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EN
Hitler did not hide the fact that he was a firm opponent of democracy. The analysis of his many statements indicates that he substantiated his anti-democratic argumentation with various contentions. He primarily accentuated crucial role played in national life by great individuals. He constantly repeated that great inventions are a result of great personalities’ efforts and not a consequence of majority’s endeavor. Democracy is nothing but a rule of the mediocre and the average; it destroys personality. He also claimed that parliamentarian democracy is closely linked with Jewry. The analysis of this fragment of Hitler’s rhetoric shows that he employed arguments which had been well-known for a long time (for example Plato’s statement that it is difficult to choose boat’s helmsman by vote). The prevalent majority of these arguments can be found on the pages of textbooks on history of political philosophy. Hitler only put them forward in much more primitive, or even brutal, form. Against the background of the above-mentioned arguments, Hitler’s attitude towards the institution of referendum during the Weimar period is provided. Hitler and NSDAP were involved with the referendum initiative concerning the rejection of the Young’s Plan but refused to participate in the referendum initiative which was supposed to lead to the strengthening of presidential powers. According to Hitler, referendums should only be employed to gain approval for already committed deeds. That was a meaning of referendums organized in 1933, 1934, 1936 and 1938 which Hitler linked with popular elections. They only provided elements of democratic decorum but they were of no account as far as Hitler’s activities were concerned. They were nothing more than a useful propaganda tool. By invoking referendums, Hitler attempted to secure for himself – mostly in the eyes of foreign countries – recognition as a national leader who enjoys his people’s support.
EN
The subject of this article is a process of emergence of Hitler’s leadership position in the Nazi organization since his joining the miniature Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP), which was NSDAP predecessor, in September of 1919 until the failed attempt by National Socialists to overthrow legitimate German government at the beginning of November 1923 (Munich Putsch). From the beginning of his political activity after World War One, Hitler determinedly and doggedly tried to achieve a commanding status. The fecklessness of DAP leaders was one of the main reasons why Hitler decided to join this party. He pretty soon recognized that the lack of leadership qualities among DAP co-creators – Karl Harrer and Anton Drexler – could be seen as an opportunity for him to realize his political ambitions and aspirations. The management of DAP was not willing, however, to become subject to Hitler, though his propaganda capabilities were widely appreciated. Only after two years had passed, the future Führer managed – as a result of „palace revolution” in August of 1921 – to reach a position of the first chairman of the party which changed its name to NSDAP in 1920. Since then, Hitler consistently strengthened his position in the party, surrounding himself with activists who favored his leadership aims and who, mostly thanks to the efficient use of propaganda mechanisms, started to create a cult with Adolph Hitler as a central figure. Dietrich Eckhart, Herman Esser and Alfred Rosenberg particularly contributed to Hitler’s perception, power and authority in the Nazi movement in the early twenties. Hitler himself also attempted to create an impression of the Providential Man. With this purpose in mind, he was using his good enough knowledge and understanding of political psychology. Even before Munich Putsch, he was known as a talented orator and organizer. He employed different methods in order to increase the party membership and enhance NSDAP influence in the Nationalist movement. After the failure of the putsch in Bavaria’s capital city, Hitler temporarily lost – while remaining in prison – his position as the Nazi leader but regained it quite soon (at the beginning of 1925) when he was again appointed the chairman of NSDAP. Since that time his power and authority among National Socialists were systematically on the rise. Not long before taking up the post of Reich Chancellor (30 January 1933) he was universally respected, idolized and almost worshipped by the Nazis and many other Nationalists. At that time he already doubtlessly achieved a status of charismatic leader-position and image he was even more vigorously trying to cultivate after 1933.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2021
|
tom 53
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nr 4
123-146
EN
The author critically analyses Krzysztof Rak’s book Poland. Hitler’s Unfulfilled Ally (2019). The monograph attempts a new look at Polish-German relations between 1933 and 1939. However, it contains simplifications and unauthorised interpretations. The author uncritically accepts the German efforts for an anti-Soviet alliance with Poland as reality. He unjustifiably suggests that the Polish and German governments agreed on a joint modus operandi against Czechoslovakia in 1938.
PL
Autor krytycznie analizuje książkę Krzysztofa Raka Polska – niespełniony sojusznik Hitlera (2019). Monografia stanowi próbę nowego spojrzenia na stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1933–1939. Zawiera jednak uproszczenia i nieuprawnione interpretacje. Autor bezkrytycznie przyjmuje za rzeczywistość niemieckie starania o antysowiecki sojusz z Polską. Bezpodstawnie sugeruje ustalenie między rządami Polski i Niemiec wspólnego modus operandi przeciw Czechosłowacji w 1938 r. Politykę polską w 1939 r. przedstawia w sposób karykaturalny.
