Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Koncepcje geopolityczne obozu narodowego w latach II wojny światowej

100%

Grott B.

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nr 11

173-191

PL

The Second World War and the anticipated victory over the Third Reich, together with the significant weakening of the USSR, became in Poland the reason for developing various new geopolitical concepts and plans for reshaping Poland’s previous borders. The menace of a new aggression from both of Poland’s powerful neighbours in the process to rebuild their previous positions of power brought forward the idea of a federation of middle-Eastern Europe countries (the so-called „Intermarium”) and a future creation of a sufficient barrier against possible aggressors. In Poland these issues were broadly discussed by the nationalistic fractions such as the National Party, the Confederation of the Nation, the Szaniec Group and the „Fatherland” Organisation. The latter two were especially productive in this area. There was a general agreement in the nationalist movement regarding the necessity to move Poland’s borders to the lower Oder and the Lusatian Neisse. Some concepts reached even further, planning the creation of a Lusatian Coutry or indeed the reslavisation of Mecklenburg. Especially active in this regard was Professor Karol Stojanowski, the leader of the People’s National Military Organisation and the author of brochures propagating ideas such as „The West Slavic Country” and „The Reslavisation of Eastern Germany”. A very interesting concept of the „Great Nation” was presented by an endecian ideologist Adam Doboszyński in a brochure of the same title, in which Doboszyński propagated not only the federation of the „Intermarium” countries, but also predicted a gradual merging of these nations into a single „Great Nation” and even the eventual development of a common language.

2

Inicjatywa Trójmorza z perspektywy niemieckiej

100%

Dahl M.

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tom 2

59-72

EN

The acquisition in 2015 of power in Poland by national-conservative party Law and Justice led to a change in priorities of Polish foreign policy. The Intermarium initiative understood as a closer cooperation of the eastern European Union states between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea became a new instrument of Polish foreign policy. For historical reasons, the initiative of the Intermarium is associated with a similar concept, pushed through Poland in the 1920s, which was focused to create an alliance of Central European countries aimed at more effective protection against Russian expansion and German hegemony. In this context, the article aims to find the answer, how the Polish Intermarium initiative is a subject of public debate in Germany and how it affects foreign policy pursued by Germany.

3

The prospect of Intermarium integration in the light of consumption risk sharing

100%

Beck K. , Shtunderenko J.

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nr 3(49)

20-34

EN

Objectives: After the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the idea of joining a prosperous bloc, which would provide financial assistance, seemed an opportunity not to be missed. However, with the possibility of the funding drying up, and the initial feeling of euphoria fading, the alignment of CEE and Western Europe on values was put to a test. This gave way to discussions about alternatives to the EU. One of them is Intermarium. This paper examines the potential benefits Intermarium countries could attain in terms of consumption risk sharing. Aims: The research takes an alternative approach to economic integration, concentrating on economic stability. In particular, it makes an empirical analysis of consumption risk sharing in Intermarium, as well as drawing a comparison with the EU and the euro zone core. Research Design & Methods: The paper uses method of risk sharing assessment proposed by Kose et al. (2009) extended by the authors to accommodate panel data setting. Findings: As the empirical results illustrate, the past integration between the old EU and its new member states weakened the Intermarium mechanisms of consumption insurance, especially in comparison to the euro zone countries. Implications / Recommendations: The potential benefits of Intermarium fall short of the EU alternative. Contribution / Value added: The paper presents the results of the first examination of the extension of risk sharing in Intermarium countries.

4

Kwestia pograniczy w regionie Międzymorza (notatki wstępne)

88%

Szaruga L.

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tom 3: Elity w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej po roku 1989

57 - 63

EN

The article discusses the issue of moving borders of the area of Intermarium (Polish: Międzymorze) comprising the states located within the area demarcated by the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, from Greece to Finland. An essential fact is that the communities of the countries between Russia and Western Europe, deprived of political independence in the 19th and 20th centuries and conforming to the treaties of the world powers, did not have an influence on forming their own territories. The text also emphasizes the specificity of historical experience of the countries of the mentioned region which were under pressure of both Nazi and Bolshevik forms of totalitarianism in the 20th century.

5

CONCEPTION OF INTERMARIUM IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY IN XXI CENTURY

88%

Tomaszewska N. , Starzyk A.

Torun International Studies

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2017

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nr 10

15-28

EN

Poland interests and her policy are strongly determined by her geopolitical conditions. More than 40 years of people democracy under USSR domination brings in whole region civilization and economic backwardness. After 1989 Poland attempts to “catch up” the Old Europe. Initiative of Three Seas is one of such attempt. Increasing relations with central and southern Europe especially in case of diversification of raw materials – like gas – can bring to region an independence from Russian supplies. Three Seas goes back to conception of Intermarium, and redefine her on amended conditions of modern world. In this article the Authors will present short history of conception Intermarium, main assumptions of polish foreign policy and will try to answer the question is this conception is still present in polish foreign policy, even if in changed form of Three Seas.

