The efficiency of international law in resolving historical problems depends on the belief of states in law as an implement for ordering their mutual relations. States' uniformity of views concerning the past, as well as their common expectations for the future, are decisive in the formation of this belief. Common appreciation of the past is of particular significance, because international legal rules and norms are the result of historical experiences. Consequently, lack of common vision of the past is responsible in practice for the discrepancy between 'Sein' and 'Sollen'. As Philip Allott pointed out, international law is a bridge between our past and future. However, unless there is a common consent on history by states and nations, this bridge is fragile. As a result, rules and norms of international law are not able to overcome the toxic past of nations, as is evident in, e.g., contemporary Polish-Russian relations. What is more, lack of a common understanding of history by states and nations connected by a common past can even lead to an exacerbation of unresolved historical disputes. Recently, this has been demonstrated in the case of Kosovo, where the weakness of international law is manifested.
Since the early 1990s Georgia has attempted to regain control of its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while Russia adopted the divide et impera policy. The content of armistice agreements (1992, 1994) reflects Georgia’s military defeats. On the former Soviet Union territory, peacekeeping forces are tolerated by Moscow only when composed of Russian troops or of parties involved in the conflict. Both sides considered the military option. Moscow was waiting for an occasion to lure Georgia into a trap. If South Ossetia were recognized as a de facto regime, it could claim its right to self-defence and call upon Russia for help. Russia invoked this claim only incidentally. If, however, South Ossetia was not a de facto regime, Georgia’s use of force against irregular groups cannot be considered as aggression and does not fall under the self-defence concept of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Russian operation had no legal grounds in the UN Security Council decision and did not meet the conditions for humanitarian intervention, nor those for a pre-emptive operation. Russia’s only plea was the defence of its armed forces attacked in South Ossetia (self-defence, Art. 51 UN Charter) but the scale and the territorial reach of Moscow’s reaction was excessive. It is meaningful that Russian troops also entered Abkhazia. Russia called upon the protection of its citizens abroad and invoked its Constitution as well as the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. This last argument cannot be accepted because it refers to the state’s obligation to protect its citizens within its territory. Recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia by other states will be hard given the universal disapproval of Moscow’s decision. The contemporary international practice is reluctant to recognize a seceding entity against the wishes of the state from which it has purported to secede. The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the basis of agreements made by Russia with these entities contravene earlier armistice agreements (August 12th and September 8th 2008).
This paper analyzes the principle of presumption of innocence, which means that, in criminal proceedings, anyone against whom criminal proceedings are held is deemed innocent until found guilty by a court rendering a final judgment of conviction. This principle is enshrined in Section 2(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The principle of presumption of innocence is closely intertwined with the principle of presumption of an honest person (presumptio boni viri), which is applied in Anglo-American procedural law and construed as a principle that everyone is deemed honest unless proven otherwise. Today, the presumption of innocence is enshrined in many international instruments, e.g. in Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is expressed also in Article 50(2) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
During the 70s and 80s of the last century a few new items of the codification´s agenda of International Law Commission (ILC) concerning the international intergovernmental organizations (IGO) have appeared. Heretofore results the ILC work confirm the analysis of this new item from three angles. The main goal of the first was to prepare the set of uniform rules for regulation certain common activities of IGOs regardless of their legal and factual specificities. Similarily as in the agenda concerning states a different level of codification and/or progressive development of international may be identified depending on the „ripeness“ of concrete topic for the purpose of codification.The final results of the ILC work represent four international treaties and one Draft of articles. As regards as international treaties it should be noted Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of Universal charater of 1975, Vienna Convention on the Succession of States with respect of Treaties 1978, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations of between International Organizations of 1986 and finally Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations of 2011.Excepting Vienna Convention of 1975 the Commision has dealt with similar problems namely whether a to what extent the rules of IGOs should have the priority over the codified rules prepared by ILC. Concrete articles of treaties and/or draft articles solve this question regarding the specifities of each concrete topic. As regards as second aspect of ILC work it evaluated the impact of different „external“ factors on the IGOs selected acts and/or activities. The relevent results are presented by the Draft Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflict on Treaties 2011 and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents of 1973.