PL
Ustrój totalitarny, w przeciwieństwie do systemu demokracji przedstawicielskiej (opartego na bezosobowych procedurach), jest mocno związany z pozycją przywódcy,. Stąd też kult jednostki nie tylko służy utrwaleniu władzy totalitarnego przywódcy, ale przyczynia się do legitymizacji całego systemu politycznego. W artykule zaprezentowano propagowanie i tworzenie kultu jednostki wokół trzech przywódców państw totalitarnych: Stalina, Mussoliniego i Hitlera.
EN
The totalitarian system, in contrast to the system of representative democracy (based on impersonal procedures), is strongly related to the position of the leader. Therefore, the cult of the individual not only serves to consolidate the power of a totalitarian leader, but also contributes to the legitimacy of the entire political system. The article presents the propagation and creation of the cult of the individual around three leaders of totalitarian states: Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler.
EN
The article is dedicated to the understanding of the Nazi anthropology as an element of the quasi-religious concept. Adolf Hitler’s racial theory unequivocally rejected the human status of persons not belonging to the Caucasian race, labeling them as Untermensch (“under-man”). Such an attitude was due to several prerequisites. However, the core reason is manifested not in the rational sphere. In the twentieth century, concepts of quasi-religions and political religions became widespread due to the reign of two totalitarian ideologies in Eurasia—Nazism and Communism. Numerous scholars emphasized the fact that these ideologies performed religious functions thus occupying an intellectual space at the interface between the religious and the secular. Quasi-religion adherents may be equally fanatic as religious radicals. Questions about whether this similarity is mere coincidence or whether quasi-religions are derivatives from traditional religions and the meaning of this problem today deserve close attention.
EN
This article presents the analysis of thematic, historical and political spectrums of the “Ukrainian” content in the German newspapers and magazines of the interwar period. As a source base for this scientific work the authors analyze the newspaper and magazine journalism of that time, which allows not only to keep certain historical episodes (konstatives), but also (in some way) to reflect the views, needs, intentions, challenges, promises as well as German political and social factors in terms of disillusionment of Ukrainian patriotic forces (performatives). Nazism and Bolshevism skillfully used propaganda to achieve predatory targets, therefore it should be a lesson for the future generations, also the importance of conceptional media in Ukraine and Poland should increase.
EN
The paper is dedicated to the analysis of Nazi economic policy on occupied Soviet territories of Ukraine and Belarus in the period from 1941 to 1943. The principles of applied economic policy and its possible influence on the achievement of designated targets are analyzed. The paper contains data about total volumes of extracted raw materials, expropriated food and working force by Nazis on this territories and their role in the supply system of German army and satisfaction of national economy’s needs. Benefits expected from economic occupation of the Soviet territory were not realized. Efficiency and goals achievement were complicated by evacuation, collaboration, guerrilla activities, and the concept of the occupation policy.
EN
The aim of the essay is to analyse the most important circumstances which could affected the final Stalin’s decision leading to the ratification of Soviet-German political relations at the end of the thirties. Among others to verify the affirmation that it was a calculated deal with exact objectives in the case of Ribbentrop-Molotov‘s Pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23rd, 1939 was a calculated accord with precise objectives when in both systems common national interests, which consisted also in the partition of Poland, overshadowed their ideological differences. This paper outlines the circumstances of the negotiations, the main actors, and motives leading to the creation of the agreement. A part of the research is the analysis of importance and direct consequences of the German-Soviet Pact. The political alliance provided Germany both a feeling of relative security in the war against Poland and neutrality of the second party, including the guarantee of a series of commodities necessary for the war economy. The defensive alliance of Western powers became inefficient. The August and September pacts enabled the Soviet Union to restrict the scope and authority of the Nazi regime in the East European territory by which minimalized the war threat temporarily. They at the same time ensured that Stalin had an approach to strategical economical areas at the Western border, not unnecessary even for his defensive. KEYWORDS
EN
The article examines Hitler’s views on Poland and Poles from the emergence of the Nazism in 1919 till the end of the Second World War. Almost from the very beginning of his political activity the attitude of the NSDAP leader was areflection of his concept of foreign policy based as it was on nationalistic and racist premises. Its objective was to ensure a“living space” for the Germans in the eastern part of Europe through the Reich’s conquest of the vast territory of the Soviet Union. In those far-reaching plans for territorial conquest, for many years (almost till the end of the inter-war period) Hitler attributed to Poland the role of Germany’s supporter and ally, though he also laid some territorial claims to Poland’s territory (the question of Gdańsk and the Pomeranian corridor). Even before Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich, many of his statements contained clear anti-Slavic sentiments. However, until about 1938 he did not treat Poland as an enemy of the Reich — in contrast to his attitude to the Soviet Union and France. As long as Hitler hoped for Poland’s accession to the pact against the Soviet Union, he refrained from any military action against Poland. Yet already from the mid-1930s he saw Poland as an obstacle to the implementation of Germany’s imperialist plans in the eastern part of Europe. Hitler’s negative attitude to Poland and Poles was revealed fully during World War II, when he launched his brutal policy aiming to exterminate the Polish nation.
