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Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
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tom 69
|
nr 5
399 – 408
EN
To put Kierkegaard and psychoanalysis together in a title seems like putting together two different and completely divergent worlds that have no common ground of intersection, standing wide apart, so that any conjunction would seem to be forced and contrived. And yet, despite the radically different context, one could disentangle a common agenda that is played out and where Freud, unwittingly no doubt, takes up a thread that was left suspended in the air by Kierkegaard. The themes that come to the fore are anamnesis and repeating. The comparison is based primarily on Freud’s Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through and Kierkegaard’s Repeating. From the author’s analysis it comes out, that Freud, if red properly, should be placed on the side of repeating.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
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tom 69
|
nr 5
409 – 415
EN
The article tries to show the role and importance of Kierkegaard’s writing The Seducer’s Diary in the frame of his fundamental work Either / Or. What is under scrutiny is not only the dilemma between aesthetical and ethical consciousness, but also the “unhappy consciousness”. The latter has in Kierkegaard – contrary to Hegel’s definition of this concept – strong existential connotations.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
388 – 398
EN
The paper offers an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s original concept of self-choice, which is as a key ethical category in his book Either-Or. The main intention is to shed light on some basic aspects of self-choice, such as the three constitutive parts of choice (freedom, principle of contradiction, and passion) and the two movements in choice (isolation, continuity). The last part of the paper focuses on the issues of criterionlessness and irrationality of choice.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
416 – 422
EN
What is the leap of faith? Is it a “suspension of the ethical”, suspension of the other in a moment of self-transformation of the knight of faith, or is it a monstrous paradox, the inherent ambiguity of existence and impossibility of ethics? – Revealed not just in the problem of “the other of the Other”, but also in the monstrous (feminine Christ's) body for others. Our last question is, how does this aversion influence not only faith as such, but also the possible subversion of “given” norms and values.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
423 – 433
EN
The contribution tackles certain themes in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, which exert more or less direct influence on Heideggers’s phenomenology. The analysis is followed by a more general reflection on the tense relationship between religious thought and philosophy.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
451 – 457
EN
The article provides an analysis of the confrontation with the limits of reason in Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. For both thinkers such a confrontation denotes some sort of “running up against the paradox” that helps human beings to constitute themselves as ethical and/or religious subjects. In contrast with the so-called “austere” interpretation of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard (Conant and others), the seemingly futile running up against the absurdity is presented as a necessary ingredient of a certain view of language and life, i.e. a view that conceives life and language merely as a succession of events and a description of facts. However, the meaning of a certain subset of events and propositions shows itself only if these events are valued in terms of the totality of individual life or state of affairs and if these propositions are accompanied by a wholesome way of living and a wholesome attitude towards the world. For both authors the confrontation with the absurdity is also closely related to the confrontation with madness as a far limit of reasoning.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
443 – 450
EN
The general aim of this article is to contribute to the answer how studying of Kierkegaard could help us to understand societal and political life. The author illustrates Kierkegaard’s usefulness by example of an innovative and illuminative Bellinger’s interpretation of Nazism and Stalinism given in Kierkegaard’s terms of anxiety and stages of existence. Bellinger interprets Hitler and Nazism as an extreme pathological example of the aesthetic stage and anxiety before the good, and Stalinism as an extreme pathological example of the ethical stage and anxiety before the evil. On this basis we may also speak about the importance of Kierkegaard for the understanding of depth motivation for political violence and crime.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
tom 71
|
nr 4
270 – 281
EN
This paper deals with S. Kierkegaard as a political thinker from a viewpoint of consistency of his literary corpus. In the first section it analyses the main aspects of the contemporary interest in Kierkegaard’s political philosophy and suggests that such interest might result in inappropriate expectations and interpretations. The second section deals with Kierkegaard’s authorship and offers a short overview of the works directly proving Kierkegaard’s continuous interest in politics. The third and fourth sections examine Kierkegaard’s criticism of politics and his main argument claiming that the plurality of qualitatively different spheres is being dissolved in the melting pot of politics. Kierkegaard’s rebuff of politics is to be read as a defence of the single individual and of the absolute relation to the absolute. Lastly, in the fifth section, the paper provides an interpretation of several controversial journal entries by Kierkegaard where he maintains that Christian existence is to be indifferent to the political and should not get involved in attempts at changing the world. Against some interprets who tried to mitigate the severity of such utterances, we argue that Kierkegaard understood Christianity as necessarily presupposing hardship and obstacles, whereas the over-amplified facility and ease of life leads to spiritlessness. This, as the paper suggests, is the reason why Kierkegaard refused to present positive political solutions to the socio-political problems of his time.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
434 – 442
EN
The article deals with Gadamer’s reception of Kierkegaard, especially in his fundamental work Truth and Method. It sheds light on his role in creating some of the basic concepts of philosophical hermeneutics. The purpose of the paper is neither to give a hermeneutic interpretation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy nor to discuss the reception of Kierkegaard’s philosophy within the so-called hermeneutic philosophy or hermeneutic phenomenology, taking into account, that the very position of hermeneutic phenomenology within contemporary philosophy still remains undecided. Even less determined is its disposition regarding the contemporaneity of philosophy.