The author focuses on the question of the independence of the Kosovo. The matter of the Kosovo's independence has been and remains very controversial. International law is the only universally acceptable language for discussing such a controversial issue, one where the international community of states at large, as well as the smaller and closer communities of the EU and NATO member states, seem to be deeply divided. It is important to admit the failure of the UN Security Council, its subsidiary bodies, and in particular some permanent members of the SC, as well as other States which encouraged or at least made possible the legal morass by recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. We can hope that the International Court of Justice, as the principle judicial organ of the United Nations, will remedy the failure of other UN bodies and bring international law back on the scene. The Court is not able to change the factual situation in Kosovo, but it can provide legal guidance for a sustainable solution.
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The article synthetically presents international law instruments referring to the handling of persons sentenced to imprisonment and serving a sentence between countries of which one is the country where the sentence was pronounced (the country of the sentence pronouncement or the sentencing country) and the other is the country of the convict's citizenship or residence (the country of the sentence execution or the executing country).
The authoress presents the issue of international ethics or morality as one of the few normative systems that regulate international relations (inter alia next to international law or political norms). The article begins with the description of levels at which ethics in international relations is present - the level of individuals, of states, of international community). The authoress attempts to compare international law and ethics and points to differences between those two normative systems and manners of distinguishing legal norms from moral ones. The emphasis is laid on the idiosyncrasy of morality (ethics). Finally she analyses the reasons for growing importance of the ethics as well as the obstacles in that process.
This paper depicts significant events, as well as important doctrines, which affected the traditional comprehension of the terms “international armed conflict” and “non-international armed conflict”, thus showing the process of adapting this distinction from the realm of facts to the realm of law. Although the division between international and non-international armed conflicts is quite old, it was not until the mid-20th century when it was first incorporated in international law. Before the Article 3 common to four Geneva Conventions was established, international law had been dealing only with rights and duties of parts to the international conflicts, regarding non-international conflicts as internal affairs of particular states. Because for many years it had been pointless to seek for norms of international law which generally and abstractly would determine humanitarian standards in case of an outbreak of internal conflict, regulations incorporated in Geneva Conventions of 1949 were first regarded as huge success. Nevertheless, currently they are commonly considered to be too vague and not precise enough. Moreover, they seem to be inadequate to modern armed conflicts – so called “transnational conflicts” or “new wars”, which do not fit in legal frames of “international armed conflict” or “non-international armed conflict”, created over 60 years ago.
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The author of the article presented a document which is obscure in the Polish specialist literature concerning political science and law, i.e. the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1991, in the new political situation, i.e. at the beginning of the creation of the foundation of a new Russian state. The author shows the importance of the document considering a few basic aspects: for the first time in the history of Russian law, it is opened for international law in such a fundamental scope as human rights and their protection; in its content, the document refers to the historical sources of legal and natural concept of human rights and in a broader sense to the idea of a democratic country's law; it transfers the fundamental human rights standards and institutional protection of these rights onto the ground of the new Russian legislation in the way in which they were determined in the basic contemporary international documents, first of all in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; as a result, the discussed document means the end of the Soviet Union legal tradition based on the idea of legal positivism. It was emphasized that the Declaration had a crucial importance because in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic all the provisions of the Declaration were included in the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. That is why the author acknowledges that the Declaration is a foundation of the Constitution of the new Russian state. Constitutionalisation of the Declaration enables a comparison of solutions referring to the basis of the idea of a state of law according to the following essential order: in the international documents, in the Declaration, in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This comparison shows a complete convergence of the adopted solutions within the above-mentioned triad. Furthermore, the comparison (although in a limited scope) of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation with the constitutions of selected democratic countries shows even more distinctly that the most fundamental contemporary standards referring to human rights and their protection were transferred to the Russian law. In the last part of the article, the author discussed one more document - the Commonwealth of Independent States Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also open to international law in this scope and convergent in its provisions with the content of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The author also presented a general outline of the political and legal background to the development of the principles of the Russian Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
The issue of humanitarian intervention and debates about it have become one of the most controversial questions in contemporary 'ius ad bellum'. The aim of the article is to discuss a validity of humanitarian intervention in the context of just war tradition. The prohibition of the threat or use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, is currently the subject of fundamental disagreement. There is comparable agreement neither states nor scholars on the exact scope of the prohibition. Controversies especially concern so-called 'unilateral humanitarian intervention', that is use of force in pursuit of human rights without express authority from the Security Council. The author argues that just war tradition seems to be an useful tool for solving difficulties surrounding the issue of validity of humanitarian intervention. The just war tradition offers a coexistence of two fundamental values of the international society, that is justice and peace. According to this tradition peace cannot be established without justice, and vice versa justice cannot exist without peace. That is why the tradition can serve as a medium protecting both human rights and international peace and security. Thus one can speak of a 'new life' of the just war tradition in today's international law.
