fear the far-reaching consequences of its implementation both for younger generations of Poles and the international standing of the Polish humanities and social sciences. There are voices of support from some historians and political scientists, politicians and the media perceived as sympathetic to the ruling camp and the right-wing. The former calls for full independence and treatment of science as a sphere free of political pressure and influence, while the latter sees historical policy as one of many policies pursued by the state, likening it to economic, social or foreign policy. Regardless of the assessments, the Law and Justice Party in power between 2005 and 2007 gave reality to the concept of 'historical policy' understood as public action in line with specific objectives and instruments. As of 2015, the links between politics and history are very clear, with politicians increasingly effective in imposing the tone of the narrative and pointing the direction of research. This article is an attempt to comment on the historical policy/memory policy after 2015, analyses press statements and comments appearing on Internet and signals the most important areas of disagreement in this matter, also pointing out the risks that, in the author's opinion, state policy in this area entails.

PL

Na temat polityki historycznej Prawa i Sprawiedliwości i Obozu Zjednoczonej Prawicy napisano już sporo. Niektórzy wieszczą jej bankructwo i kompromitację, inni obawiają się skutków jej wdrażania zwłaszcza dla młodszych pokoleń Polaków, i widzą w niej zagrożenie dla polskiej humanistyki i nauk społecznych i ich pozycji międzynarodowej. Ze strony części historyków i politologów, polityków i mediów postrzeganych jako sprzyjające obozowi władzy i prawicowe, płyną głosy poparcia. Ta pierwsza grupa apeluje o pełną niezależność i traktowanie nauki jako sfery wolnej od nacisków i wpływów politycznych, druga politykę historyczną uznaje za jedną z wielu polityk prowadzonych przez państwo, przyrównując ją do polityki gospodarczej, społecznej czy zagranicznej. Niezależnie od ocen, sprawujące władzę w latach 2005–2007 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość urzeczywistniło pojęcie „polityki historycznej” rozumianej jako działanie publiczne zgodne z określonymi celami i instrumentami. Począwszy od 2015 r. związki między polityką i historią są bardzo wyraźne, a politycy coraz skuteczniej narzucają ton narracji i wskazują kierunki badań. Artykuł jest próbą komentarza na temat polityki historycznej/polityki pamięci po 2015 r., autor analizuje w nim wypowiedzi prasowe i komentarze pojawiające się na portalach internetowych i sygnalizuje najważniejsze obszary sporów w tej materii, wskazując na zagrożenia, jakie – w jego ocenie – niesie z sobą polityka państwa w tym zakresie.