EN
The author presents available archival and published Italian sources devoted to the last weeks of peace between March/April and September 1939. The materials provide clear evidence that in late spring and summer 1939, an arrangement or agreement betweenPoland and Germany was impossible. The main reason was Hitler’s determined political and economic will to attack and destroy Poland.
PL
Autor przedstawia dostępne materiały archiwalne i opublikowane źródła włoskie poświęcone ostatnim tygodniom pokoju w okresie od marca/kwietnia do września 1939 r. Z materiałów jednoznacznie wynika, że pod koniec wiosny i latem 1939 r. niemożliwe było zawarcie porozumienia lub umowy między Polską i Niemcami. Wynikało to przede wszystkim z politycznej i gospodarczej determinacji Hitlera dążącego do przeprowadzenia ataku i zniszczenia Polski.
PL
Bal w Operze autorstwa Juliana Tuwima jest jedną z najbardziej niezwykłych apokaliptycznych wizji, powstałych w latach poprzedzających wybuch II wojny światowej. Kiedy Tuwim zaczynał pisać swe dzieło, optymizm charakteryzujący lata 20. XX wieku już dawno wygasł. Pogorszenie klimatu politycznego Tuwim odczuł szczególnie boleśnie. Dla kogoś, kto uważał się zarówno za Polaka, jak i za Żyda, niezwykle dotkliwa była wszechobecna atmosfera antysemityzmu, rozniecana przez dojście Hitlera do władzy w Niemczech, utrzymywanie się kryzysu gospodarczego i gotowość części obozu rządowego do przyjęcia antysemickiego programu. Bal w Operze stanowi brutalny opis zdeprawowanej faszystowskiej dyktatury, którego autor jest na skraju rozpaczy. W przeciwieństwie do niektórych innych polskich pisarzy „katastroficznych” z lat 30. XX wieku, takich jak Gałczyński i Witkiewicz, Tuwim akcję tej faszystowskiej dystopii umieszcza właśnie w Polsce. Jest to poemat apokaliptyczny, w którym makabryczna wizja Tuwima dotycząca niegodziwych występków skorumpowanego społeczeństwa spaja się z zapowiedzią jego zniszczenia.
XX
Julian Tuwim’s Bal w Operze (A Ball at the Opera) is one of the most remarkable of the apocalyptic visions which were produced in the doom-laden years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. When he began to write it the optimism which had characterized the 1920s had long been dissipated. The worsening political climate was particularly painfully felt by Tuwim. As someone who considered himself both Polish and Jewish the pervasive climate of antisemitism, stimulated as it was by Hitler’s coming the power in Germany, the persistence of the depression and the willingness of a section of the government camp to adopt an antisemitic platfrom was extremely painful to experience. A Ball at the Opera is a savage description of a corrupt fascist dictatorship written by an individual in despair. Unlike some other Polish ‘catastrophist’ writers of the 1930s, such as Gałczyński and Witkiewicz, Tuwim clearly situates this fascist dystopia in Poland. It is an apocalyptic poem where Tuwim’s horror of a corrupt society’s filthy doings fuses with a foreboding of the destruction of that society.
EN
Adolf Hitler and his party, the NSDAP, seduced the German people not only their political ideology, but also their appeal to the then popular myth of the perfect Aryan race. It was the Aryans, the best and most creative of the human races, who, Hitler's followers proclaimed, were to be behind every positive, creative action in human history, behind every great work of art and scientific breakthrough. The Nordic peoples of northern Europe, and especially the Germans, were supposed to be the descendants of the ancient Aryans and as such should take their ancestral place. The article deals with the myth of the Aryans, its incorporation into the theory of human races, and its use by the Nazis to subjugate the Germans and racialize them. It discusses the use of archaeology and archaeological discoveries in particular to lend credence to the Nazi mythology and the narrative built around it, as well as the most spectacular examples of archaeological careers in the Third Reich. When archaeologists were involved on the side of Nazism, they became complicit in the construction of a criminal and genocidal ideology and system of power.