The article aims at contributing to the current expert discussion that considers different ways how to derogate the amnesties proclaimed by the President of the Slovak Republic. Different stances exist with regard the issue under consideration: coherence with the international law, violation of international obligations by the Slovak republic, the non-retroactivity issue. The international law acknowledges exemptions from the non-retroactivity principle with regard to treaties. Was it possible to explore per analogiam the international law experience with respect to amnesties derogation? Priority of the international obligations is in force with respect to the Slovak republic to the domestic law regulations.
The application of international law fulfills important task whereas enables the practical exercise of regulatory functions of its concrete rules in the international practice. In this respect it should be firstly noted that implementation of international law into domestic legal order is generally required by states as a necessary precondition for its application. Taking into account the absence of international rule prescribing specific form and manner of implementation, the relevant practice of the states is decisive. Within the states preferring the monist conception the direct application of international treaties (self executing treaties) is possible. Relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) should be respected (namely Articles 25, 28, 29, 31) within the process of direct application of international treaties and their breach raises the international responsibility of states. The same requirement has to be complied with respect of application of international treaties by international organizations. There is no room for direct application of international treaties within states preferring dualist conception whereas the content of each treaty has to be obligatory transformed into specific kind of domestic legal regulation. Regarding the application of customary international law, the practice of states in principle confirms that they are not formally implemented into domestic legal orders of states and public bodies usually apply customary international law directly. The diversity of the judgments of international judicial bodies and decisions of international organizations prevent any attempt of states to apply them in a uniform manner. Similarly, as in the case of international treaties, there are no rules prescribing their specific application and different practice of states enjoy the leading role in the application of the international obligations arising from the international judgments and decisions.
The text focuses on a role which recognition, justice and democracy play in the era of global disputes and mass media distortions. It deals with problems of misrecognition, injustice and democratic deficit mainly from European and Latin American perspectives, particularly from the points of view of Central Europe and Brazil. It points out the issues of social and political justice, extraterritorial recognition, participation in economic and political democracy, especially concerning international and transnational legal frameworks.
The content of this article was presented at the 16th Annual Meeting of the Autumn School of Law “The Changes of the Rule of Law” organized by the Institution of State and Law of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (11.-19. november 2011 in Modra Harmonia).One of the most remarkable feature of the past century represents the process of the “gradual externalization” of the rule of law principles (originally rooted within the internal legal order of states) on the “higher” level of international legal order. This process has been accompanied by a number of problems due to particularities of international legal order and its differences (with the comparison of domestic legal orders of states).Despite this facts some concrete results of this process have been achieved and following segments of international rule of law are today generally recognized both in the practice of states and legal writing of international law. International normativity today represents dynamic segment of international rule of law with regard of the increasing scope of its regulation combined with specialization and the tendency of universality in more important topics of international law. In its entirety represents less or more detailed and/or efficient measure in order to exclude or at least to reduce the room for wilful (arbitrary) conduct of states and other subjects of international law. Principle of legal equality of states can be also observed within the segment of international normativity. Generally speaking its main purpose is to guarantee equal position of all states vis á vis the system of international law including the process of creation of its rules (both conventional and customary), process of its formal validity, the process of their practical application by equal and non discriminatory manner in relation to all state parties of valid international treaties etc. Unlike of domestic legal orders of states where the application of responsibility is regularly preceded by the decision (s) of independent judicial bodies the situation within the segment of international normativity is different. The principal reason of such difference consists in a lack of obligatory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies. There is a general consensus that the acceptation of obligatory jurisdiction of international courts would strengthen the role of rule of law especially in the sphere of so called secondary rules of international law and their enforceability.