6

Geopolityka środkowoeuropejskiej solidarności. Polacy i Węgrzy między historią, stereotypem a uwarunkowaniami przestrzenno-politycznymi

71%

Adamczyk A.

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nr 1

195-214

EN

The Polish-Hungarian relationship remains something extraordinary on a European scale. Although the consciousness of the societies of both nations is dominated by a positive perception of mutual relations, it was not a constant phenomenon in history. It was most intense when both countries resisted the domination of the Germanic element. Hungary was the first to lose its independence, succumbing to the Eastern factor. Also Poland shared the fate of Hungary, succumbing to pressure from both the east and the west. Historical experience of both countries showed the necessity to cooperate against threats coming from both directions. However, the conditions after 1886 were not conducive to the implementation of this assumption, although in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Poles and Hungarians had geopolitical visions defining the scale of possible transformations in Central Europe. The change came after the end of World War II. Regardless of the naturally existing discrepancies in the perception of one’s surroundings, in the 21st century it is difficult to indicate any Polish geopolitical concept that does not take into account the regional role of Hungary, or the Hungarian one that ignores the Republic of Poland.

PL

Stosunki polsko-węgierskie pozostają czymś niezwykłym na skalę europejską. Choć w świadomości społeczeństw obu narodów dominuje pozytywne postrzeganie wzajemnych relacji, nie było to zjawisko stale występujące w historii. Najintensywniej zachodziło, gdy oba kraje opierały się dominacji pierwiastka germańskiego. Węgry jako pierwsze utraciły niepodległość, ulegając naciskom ze Wschodu. Również Polska podzieliła los Węgier, ulegając presji zarówno ze Wschodu, jak i Zachodu. Doświadczenia historyczne obu krajów pokazały konieczność współdziałania wobec zagrożeń płynących z obu kierunków. Warunki po 1886 roku nie sprzyjały realizacji tego założenia, choć w XIX i XX wieku Polacy i Węgrzy snuli wizje geopolityczne określające skalę możliwych przemian w Europie Środkowej. Zmiana nastąpiła po zakończeniu II wojny światowej. Niezależnie od naturalnie występujących rozbieżności w postrzeganiu własnego otoczenia, w XXI wieku trudno wskazać polską koncepcję geopolityczną, która nie uwzględnia regionalnej roli Węgier, czy też węgierską, ignorującą Rzeczpospolitą Polską.

7

Polityka handlowa rządów sanacji wobec koncepcji Międzymorza

63%

Kuryk D.

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nr 2

97-116

EN

Until today, the years 1919-1939, i.e. the interwar period, is sometimes presented as the time of the clash of two outstanding personalities - Jozef Pilsudski and Roman Dmowski. Only the former was able to take over the full political power in the country, and thus - an almost unlimited possibility of implementing his own political vision, including into this impact on Poland's position on the geopolitical chessboard. After gaining power in May 1926, he had a chance to implement his concept of the Intermarium, i.e. an informal alliance of states in the Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea area. This idea was not put into practice and the trade policy pursued by the authorities of the Second Commonwealth of Poland was a significant reason for it. This policy was completely unsuited to the needs of integration with the states of the three seas. It was clearly protectionist in nature and thus export-oriented, which was most evident during the crisis of the 1930s.

PL

Do dziś lata 1919-1939, czyli okres dwudziestolecia międzywojennego, są przedstawiane jako czas starcia dwóch wybitnych osobowości – Józefa Piłsudskiego i Romana Dmowskiego. Tylko pierwszemu z nich dane było przejąć pełnię władzy politycznej w kraju, a co za tym idzie – prawie nieograniczoną możliwość realizowania własnych wizji politycznych, w tym tych dotyczących położenia Polski na szachownicy geopolitycznej. Po zdobyciu władzy w maju 1926 r. pojawiła się przed nim szansa urzeczywistnienia wysuwanej przez siebie koncepcji Międzymorza, czyli nieformalnego sojuszu państw obszaru bałtycko-adriatycko-czarnomorskiego. Idea ta nie została wcielona w życie i wydatnym tego powodem była prowadzona przez władze II Rzeczypospolitej polityka handlowa. Była ona kompletnie nienastawiona na potrzeby integracji z państwami rejonu trzech mórz. Miała ona wyraźnie protekcjonistyczny charakter, a tym samym proeksportowe nastawienie, co było najlepiej widoczne w czasie kryzysu lat trzydziestych.