PL
Adolf Hitler i jego partia NSDAP uwiedli naród niemiecki nie tylko swoją ideologią polityczną, lecz także odwołaniem się do popularnego wówczas mitu o doskonałej rasie aryjskiej. Za każdym pozytywnym, twórczym działaniem w historii ludzkości, za każdym wielkim dziełem sztuki i przełomem naukowym mieli stać, jak głosili zwolennicy Hitlera, Aryjczycy, najlepsza i najbardziej twórcza z ras ludzkich. Nordyckie ludy północnej Europy, a zwłaszcza Niemcy, miały być potomkami starożytnych Aryjczyków i jako takie powinny zająć ich miejsce przodków. Artykuł dotyczy mitu Aryjczyków, jego włączenia do teorii ras ludzkich oraz wykorzystania go przez nazistów do podporządkowania Niemców i ich rasizmowi. Omawia wykorzystanie archeologii i odkryć archeologicznych w szczególności do uwiarygodnienia mitologii nazistowskiej i zbudowanej wokół niej narracji, a także najbardziej spektakularne przykłady karier archeologicznych w III Rzeszy. Kiedy archeolodzy zaangażowali się po stronie nazizmu, stali się współwinnymi konstruowania zbrodniczej i ludobójczej ideologii i systemu władzy.
PL
Artykuł podejmuje temat stworzonych przez Ericha Fromma, Theodora Adorno, Hansa Eysencka i Miltona Rokeacha teorii charakteryzujących osobowości szczególnie podatne na wpływ autorytaryzmu, zwalczające demokrację. W jego pierwszej części znajduje się charakterystyka tych osobowości, konkretnie jednostek o charakterze autorytarnym (Erich Fromm), o osobowości autorytarnej (Theodor Adorno), o osobowości twardej (Hans Eysenck) oraz dogmatycznej (Milton Rokeach). W drugiej części artykułu staram się znaleźć cechy wspólne dla tych konstruktów teoretycznych. W większości jest to jednak krytyka błędnego (moim zdaniem) myślenia przy tworzeniu tych teorii. Zauważyłem, że twórcy większości spośród nich, nie tylko opisują typy osobowości szczególnie podatne na wpływ autorytaryzmu, ale przede wszystkim je potępiają. W praktyce sprowadza się to do atakowania skrajnej prawicy. Jednak należy zwrócić uwagę na kilka istotnych kwestii, które negują takie nastawienie. Z autorytaryzmem nie można utożsamiać tylko prawicy. Sam podział prawica– –lewica nie jest zbyt ostry. Z kolei autorytaryzm nie zawsze oznacza brak humanitaryzmu, nietolerancję, prześladowania. Większość powyższych konstruktów teoretycznych wskazuje błędnie, że cechy polityczne człowiek nabywa pod wpływem otoczenia, środowiska. Natomiast nie są one jakoś dziedziczone, uwarunkowane genetycznie. Ponadto uważam, że tylko pewna, mniejsza część społeczeństwa ma sprecyzowane poglądy polityczne. I tylko wśród nich występuje grupa ludzi o skłonnościach autorytarnych. Ta część społeczeństwa, która ma niesprecyzowane poglądy polityczne może koniunkturalnie poprzeć pewną opcję polityczną, nawet autorytarną, jeżeli zapewni ona jej korzyści. Założenie, że polityczne działania społeczeństwa wynikają z wewnętrznych cech jednostek, to kolejny punkt, z którym trudno się zgodzić. W rzeczywistości decyduje skuteczność ekipy rządzącej.
EN
This article addresses the subject of Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno, Hans Eysenck and Milton Rokeache theory characterizing personality particularly susceptible to the influence of authoritarianism, personality that combat democracy. In its first part there is the characteristics of these personalities, specifically authoritarian units (Erich Fromm), with authoritarian personality, hard personality (Hans Eysenck) and dogmatic (Milton Rozeach). The second part of this article is trying to find common features for these theoretical constructs. Mostly, however, it is a criticism of erroneous (in my opinion) thinking when creating these theories. I noticed that the creators of the majority of them not only describe personality types particularly susceptible to the influence of authoritarianism, but above all they condemn them. In practice, this comes down to attacking the extreme right. However, attention should be paid to several important issues that negate this attitude. With authoritarianism, only the right can be identified. The division of the right/left is not very sharp. In turn, authoritarianism does not always mean a lack of humanitarianism, intolerance, and persecution. Most of the above theoretical constructs indicate, in my opinion, it is wrong that the political features of a person acquire under the influence of the environment, the environment. However, they are not somehow inherited, genetically conditioned. In addition, I think that only a certain, smaller part of society has specific political views. And only among them there is a group of people with authoritarian tendencies. This part of a society that has unspecified political views can be a business – related political option, even authoritarian, if this option provides its benefits. The assumption that the political actions of society result from the internal features of individuals is another point with which it is difficult to (me) agree. In fact, the effectiveness of the ruling team decides.
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