In its Judgment of 25 September 1997, the Court asserted that Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989, the works on the Nagymaros project and on the part of the Gabčíkovo project for which it was responsible. Czechoslovakia was entitled to proceed, in November 1991, to the “provisional solution“. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia was not entitled to put into operation, from October 1992. The Court decided that Hungary and Slovakia must negotiate in good faith in the light of the prevailing situation and must take all necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the said Treaty, in accordance with such modalities as they might agree upon. Hungary was to compensate Slovakia for the damage sustained by Czechoslovakia and by Slovakia. Slovakia was to compensate Hungary for the damage it had sustained because of the putting into operation of the dam. In 1998, Slovakia filed in a request for an additional Judgment in the case. Slovakia considered such a Judgment necessary because of the unwillingness of Hungary to implement the Judgment. After the filing by Hungary of a statement of its position on Slovakia’s request, the Parties resumed negotiations and informed the Court on a regular basis of the progress in them.
Current development of International law encourage us to rethink well-established theory of monism and dualism explaining the relationship between International and Municipal law.1 New ideas of the relationship of legal orders are emerging mainly in the European region which is affected by the legal order of European Union. These ideas are related to the theory of legal pluralism. Although increasing constitutionalism and fragmentation undermine its foundations, the pluralism is still one of the best solutions how to deal with the new role of International law (which now also govern the fields so far covered just by national law), relationship between International, European and Municipal law or internationalization of the constitutional law. Basic idea of the pluralism is existence of no hierarchy, so we can apply norm of this legal order which is the best for the protection of the values common for all legal orders.
The relationship between international and national law has been traditionally defined by the theories of monism and dualism. These theories became established in a period when it was argued about the primacyof international law over national law or vice versa, or whether international law can be regarded as an autonomous legal system worth of adherence. However, the ideas have been replaced by reflections on the relationship between legal systems as such, in particular in the European area, where European law has wedged in between international and national law. The European Union continuously strengthens the autonomy of European law; therefore we present several considerations on the influence of European law as another legal order applicable by authorities of the member states on the relationship between the laws in conditions of the European region. Although the theory of pluralisn is not a generally established and respected theory describing the relationship among international, European and national laws, a variety of different considerations lead us to review our view of this relationship. They include new function of international law, European regionalism and internationalization of constitutional law and other concepts, which were initially only applicable to national law. Also these reasons bring the ideas on legal pluralism of laws to the foreground. However, there are also considarations, which undermine the position of pluralism as a suitable theory for the relationship among international, European and national laws, such as fragmentation of international law undermining the legal certainty in international law or constitutionalism at global or European level.
The article deals with the topical issues of pension security - positioning of the Slovak second pillar within the European and global context of pension security. The author refers to the constitutional and international obligations of the Slovak Republic to ensure certain rate of replacement of income after attainment of the pension age, which is currently 40%. If benefits from so-called second pillar were not taken into consideration, a large number of citizens of SR would not achieve this amount of allowance from the first pillar only. Another argument in favour of the inclusion of the capitalization pillar in the system of social security law is, by the author´s opinion, also the fact that at world level the characteristics of our second pillar are attributed to the first pillar. On the other hand, the world second pillar has the characteristics of the Slovak third pillar. Moreover, the recent coordination regulation of EU places the old-age pension saving schemes under the regime of this regulation, which explicitly excludes only schemes belonging to the world second pillar (within the meaning of the Slovak third pillar).
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