|
2004
|
tom 13
|
nr 1(49)
107-123
EN
The leading question of the article is whether repetition can safeguard what is particular from being subsumed under the universal. To this query, a related problem is appended, of whether an individual can be freed from the strictures of history, and whether history allows repetition occasionally failing to obliterate all that has already occurred. In other words repetition is presented as a space in which time, cultural dependencies and transcendence can be investigated. Three authors are discussed in this context. Freud finds repetition to be a disease symptom that is triggered by a failure to gratify instinct. Nietzsche emphasises the impossibility to construct an ego that is transparent to itself, and uses the idea of eternal returns to dispel the illusion of a holistic ego. Kierkegaard views repetition as a process that unifies particular experiences into a continuous whole that makes it possible to an individual to undertake a positive auto-creation.
EN
In the history of Kierkegaard studies, A Literary Review has often been hailed as the Danish philosopher’s main contribution to the field of social-political philosophy. Although this aspect of the work has been explored in some detail, only few commentators have taken the time to study the background of it, i.e., the book which Kierkegaard purports to analyse in the review, namely Two Ages by Thomasine Gyllembourg. The present article explores the relation between Gyllembourg’s novel and A Literary Review with an eye to determining what influence Gyllembourg’s work might have had on Kierkegaard. It is argued that Gyllembourg’s novel served primarily as an occasion for Kierkegaard to further develop ideas that he was already concerned with previously in connection with his authorship.
EN
This paper offers a systematic overview of the aspects of Heidegger’s Being and Time that are concerned with the understanding of human sociality. Three dimensions of Heidegger’s analysis are distinguished: self-being, caring-with and being-with-one-another. These dimensions can be enacted in different modalities on the spectrum of unownedness and ownedness. To keep matters simple, the author focuses on the unowned and owned extremes, distinguishing anyone-self and owned self, leaping in and leaping ahead solicitude, as well as the anyone and a people. His discussion of these key terms of the analysis in Being and Time focuses on investigating Kierkegaard’s role in the development of Heidegger’s thought.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
tom 69
|
nr 5
378 – 387
EN
Theodor Haecker (1879 – 1945) was an influential commentator, translator and promoter of Kierkegaard’s philosophy during the era of the German “Kierkegaard Renaissance.” In 1914 he published the translation of one part of Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review (1846) to which he attached a twenty-five-page-long Afterword. In the Afterword he engaged in a sharp polemic against the contemporary cultural and political liberalism promoted in certain German periodicals. He based his criticism on Kierkegaard’s findings concerning the levelling role of the modern press. Haecker’s translation and commentary create a philosophical continuum that attests to the lasting relevance of Kierkegaard’s thought. They influenced the thinking of a number of German-speaking philosophers, such as K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, F. Ebner and T. W. Adorno.
|
2008
|
tom 17
|
nr 1(65)
101-109
EN
Kierkegaard was a fierce critic of ecclesiastic institutions. His objections were mainly directed against arbitrary deviations from the letter of the New Testament, which had led to pernicious dichotomies: a fighting church versus a triumphant church, an imitator versus an admirer. He argued against theses spurious distinctions that the essence of Christianity lay purely in the existential effort of an individual who stands firmly by his/her religion, who perseveres in an act of faith before God and who follows the ways of Christ. Consequently Kierkegaard deprecated mass movements in the church and deplored religious communality that arose from a close cooperation between the church and the state. The church must be concerned with supernatural issues, the state has only earthly interests. Their domains should be kept separate. The church should only apply herself to the transmission of the message of the New Testament and to its defense.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
tom 71
|
nr 4
282 – 291
EN
The paper identifies four models of social involvement in Kierkegaard’s treatise The Single Individual. These models are embodied in four figures discussed by Kierkegaard: the professional leader of the crowd, the truth-witness, the politician who loves being a human being and loves humankind, and Kierkegaard himself as an author. The paper explores the motives, stances, activities and goals of these figures. It analyses their attitudes to the single individual and the crowd, as well as to politics. The investigation develops against the background of Martin Buber’s claim that Kierkegaard makes a demand on the single individual to withdraw from political life and renounce any ambition to form it.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
tom 70
|
nr 9
726 – 735
EN
In 1914 Theodor Haecker presented Kierkegaard to the German-speaking public as a social critic, when he published the translation of a fragment from Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review (1846). The translation inspired several influential authors of the interwar period, who commented on the condition of the society of that time. One of them was Karl Jaspers who believed that Kierkegaard’s views were more relevant in the 20th century than they were in the 19th century. In his work The Spiritual Condition of the Age (1931/1932) Jaspers adopted several motifs from Kierkegaard’s critique of society. In the present paper the author examines thematic points of intersection of Kierkegaard’s reflections on the public and Jaspers’ reflections on the mass. He elucidates also Kierkegaard’s and Jaspers’ views on excellence, envy, levelling and modern media. Both thinkers provide original and incisive analyses of the decadent features of modern society.
