This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Not only did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, although they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space-God relationship. Moreover, it was just a conceptual disagreement, since the identification of space with an attribute of God is to be found not only by Leibniz but also by Newton, as well as by his defender Samuel Clarke. Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.