|
2007
|
tom 56
|
nr 4
477-497
EN
The aim of the text is to analyse the character of Nastasya Filippovna (from Dostoevsky's novel 'The Idiot') and to explain her paradox through the notions of anxiety and despair taken from the philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard. The psychological, theological, and philosophical descriptions in 'The Concept of Anxiety' (concerning anxiety) and 'Sickness unto Death' (concerning despair) are referred to moments from the heroine's life, to her and other characters' expressions, and to the theses and interpretations concerning Nastasya's character expressed by researchers of Dostoevsky's works. Kierkegaard's and Dostoevsky's understanding of a man was strongly influenced by the perspective of Christian faith, itself paradoxical and incomprehensible. From the point of view of the Danish philosopher, Barashkova's absurd deeds may be understood (and explained) as resulting from her anxiety about her own 'original sin', which she had not committed, but whose commitment she, misled by her own innocence, took for granted and started to make desperate attempts to ensure herself that she had already been lost for the rest of eternity. For this reason, she ran away from Prince Lev Myshkin many times, although until the very end he kept offering her his help and an opportunity to lead a respectable life. Deeds of Nastasya Filippovna can be understood as an evidence for her despair, which, described by Kierkegaard as 'sickness unto death', is the other phenomenon leading to eternal loss. For the Danish philosopher, despair is the greatest sin itself, as it is the reverse of faith: lack of it. A man who did not lose his faith believes that God can forgive any sin, since for the Lord nothing is impossible. Nastasya lacks this faith and therefore, from Kierkegaard's point of view, she seems to be eternally lost. However, some researchers of Dostoevsky's works (as e.g. Elzbieta Mikiciuk) claim, that the symbolic presence of the suffering Christ in Nastasya's life to its very end in Rogozhin's house (cf. Holbein's painting of 'Christ in the Grave', considering the meaning of the woman's name: Anastasis – 'resurection', and 'barashek' - ‘Lamb') is the manifestation of the Christian hope for the unhappy woman, as her suffering was much deeper and stronger than her sins. Therefore the described heroine of Dostoevsky's novel seems to be the evidence for the paradoxical role of anxiety, despair and suffering in the existence perceived from the Christian point of view.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
tom 71
|
nr 4
257 – 269
EN
The paper tries to clarify Kierkegaard’s apolitical standpoint as an integral part of his philosophy. Kierkegaard’s apoliticism is understood here as a principled stand of a deeply religious thinker based on the essential discrepancy between Christianity and politics. The author shows that Kierkegaard preaches programmatic indifference of Christianity to any kind of politics and that all political interpretations of Kierkegaard are therefore indeed misinterpretations; moreover, they are in contrast with Kierkegaard’s central philosophical categories such as the single individual, inwardness, freedom and eternity. The paper results in the analysis of his sharp criticism of the union of Christianity and the state.
EN
Carl Schmitt sees the year of 1848 as the critical point of the 19th century. With reference to the events of that year the Communist line of interpretation was constituted which explains the 19th century through the prism of the continuity of the revolutionary movement’s development. The symbol of this continuity is The Communist Manifesto which connects the revolutionary events of 1848 and 1917. Against this tradition of interpretation Schmitt promotes a different line of interpretation based on an alternative continuity. Although the group of thinkers belonging to this line is relatively heterogeneous Schmitt identifies three diagnostic-prognostic moments that connect them. Included in this line are both Søren Kierkegaard and Juan Donoso Cortés, whose respective contributions he analyses. His parallel reading of these authors includes a problematic exposition of some aspects of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.
EN
The main purpose of the article is to analyse the category of metaphysical boredom. It is understood as a principle of existence, an irremovable feature of existence (defined mainly in Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy). This kind of boredom is very close to the category of romantic boredom which is an essential element of the romantic worldview and part of romantic existence. First of all, it appears to be a border experience (in the existential and cognitive sense) which constitutes the identity of the romantics. It denotes a state in which a question may be asked about the sense of existence. This leads to a description of the world in which existence is treated as nothingness. In this case boredom turns out to be a confrontation with the fact that one is condemned to existence. The bored subject has the feeling of being imprisoned in its own existence and suspended in the world defined as an abyss in which one cannot fi nd any point of support. It is in boredom that one embraces the whole existence: the bored subject sees a possibility of not existing, it perceives the world the way it is, as insignifi cant, fragile and chaotic. Słowacki and Witkacy were two great writers who wanted to explore boredom. In their works and biographies we can find examples of such boredom — showing very clearly that existence is infected by nothingness and the world is deprived of any ordering principles. A detailed analysis of the writers’ letters (mostly Słowacki’s letters to his mother and Witkacy’s letters to his wife) reveals a picture of boredom that is absolute, total, all-embracing and irremovable. Boredom is neither a transition state, nor a temporary mood. It does not exist at the emotional level. Boredom pervades everything; it becomes “air”, an irremovable element of existence. That is why one has to understand it as metaphysical boredom: as a feature of existence, a principle of existence and nothingness that is everywhere. Both the biographies of the two writers (which, as the letters show, were a constant fight with boredom) and their works (many of which were dedicated to boredom) are extremely important contributions to the discussion about the notion of boredom.
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